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Torture at Home: Borrowing from the Torture 
Convention to Define Domestic Violence   
Claire Wright* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind 
of the oppressed.1 
Men are taught to apologize for their weaknesses.  Women for their 
strengths.2 
Fourteen-year-old Josh stared mindlessly at his computer screen, 
unsure of how to respond to his father’s latest angry rant.  He had sent his 
father an email the night before, asking if they could postpone their 
weekend camping trip.  Josh wanted to attend his friend’s birthday party 
and get a good night’s sleep in a proper bed before his upcoming final 
exams.  To put it mildly, his father had not responded well to Josh’s 
 
* Claire Wright is an associate professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, in San 
Diego, California, where she teaches property law and a variety of international law courses.  
On February 27, 2009, she coordinated the Ninth Annual Women in the Law Conference 
entitled Confronting Domestic Violence Head On: The Role of Power in Domestic 
Relationships and 2009 Ruth Bader Ginsburg Lecture at Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  
At this conference, she first presented the concept for this article. 
 1. Alistair Boddy-Evans, Quotes: Stephen (Steve) Bantu Biko, ABOUT.COM, 
http://africanhistory.about.com/od/bikosteve/p/qts_biko.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012); see 
also STEVE BIKO & AELRED STUBBS, I WRITE WHAT I LIKE, 68, 92, 103–04 (Aelred Stubbs 
ed., 1978).  Biko was an anti-apartheid activist in South Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Background Steve Biko: Martyr of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 1997, 
10:19 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/37448.stm.  In 1978, he was severely beaten 
and died while in police custody.  Id.  He was thirty years old.  Id.  
 2. This quotation has often been attributed to Lois Wyse (see e.g., VALERIE YOUNG, THE 
SECRET THOUGHTS OF SUCCESSFUL WOMEN: WHY CAPABLE PEOPLE SUFFER FROM THE 
IMPOSTER SYNDROME AND HOW TO THRIVE IN SPITE OF IT  63 (Crown Business 2011); 
CONNER BROWN GLASER & BARBARA STEINBERG SMALLEY, MORE POWER TO YOU: HOW 
WOMEN CAN COMMUNICATE 7 (Warner Books 1995); KAREN WEEKS, WOMEN KNOW 
EVERYTHING! 181 (Quirk Books 2011); ALICE D. LAVIOLETTE & OLA W. BARNETT, IT 
COULD HAPPEN TO ANYONE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN STAY 15 (Sage Publications, Inc. 2d 
ed. 2000).  Wyse was the president of one of the largest advertising companies in the world, 
and she was the author of more than sixty-five books.  Claudia H. Deutsch, Lois Wyse, Ad 
Wordsmith and Prolific Author, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/07/business/07wyse.html.  For thirteen years, she also 
wrote a column about her life and family for the magazine Good Housekeeping entitled The 
Way We Are.  Id.  She died in 2007 at the age of eighty.  Id.  
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request.  He had demanded that Josh keep their “camping date” and called 
Josh “selfish,” “lazy,” (presumably, he thought Josh did not like to hike or 
“rough it” in the wild), “a mama’s boy,” and a number of other demeaning 
names and put-downs.  The truth was that Josh liked camping and hiking 
and desperately wanted to have a good relationship with his father.  At the 
same time, he knew from his fourteen years of experience with his father 
that the only way to get along with him was to agree with him 100 percent 
of the time.  Ironically, though his father had called him a “wimp” in his 
reply message, Josh felt like a wimp only when he gave in to his father’s 
demands.  He knew that his resistance was futile.  As he felt a nauseating 
combination of frustration, depression, and fear of failure, Josh typed “ok” 
and hit the send button.   
On Friday afternoon, Josh’s father surprised him by picking him up 
directly at school.  Josh pleaded with his father to drive by his mother’s 
house so he could pick up some study materials that he had planned to 
review that weekend, but his father glared at him and asked, “You’re not 
going to start that up again, are you?”  Josh did not even know what “that” 
was, but he knew better than to ask for clarification.  When they arrived at 
their campsite, Josh’s father instructed Josh to set up the tent, and then set 
off to find a “nice, long hike” for them to take the next day.  Josh tried to 
set up the tent but could not find any directions, and various pieces of 
equipment appeared to be missing.  He sat down at a picnic table next to 
his father’s van and waited for him to return to their campsite.  
When Josh’s father returned, he started shouting at Josh at the top of 
his lungs, accusing him of being lazy and disrespectful.  Josh was terribly 
embarrassed as a number of neighboring campers heard the commotion and 
looked over at them.  Josh’s father then said that Josh must be “brain-dead” 
because he had not realized that the broom they had brought with them in 
the back of the van actually served as the tent’s center pole.  He then 
handed Josh the broom and instructed him to hold it over his head in a 
horizontal position and take ten laps around the long circular driveway of 
the campground, saying this run would help Josh remember how to 
assemble the tent in the future.  As Josh was a member of the junior varsity 
football team at his school, the run did not take a big toll on him physically.  
The shame he felt as he passed other campers on his run, however, was 
excruciating.   
After two long, mostly silent days of hiking, Josh and his father sat 
down to have their last meal before they drove back home.  While eating, 
they noticed that the family at the campsite next door was packing up to 
return home as well.  The father said he was going to fill their van with gas 
and would return in half an hour to an hour, and then the mother and two 
girls left the campsite for several minutes.  After ensuring there were no 
witnesses, Josh’s father instructed Josh to grab the family’s big cooler and 
radio that were sitting on the nearby picnic table.  Without thinking, Josh 
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said, “Dad, that’s really crazy.”  His dad towered over him and, in a low, 
threatening voice, said that if Josh knew what was good for him, he would 
do exactly as he was told or he would find himself walking all the way 
back home.  With great trepidation, Josh went over to their neighbor’s 
campsite, placed the radio on top of the cooler, and carried both back to his 
and his father’s campsite.   
Just as he was heading back, the father of the family next door pulled 
up in their van and asked Josh what he was doing.  Josh looked over to his 
father for guidance as to what to say, and his father then apologized 
profusely to this man and explained that he had been having a lot of trouble 
with Josh lately.  He said Josh had probably intended to steal the items, if 
only for a prank.  In fact, Josh’s father remarked to the neighbor, “You 
probably even heard me discipline him on Friday night.”  The man nodded 
sympathetically, looked Josh straight in the eye, and said, “Now you listen 
to me, son—I’m going to do your dad a big favor and not call the cops.  
But you’d better start respecting other people, including your father.  Your 
life is just going to keep going straight downhill until you can be honest 
and admit that you’re the real problem.” 
As unpleasant as Josh’s life is, he nonetheless possesses a number of 
advantages over most abused children and adolescents in this country.3  To 
begin with, on some level, he understands that his father is abusing him.  In 
addition, he is old enough to testify in his parents’ child custody dispute.4  
Perhaps he even lives in one of the approximately twenty-five states that 
recognizes a rebuttable presumption against granting sole or joint custody 
to a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence in the recent past.5  It is 
possible that his father’s email communications can be admitted as 
evidence of his father’s mental abuse in his parents’ custody proceeding.6  
As indicated, most minors who are being abused by a parent or other 
 
 3. Josh and the above-described scenario with his father are fictional, but unfortunately, 
the types of abuse revealed in this vignette occur on a daily basis to many children in the 
U.S.  See Assessing the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children, HELIUM.COM, http:// 
www.helium.com/knowledge/73119-assessing-the-effects-of-domestic-violence-on-children 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2012).   
 4. In a custody proceeding in California, the court must permit a child fourteen years or 
older to testify in a custody proceeding if she or he desires, unless the court determines that 
doing so is not in the child’s best interests, and in that case the court must explain that 
finding on the record.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(c) (West 2012).  In addition, a child who is 
less than fourteen years of age may testify in a custody proceeding, if the court determines 
that permitting the child is in the child’s best interests.  Cal. Fam. Code § 3042(d) (West 
2012).  Moreover, whenever any child is precluded from testifying, the court must provide 
an alternative means of obtaining input from the child regarding his or her preferences.  
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(e) (West 2012). 
 5. See ABACDV, infra note 351.  
 6. PETER JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 17 (“Domestic violence victims . . . [m]any times . . . cannot supply 
the evidence to support their claim.  Even when they do, judges and lawyers may not find it 
relevant to determining issues related to custody and visitation . . . .”). 
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guardian are not so lucky.  Many such minors are too young to testify in a 
custody proceeding, and some of them may not even understand that they 
are being abused.  Additionally, many minors are likely to live in a state 
that either: 1) does not respect a rebuttable presumption against granting 
joint custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence or 2) does 
respect such a rebuttable presumption but likewise recognizes a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of granting joint custody to both parents so that these 
two presumptions counter each other.7  At the same time, even an 
adolescent in a state such as California faces a formidable challenge in 
convincing a judge or custody mediator that custody should be denied to a 
parent who has been verbally or emotionally abusive.  To begin with, 
mental abuse is notoriously difficult to prove, given that it not only 
typically occurs in private, but it also does not leave telltale scars that other 
witnesses may see.8  Even more importantly, though, the definition of 
domestic violence utilized by the overwhelming majority of states does not 
encompass mental abuse (other than mental abuse caused by an abuser’s 
threat of future physical harm or sexual assault, refusal to refrain from 
contact with the victim, or invasion of the victim’s privacy).9  As a result, 
even if Josh lives in a state that recognizes a rebuttable presumption against 
granting sole or joint custody to a parent who has committed domestic 
violence, a custody court today likely would order Josh to spend significant 
time alone with his father in a post-separation custody arrangement.10   
 
 7. See ABACDV, infra note 351. 
 8. George L. Jantz et al., HEALING THE SCARS OF EMOTIONAL ABUSE 11 (Revell rev. ed. 
1995) (“The signs of emotional abuse . . . are easier to overlook.  There is no scar tissue to 
stretch, no bruises to yellow and heal, no gaping wound to point to.”); Catharine Dowda, 
INVISIBLE SCARS: HOW TO STOP, CHANGE OR END PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE 7 (New Horizon 
Press 2009) (“We are the walking wounded, but you can’t see that by looking at us.  The 
damage is not physical.  You will not see bruises, cuts, breaks or marks.  We hurt from the 
psychological impairment of abusive words, actions, thoughts and deeds.  We seek to heal 
our wounds and form strong, healthy invisible scars.”); see also Anna Marie Bowman, What 
is Child Abuse and How to Spot It, HUBPAGES (Aug. 28, 2012), http://anna-marie-
bowman.hubpages.com/hub/What-is-Child-Abuse-and-How-to-Spot-it (“Emotional abuse is 
by far the hardest to recognize, the most socially accepted, and the most difficult to prove.... 
The signs manifest in behavior.”); Peter Allen, Shouting at Your Wife May Get You a 
Criminal Record in France, MAILONLINE, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/article-1240770/France-introduce-new-law-banning-psychological-violence-
marriages.html (explaining that since psychological abuse leaves no visible scars, “[m]any 
believe the offence [of psychological abuse in an intimate relationship] will be impossible to 
prove,” and indicating that the police and courts will not be able to distinguish “rudeness” 
from “psychological abuse”).   
 9. See infra Section VI (Definitions of Domestic Violence Utilized in the Fifty States); 
ABACDV, infra note 351. 
 10. Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson, The Role of Family Courts in Domestic Violence: The 
U.S. Experience, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: STRATEGIES FOR 
INTERVENTION 191 (Peter G. Jaffe et al., eds., Guilford Press, 2004) (“The more recent 
rebuttable presumption statutes tend to be more specific about what level of domestic 
violence must occur to trigger the effects of the statute . . . .  [A]t the same time, they offer 
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 This article utilizes a psychological or behavioral perspective to 
analyze the domestic violence laws in this country and it concludes that, at 
the very least, states should amend their child custody laws to include 
“mental abuse,” a term which is used in this article to refer to verbal, 
emotional, and psychological abuse, each of which is discussed further 
below.  Section II of this article explains the behavioral approach to law, 
while Section III provides background information regarding the 
phenomenon of domestic violence.  Section IV discusses the major theories 
of domestic violence that have been proposed to date.  Section V explains 
the psychological theory of domestic violence, which strongly suggests that 
the legal system should implement more effective deterrents and sanctions 
for the mental abuse of one family member by another, especially when the 
victim is a child.  Section VI discusses the domestic violence laws in effect 
in the U.S. states, paying particular attention to how states’ child custody 
laws treat domestic violence in general and mental abuse in particular.  
Section VII addresses possible constitutional objections to states’ inclusion 
of mental abuse in their definitions of domestic violence.  Section VIII 
reviews legal prohibitions against other forms of abuse of power, including 
bullying, hazing, torture, and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment 
or punishment. Section IX sets forth a definition of domestic violence that 
incorporates mental abuse.  Finally, Section X concludes by proposing that 
states adopt a new, psychologically-sound definition of domestic violence 
that encompasses all forms of mental abuse, at least for use in child custody 
proceedings.   
II. BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO THE LAW  
Psychological issues have influenced U.S. jurisprudence for hundreds 
of years.11  This is a natural enough state of affairs, given that the primary 
role of law is to regulate human behavior,12 and the word “psychology” 
means “the science of mind and behavior.”13  In the 1970s, however, 
 
no relief in cases where the abusive parent uses tactics of power and control that may be 
equally harmful but that do not meet the statutory requirement to trigger the presumption.”). 
 11. See, e.g., ROBERT G. MEYER & CHRISTOPHER M. WEAVER, LAW AND MENTAL 
HEALTH: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 116 (2005) (“Like much of our legal tradition, the 
ruling of McNaughton was derived from English law.  As early as the 1500s, English 
common law had recognized that ‘lunatics and idiots’ whose mentality approached that of a 
‘wild beast’ could not be held accountable for otherwise illegal conduct.”). 
 12. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 405, 412 (2005) (“[O]ne can make a strong case that all law exists to effect changes 
in human behavior[.]”).  
 13. Psychology Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/psychology (last visited Aug. 30, 2012); see also American Psychological 
Association: Support Center, How Does the APA Define Psychology, AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGY ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/support/about/apa/psychology.aspx#answer 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (defining psychology as “the study of the mind and behavior” 
and elaborating that “[t]he discipline embraces all aspects of the of the human experience—
from the functions of the brain to the actions of nations, from child development to care for 
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recognition of the new interdisciplinary field of “psychology and the law,” 
which has been described as “involv[ing] the application of scientific and 
professional aspects of psychology to questions and issues relating to 
law,”14 began.15  The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral 
Science explains that this new field of study is intended to increase “the 
administration of justice in our society.”16  In this respect, the behavioral 
approach to law can be viewed as a sub-set of both critical legal theory17 
and “law and society” legal theory.18  
Behavioral theory was largely responsible for the American Law 
Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code which relaxed the two-part insanity test 
set forth in the case of Queen v. M’Naghten.19  That test provides that a 
defendant was insane, if “at the time of committing the act the party 
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the 
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as 
not to know that what he was doing was wrong.”20  The Model Penal Code 
states that a person lacks the capacity to commit a proscribed act either 
when he or she cannot understand that the act is prohibited, or, despite his 
 
the aged.  In every conceivable setting from scientific research centers to mental health 
services, ‘the understanding of behavior’ is the enterprise of psychologists.”); DENNIS COON 
& JOHN O. MITTERER, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY: GATEWAYS TO MIND AND BEHAVIOR 
12 (2007) (defining the discipline of psychology as “the scientific study of behavior and 
mental processes.”).   
 14. Careers in Psychology and Law: Overview of Psychology and Law, AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGY-LAW SOCIETY, http://www.ap-ls.org/academics/careersoverview.html (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
 15. Id.  For a good summary of the development of the law and psychology movement, 
see James R.P. Ogloff et al., Education and Training in Psychology and Law/Criminal 
Justice: Historical Foundations, Present Structures, and Future Developments, 23 CRIM, 
JUST. AND BEHAV. 200, 203 (1996), available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=publicpolicytomkins.   
 16. Forensic Psychology, in THE CORSINI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 590, 591 (W. Edward Craighead et al., eds., 3rd ed. 2001). 
 17. “Critical legal studies (CLS) is a theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms 
and standards in legal theory and practice.  Proponents of this theory believe that logic and 
structure attributed to the law grow out of the power relationships of the society.”  Critical 
Legal Studies: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu 
/wex/critical_legal_theory (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). “Critical theory building in law has 
developed considerably during the past two decades and . . . for applications in law and 
psychiatry . . . .”  B.A. ARRIGO, PUNISHING THE MENTALLY ILL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 153 (2002) (internal citations omitted).  
 18. The “law and society” philosophy of law, stated most generally, holds that “[l]aw is a 
mirror of society that functions to maintain social order.”  Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law and 
Society, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 368, 368 (Dennis 
Patterson, ed., 2d ed. 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract 
_id=1345204. 
 19. Queen v. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843) available at http://www.bailii.org 
/cgibin/markup.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKHL/1843/J16.html&query=Queen+and+v.+and+M'N
aghten&method=boolean.   
 20. Id. at 722.  A good history of the Queen v. M’Naghten case and the U.S. 
Government’s adoption of the insanity test set forth in M’Naghten can be found in DAVID C. 
BRODY ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 162 (2d ed. 2011). 
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or her understanding of the proscription, nonetheless is incapable of 
conforming his or her conduct to it.21  The ALI explained that “[t]he law 
must recognize that when there is no black and white it must content itself 
with different shades of gray.”22  Most states have since incorporated the 
ALI’s Model Penal Code provision on the diminished capacity defense into 
their criminal codes.23  In addition, the law and psychology movement has 
successfully advocated for recognition of mentally disabled people’s legal 
rights.24  Furthermore, legal scholars and psychologists have been 
instrumental in demonstrating the general unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony,25 and numerous DNA exonerations of innocent individuals have 
confirmed that many eyewitness identifications are flawed.26  Some 
scholars have even proposed a new Model Penal Code that would require 
the exclusion of eyewitness testimony in any criminal prosecution in which 
police personnel failed to follow a strict set of procedures.27  Practicing 
lawyers and legal scholars have in fact utilized tenets of psychology (as 
well as neuroscience, the study of “how nervous systems [including the 
brain] are organized, and how they function to generate behavior”28) to 
benefit society in numerous additional ways.  For example, they have 
assisted in the formation of litigation settlement strategies,29 supported the 
 
 21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1) (2011) (“A person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”).   
 22. People v. Drew, 22 Cal.3d 333, 342 (1978), superseded by statue as stated in People 
v. Skinner 39 Cal.3d 765, 768–69 (1985) (citing United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 
618–19 (2d Cir. 1966)(quoting ALI, MODEL PEN. CODE (Tent. Drafts, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, p. 
158.)).   
 23. Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal 
Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 1, 12 (2005).  
 24. See generally  MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL 
DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 1–19 (Oxford University Press 2012); 
PETER BARLETT ET AL., MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 254 
(2006) (“Only in the last few decades has mental disability law has [sic] come into its own 
as a field of international human rights law.  The United Nations Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness, promulgated at the end of 1991, was the first 
major international instrument to articulate these rights in any detail.”).   
 25. See, e.g., Laura Engelhardt, The Problem with Eyewitness Testimony: Commentary 
on a Talk by George Fisher and Barbara Tversky, 1 STAN. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 25, 26 (1999). 
 26. Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (“Eyewitness 
misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions nationwide, playing a 
role in nearly 75% of convictions overturned through DNA testing.”).  
 27. Michael J. Saks et al., Toward a Model Act for the Prevention of Erroneous 
Convictions, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 672–74 (2001). 
 28. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (Dale Purves et al., eds., 4th ed. 2007). 
 29. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New 
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 77, 84, n.35 (1997) (in part discussing, 
and in turn quoting ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & LEE ROSS, INTRODUCTION TO BARRIERS TO 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 10–19 (Kenneth J. Arrowet et al., eds., 1995) to the effect that 
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creation of alternative dispute mechanisms for emotionally charged legal 
disputes such as contested child custody proceedings,30 and successfully 
promoted the legal system’s recognition of the disease model over the 
moral deficiency model of addictions.31  Domestic violence unquestionably 
constitutes aberrant human behavior, consisting, as it does, of a person 
somehow injuring one of his or her supposed “loved ones.”  Therefore, 
utilization of a behavioral perspective to analyze the available legal 
remedies and sanctions available for domestic violence victims is 
particularly apt.   
III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 
In the twenty-first century, domestic violence continues to be one of 
the most misunderstood crimes.  Although commentators generally agree 
that the financial cost of domestic violence is too high,32 confusion and 
debate abound regarding many other aspects of domestic violence.  For 
example, its definition, incidence, gender symmetry, and cause(s) are all 
highly controversial.  Each of these issues is discussed below.   
A. TYPES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 The term “domestic violence” is a creation of the state legislatures.  
In the 1970s, states began to adopt statutes addressing “spousal abuse.”33  
After it became clear that persons other than spouses or former intimate 
partners could be subjected to violence in relationships as well, states 
began to adopt statutes specifically dedicated to the various forms of 
violence that can occur in the context of domestic relationships.34  These 
statutes often use the terms “domestic violence” and “domestic abuse” 
interchangeably,35 and, given the variation among states regarding legally 
 
certain “cognitive and motivational processes . . . [can] cause the rejection of agreements 
which ‘seemingly meet the requirements of rational self-interest.’”). 
 30. Ludwig F. Lowenstein, The Value of Mediation in Child Custody Disputes (Recent 
Research 1996–2001), 166 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 739, 739 (2000) (reporting that research 
strongly supports the increased use of mediation in child custody disputes). 
 31. See, e.g., Robert G. Meyer & Christopher M. Weaver, LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH: A 
CASE-BASED APPROACH 207–12 (2005) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of 
the disease model of addictions in the case of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).)   
 32. See infra Section III.B (Costs of Domestic Violence).   
 33. EVA S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 8–9, 89, 109–10 (3rd ed. 2003) [hereinafter BUZAWA]; see also Jennifer 
Thompson, Comment, Who’s Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing a Traditional 
Paradigm in the Context of Specialised Domestic Violence Court Programs, 56 ME. L. REV. 
407, 417–18 (2004).  
 34. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 111. 
 35. Cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (2010) (LexisNexis) (defining “domestic abuse” in 
Arkansas’ Domestic Abuse Act of 1991) and ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-9-113 (2012) 
(LexisNexis) (entitled “Domestic violence training” requiring all new law enforcement 
officers in Arkansas to complete at least twenty hours of training in “domestic violence” and 
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recognized domestic relationships and crime definitions, these statutes tend 
to define “domestic abuse” or “domestic violence” very generally as 
“abuse” or “violence” (i.e., a specifically proscribed act) inflicted by one 
member of a defined “domestic relationship” against another, and then 
further define “abuse” and “domestic relationship” in separate statutory 
provisions.36   
The American Psychological Association’s (APA) Presidential Task 
Force on Violence and the Family “defined family violence and abuse as 
including a range of physical, sexual, and emotional maltreatment by one 
family member against another[,]”37 and clarified that “the term family 
includes a variety of relationships beyond those of blood or marriage, in 
recognition that similar dynamics of abuse may occur in these 
relationships.”38  Numerous domestic violence experts and government 
agencies are in accord with the APA’s general statement regarding 
domestic violence.39  For example, psychologist and domestic violence 
expert Daniel Sonkin states that “most advocates and professionals agree 
that violence manifests in three general forms, physical, sexual and 
psychological . . . .”40  Similarly, the Office of Violence on Women 
(OVW), a U.S. Department of Justice agency, has stated that “[d]omestic 
violence can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological 
actions or threats of actions that influence another person.”41  The OVW 
has also clarified that such psychological actions can include destruction of 
pets or personal property as well as forced isolation of the victim.42  The 
U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women likewise 
 
twenty hours of training in “child abuse,” and specifying that some of the topics covered 
will be “[t]he dynamics of domestic abuse[,]” “The Domestic Abuse Act of 1991[,]” and 
“[d]omestic abuse victim interview techniques[.]”). 
 36. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6203, 6211 (West 2012). 
 37. VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY: REPORT OF THE APA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON 
VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION 1 (1996), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/pii/pubsonviolence.html (last 
accessed Feb. 2, 2012).  “The American Psychological Association’s Presidential Task 
Force on Violence and the Family was convened to bring psychological research and 
clinical experience to bear on the troubling problem of violence in the family and to make 
recommendations for solutions.”  Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Joseph S. Volpe, Effects of Domestic Violence on Children and Adolescents: An 
Overview, THE AM. ACAD. OF EXPERTS IN TRAUMATIC STRESS, INC., http://www.aaets. 
org/article8.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013); DIANE ELMORE, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 
PUB. INTEREST GOV’T RELATIONS OFFICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, available at 
http://www.apa.org/about/gr/issues/women/violence.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).  
 40. Daniel Jay Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment in Domestic Violence 
Perpetrator Treatment Programs: Multiple Perspectives, www.danielsonkin.com/ 
PsychAb.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Sonkin, Defining Psychological 
Maltreatment]. 
 41. What is Domestic Violence?, OFFICE OF VIOLENCE ON WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).  
 42. Id. 
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defines “violence against women” as “any act of gender-based violence 
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private 
life.”43  Each of these types of abuse (physical, sexual, emotional, 
psychological, and economic) is discussed further below.  
According to Sonkin, “there is fairly consistent agreement as to what 
behaviors are included in the physical violence category.  These acts would 
include a range from the less lethal acts of grabbing and pushing to the 
more lethal acts of choking, punching and assaults with weapons.”44  The 
Fourth National Incidence Study (NIS-4) on child abuse mandated by the 
U.S. Congress similarly defines physical abuse of a child as “a form of 
maltreatment in which an injury is inflicted on the child by a caregiver 
via various nonaccidental means, including hitting with a hand, stick, strap, 
or other object; punching; kicking; shaking; throwing; burning; stabbing; or 
choking to the extent that demonstrable harm results.”45 A 2008 report 
synthesizing one hundred years of social science research and many 
hundreds of published studies concluded “that physical punishment puts 
children at risk for negative outcomes, including increased mental health 
problems,”46 although forty-nine states clearly permit some forms of 
corporal punishment of a child by the child’s parent or other caretaker 
within the child’s home.47   
Psychologists generally define “sexual abuse” as “any non-consensual 
sexual activity.”48  As non-consensual sexual contact between spouses has 
 
 43. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, ¶ 14, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/ 
res/48/a48r104.htm.  
 44. See, e.g., Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.  A more 
complete list of examples of physical violence compiled by Sonkin include slapping, 
drowning, grabbing, hair-pulling, punching, arm-twisting, pushing, hanging by neck, arms, 
or feet, kicking, handcuffing, kneeing, tying up with rope, choking, clawing or scratching, 
pushing to ground, threatening with gun or knife, biting, using knife or gun, threatening with 
object, burning, using object, spitting, and breaking or throwing objects.  Daniel Sonkin, 
What is Violence?, in DANIEL JAY SONKIN, A COUNSELOR’S GUIDE TO LEARNING TO LIVE 
WITHOUT VIOLENCE (1995), available at http://www.danielsonkin.com/articles/Ch2.html 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2012).    
 45. Angelo P. Giardino & Eileen Giardino, Physical Abuse, MEDSCAPE REFERENCE, 
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/915664-print (last updated Feb. 2, 2012)  (citing AJ 
SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,  FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE 
STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2006)). 
 46. ELIZABETH T. GERSHOFF, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE, REPORT ON PHYSICAL 
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT RESEARCH TELLS US ABOUT ITS EFFECTS ON 
CHILDREN 7 (2008), available at http://www.phoenixchildrens.com/PDFs/principles_and 
_practices-of_effective_discipline.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 47. Id. at 20.  
 48. See, e.g., Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.  
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been considered a crime in all fifty states since 1993,49 state domestic 
violence statutes tend to include sexual assault in their definition of 
domestic violence.50  
 Most psychologists and other domestic violence experts actually use 
the terms “emotional abuse” and “psychological abuse” interchangeably,51 
but those who do not tend to use the former to refer to conduct that 
threatens to impair a victim’s ability to access and express his or her 
emotions, and the latter to refer to conduct that threatens to impair a 
victim’s entire mental faculties.52  For example, one psychologist who 
insists that emotional abuse and psychological abuse are distinct 
phenomena defines emotional abuse of a child as “the sustained, repetitive, 
inappropriate emotional response to the child’s experience of emotion and 
its accompanying expressive behavior”53 and psychological abuse of a 
child as “sustained, inappropriate behaviour which damages, or 
substantially reduces, the creative and developmental potential of crucially 
important mental faculties and mental processes of a child . . . [including]  
intelligence, memory, recognition, perception, attention, language and 
moral development.”54 
Psychologists have articulated psychological and/or emotional abuse in 
a number of different ways.55  For example, the Concise Dictionary of 
Modern Medicine (specifically in the section dedicated to pediatrics) 
defines emotional abuse as “[t]he infliction of . . . coercive, demeaning, or 
overly distant behavior by a parent or other caretaker that interferes with a 
child’s normal social or psychological development.”56  Similarly, it 
defines psychological abuse as “[a] form of mistreatment in which there is 
 
 49. Jennifer A. Bennice & Patricia A. Resick, Marital Rape: History, Research, and 
Practice, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 228, 231 (July 2003).    
 50. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
DEFINITIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 3 (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/defdomvio.pdf. Some 
states, however, include physical force as an element of sexual assault (other than statutory 
rape), and as “many battered women consent to sexual activity for fear of escalating 
physical and psychological violence . . . [,] the behavior itself (sexual intercourse, for 
example) may not be sufficient to [establish sexual abuse or violence in the case of intimate 
partners].”  Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.      
 51. See, e.g., Kieran O’Hagan, Emotional and Psychological Abuse: Problems of 
Definition, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: THE INT’L J. 449, 449 (Apr. 1995); see generally 
MARY SUSAN MILLER, NO VISIBLE WOUNDS: IDENTIFYING NON-PHYSICAL ABUSE OF WOMEN 
BY THEIR MEN (1996). 
   52.  See, e.g., KIERAN O’HAGAN, EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 
28, 33–34 (1993). 
 53. Id. at 28. 
  54.  Id. at 33–34.  
  55. See, e.g., VERA E. MOURADIAN, NAT. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PREVENTION 
RESEARCH CTR, ABUSE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS: DEFINING THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS 
AND TERMS (2000), available at http://www.musc.edu/vawprevention/research/defining.shtml 
[hereinafter MOURADIAN]. 
 56. JOSEPH C. SEGEN, CONCISE DICTIONARY OF MODERN MEDICINE 217 (2002).   
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intent to cause mental or emotional pain or injury . . . [which] includes 
verbal aggression, statements intended to humiliate or infantilize, insults, 
threats of abandonment or institutionalization.”57   
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in a 2003 report, 
stated that “[p]sychological maltreatment—also known as emotional abuse 
and neglect—refers to ‘a repeated pattern of . . . behavior or extreme 
incident(s) that convey[s] to [victims] that they are worthless, flawed, 
unloved, unwanted, endangered, or only of value in meeting another’s 
needs.”58  Yet another definition of emotional abuse, offered by the 
psychologist Steve Hein, is “any kind of abuse that is emotional rather than 
physical in nature . . . [which] can include anything from verbal abuse and 
constant criticism to more subtle tactics, such as intimidation, 
manipulation, and refusal to ever be pleased.”59  As indicated by these 
definitions, verbal abuse is simply a verbal manifestation of emotional 
and/or psychological abuse, and such verbal manifestations can include 
accusing, blaming, blocking and diverting, countering, constantly 
criticizing, discounting, insulting, judging, name-calling, ordering, 
trivializing, and threatening,60 as well as swearing, attacking, demeaning, 
belittling, undermining, denying abuse, and humiliating the victim.61   
In an effort to clarify psychological or emotional abuse and distinguish 
it from simple marital or family discord, numerous researchers and 
domestic violence experts have attempted to more specifically detail the 
characteristic features, and/or provide specific examples, of this type of 
abuse.  The most widely used such measure is the Conflict Tactics Scale, 
which was proposed by sociologist and renowned domestic violence expert 
Murray Straus in 1979.62  This scale was intended to measure four types of 
psychological abuse: passive behaviors, hostile behaviors, threatening 
 
 57. SEGEN, supra note 56, at 549.   
 58. JILL GOLDMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE ON CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE 
FOUNDATION FOR PRACTICE 19 (2003), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/ pubs/user 
manuals/foundation/foundationc.cfm#backten.   
 59. Steve Hein, What is Emotional Abuse?, EMOTIONAL ABUSE, http://eqi.org/eabuse1.htm. 
 60. PATRICIA EVANS, THE VERBALLY ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIP: HOW TO RECOGNIZE IT AND 
HOW TO RESPOND 81–105 (2003).  
 61. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.  See also Cpmcd2000, 
Alec Baldwin to Daughter—“Thoughtless Little Pig . . .,” YOUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgj6NEk9xEw.  In this author’s opinion, actor Alec 
Baldwin’s well-publicized voicemail message for his then-eleven-year-old daughter, calling 
her a ‘thoughtless little pig,’ is the kind of statement, which would constitute verbal abuse.  
ABALK2, That Alec Baldwin Voicemail in Full, GAWKER.COM (Apr. 20, 2007, 4:20 PM), 
http://gawker.com/254061/that-alec-baldwin-voicemail-in-full.  
 62. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40 (citing M. Straus, 
Measuring Intrafamilial Conflict and Violence: The Conflict Tactics (CT) Scale, 45 J. OF 
MARRIAGE AND FAM. 633 (1979)). 
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behaviors, and overt physical violence.63  Specific acts provided as 
examples of such behaviors were:  
Insulted or swore at the other one[;] 
Sulking or refusing to talk to the one [sic][;] 
Stomped out of the room or house (or yard)[;] 
Did or said something to spite the other one[;] 
Threatening to hit or throw something at the other one[;] 
Threw or smashed or hit or kicked something[.]64 
The Conflict Tactics Scale has been criticized for failing to include a 
number of actions that domestic violence experts today consider 
psychological maltreatment, but as Sonkin notes, it was the first attempt to 
specifically define and measure this form of domestic violence and it 
encouraged others to provide even better tools.65  
On the “other end of the spectrum of tools designed to measure 
psychological or emotional abuse is that proposed by the Domestic 
Containment Program in Duluth, Minnesota, which is typically referred to 
as the “Duluth Model” of domestic violence.”66  This model is based on the 
feminist theory of domestic violence, which is discussed further in the 
following section of this article, and which maintains that domestic 
violence stems from the paternalistic nature of U.S. society.67  The well-
known “power and control wheel” utilized in the Duluth Model of domestic 
violence includes eights types of psychological violence and provides non-
exhaustive examples of each such type.68  These eight categories of 
psychological violence are: 
Using coercion and threats (making and/or carrying out threats to 
do something to hurt her, threatening to leave her, to commit 
suicide, or to report her to welfare, making her drop charges, 
making her do illegal things)[;] 
Using economic power (preventing her from getting or keeping a 
job, making her ask for money, giving her an allowance, taking her 
money, not letting her know about or have access to family 
income)[;] 
 
 63. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40.   
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. See infra text accompanying notes 230–32. 
 68. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40. 
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Using male privilege (treating her like a servant, making all the big 
decisions, acting like the master of the castle, being the one to 
define men and women’s roles)[;] 
Using children (making her feel guilty about the children, using the 
children to relay messages, using visitation to harass her, 
threatening to take away the children)[;] 
Minimizing, denying, and blaming (making light of the abuse and 
not taking her concerns about it seriously, saying the abuse didn’t 
happen, shifting responsibility for abusive behavior, saying she 
caused it)[;] 
Using isolation (controlling what she does, who she sees and talks 
to, what she reads and where she goes, limiting her outside 
involvement, using jealousy to justify actions)[;] 
Using emotional abuse (putting her down, making her feel bad 
about herself, calling her names, making her think she’s crazy, 
playing mind games, humiliating her, making her feel guilty)[;] 
Using intimidation (making her afraid by using looks, actions, 
gestures, smashing things, destroying her property, abusing pets, 
displaying weapons)[.]69 
Melanie Shepard and James Campbell since developed what they 
referred to as the “Abusive Behavior Inventory” based on the frequency of 
the above-listed abusive behaviors in a relationship during a six-month 
period.70  They distinguished their Abusive Behavior Inventory from the 
Conflicts Tactics Scale on the basis that their Abusive Behavior Inventory 
is “not framed within the context of conflict, but rather abuse”71 and 
includes sexual abuse as well as additional types of psychological 
maltreatment not included in the Conflict Tactics Scale.72 
In between the “narrow” list of examples of psychological abuse 
provided by the Conflict Tactics Scale and the “broad” list of such 
examples provided by the Duluth Model and the Abusive Behavior 
Inventory, psychologists and other domestic violence experts have 
provided a number of other lists of examples of psychological and/or 
emotional abuse.73  For example, such lists include the Amnesty 
International list of behaviors constituting psychological violence or 
terrorism, which psychologist Lenore Walker proposed be utilized in the 
 
 69. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40. 
 70. Id. (citing Melanie F. Shepard & James A. Campbell, The Abusive Behavior 
Inventory: A Measure of Psychological and Physical Abuse, 7 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 291, 
291–305 (1992)).   
 71. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
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domestic violence context,74 and the Psychological Violence Towards 
Women Inventory, which was developed by Richard Tolman in 1989.75  
The behaviors included in the Amnesty International list of behaviors 
constituting psychological violence or terrorism are: 
Isolation of victim[,] 
Induced debility-producing exhaustion[,] 
Monopolization of perceptions, including obsessiveness and 
possessiveness[,] 
Threats, such as death to self, victim, family or friends, or sham 
executions[,] 
Degradation, including humiliation, denial of victim’s power, and 
verbal name-calling[,] 
Drug or alcohol administration[,] 
Altered states of consciousness produced by a hypnotic state[,] 
Occasional indulgences that keep hope alive that the abuse will 
cease[.]76 
The fifty-eight items included in Tolman’s Psychological Violence 
Towards Women Inventory are similarly grouped into the following six 
categories:  
Attacking her personhood, demeaning, belittling, undermining self-
worth[,] 
Defining her reality, getting her to question her own perceptions 
and judgments[,] 
Controlling her contact with outside world and support systems[,] 
Demanding subservience, complying with rigid sex-role 
expectations within the family[,] 
Withholding positive reinforcers within the relationship[,]  
Threatening nonphysical punishment for noncompliance with 
requests; status and emotional regulation[.]77 
 
 74. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40 (citing L.E.A. WALKER, 
ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR THEORY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 
(1994)). 
 75. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40 (citing R.M. Tolman, 
The Development of a Measure of Psychological Maltreatment of Women by Their Male 
Partners, 4 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 159, 159–78 (1989)).  
 76. Sonkin, Defining Psychological Maltreatment, supra note 40 (also providing specific 
examples of these behaviors in the domestic violence context).  
 77. Id. 
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Whatever general definition of psychological or emotional abuse or 
examples that psychologists and other domestic violence experts have 
provided, they agree that such abuse is almost always perpetrated through a 
“series of acts” or a “course of conduct,” rather than through a single event, 
which torments the victim with anxiety, depression, and self-doubt.78  That 
is, a single communication, such as a derogatory remark made by one 
member in a domestic relationship to another (including a child) is not 
considered emotional or psychological abuse.79  In addition, experts agree 
that communications between parties in a domestic relationship which 
serve a legitimate purpose (e.g., conversations regarding a subject of 
interest, disagreements between couples, and the delivery of disappointing 
or even hurtful news) do not constitute psychological or emotional abuse.80 
Economic abuse is generally defined as behavior that is intended to 
prevent the victim “possessing or maintaining any type of financial self-
sufficiency or resources and enforcing material dependence of the victim 
 
 78. See, e.g., Adam M. Tomison & Joe Tucci, Emotional Abuse: The Hidden Form of 
Maltreatment, 8 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION,  AUSTRALIAN INST. FAM. STUD., 
(1997), available at http://www.aifs.gov.au/nch/pubs/issues/issues8/issues8.html (stating 
that “[a] common feature of most definitions . . . is the basic tenet that isolated instances of 
inappropriate responses do not constitute emotional abuse for the purposes of intervention. 
Unlike physical and sexual abuse, where a single incident may be considered abusive, 
emotional abuse is characterised by a climate or pattern of behaviour(s) occurring over time.  
Thus, ‘sustained’ and ‘repetitive’ are the crucial components of any definition of emotional 
abuse.”); see also Andrew Vacchs, You Carry the Cure in Your Own Heart, PARADE 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 28, 1995, available at http://www.vachss.com/av_dispatches/disp_ 
9408_a.html (author, lawyer, and former sex crimes investigator defining emotional abuse 
as “the systematic diminishment of another.  It may be intentional or subconscious (or both), 
but it is always a course of conduct, not a single event.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Yvonne M. Vissing et al., Verbal Aggression by Parents and Psychosocial 
Problems of Children, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 223, 230 (1991) (stating that 
“occasional verbal aggression does not constitute verbal abuse.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Steven Stosny, Emotional Abuse of Family Members Should be Legal?, 
PSYCHOLOGYTODAY.COM (Feb. 15, 2010, 9:46 AM), http://www.psychologytoday.com 
/print/38335 (renowned U.S. psychologist commenting, with respect to France’s new law 
prohibiting psychological abuse of a spouse or other intimate partner, that “[o]bviously the 
law would not be applicable to ‘passive-aggressive husbands’ or ‘nagging wives’ or 
irrational behavior in infrequent arguments.  It would prohibit harmful behaviors, not 
unpleasant ones.  It would address human suffering, not unhappiness . . . . The legal 
standard would be the same applied in most social laws: what reasonable people (not 
paranoid or vengeful spouses) would regard as harmful, demeaning, humiliating, or fear-
invoking.”); James Chapman, Domestic violence laws will now criminalize mental torment, 
mind games and money controls too . . . and laws will be applied to those aged under 18, 
MAILONLINE, Sept. 17, 2012, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2204778/Domestic-violence-include-mental-torment-laws-applied-aged-18.html (accessed 
Mar. 27, 2013) (discussing how the executive branch of the U.K. government has recently 
expanded the U.K.’s definition of domestic violence to “‘raise awareness that domestic 
violence and abuse does not just encompass physical abuse but can also include coercion 
and control’” and clarifying that this type of abuse “isn't about people having a row and 
shouting.  It's about people's whole lives being controlled, whether that's not being allowed a 
bank account, access to a phone or to leave the house . . .”).   
WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2013  6:05 PM 
Summer 2013] TORTURE AT HOME 477 
on the abusive partner.”81  Some psychologists also explicitly include 
actual or threatened property damage or financial injury in their definition 
of psychological or emotional abuse.82   
As stated above, the term “mental abuse” is used in this article to refer 
to both emotional and psychological abuse, whether expressed verbally or 
otherwise, and the story presented at the beginning of this article illustrates 
several examples of such abuse.  These examples include describing Josh 
as “lazy” and a “wimp,” glaring at Josh with tremendous hostility, 
humiliating Josh both in private and in public (when he orders Josh to run 
ten laps around the campground while holding a broom over his head), 
implicating Josh in criminal activity, shifting blame to Josh by falsely 
indicating to their campground neighbor that it had been Josh’s idea to steal 
the cooler and radio, continually elevating his own needs above Josh’s, and 
denying Josh’s existence as a separate person (when he refuses to cancel 
the camping trip, insists that he and Josh drive straight to the campground 
without stopping by Josh’s mother’s house so that Josh can retrieve his 
study materials, and endangers Josh simply in order to obtain a free cooler 
and radio).  
Of course, not every perpetrator of domestic violence continually 
engages in physical, sexual, mental, and economic abuse.  In fact, Michael 
Johnson of Pennsylvania State University reports that a domestic violence 
perpetrator tends to engage in one of two major types or categories of 
domestic violence, which he refers to as “situational couple violence,” and 
“intimate terrorism.”83  As described by Johnson, situational couple 
violence is characterized by physical violence, which the perpetrator 
engages in on an occasional basis in response to “particular conflicts or 
 
 81. See, e.g., MOURADIAN, supra note 55.   
 82. See, e.g., Melissa Smith & Jeanne Segal, Domestic Violence and Abuse: Signs of 
Abuse and Abusive Relationships, HELPGUIDE.ORG, http://helpguide.org/mental/domestic_ 
violence_abuse_types_signs_causes_effects.htm (last updated Apr. 2012).  
 83. MICHAEL JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, 
VIOLENCE RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 2, 24 (Northeastern Univ. 
Press 2008) [hereinafter JOHNSON 2008]; Michael P. Johnson, Differentiating Among Types 
of Domestic Violence: Implications for Healthy Marriages, in MARRIAGE AND FAMILY: 
PERSPECTIVES AND COMPLEXITIES 281, 282 (H. Elizabeth Peters, Claire M. Kamp Dush, 
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Johnson 2009].  In these two works, Johnson also mentions two 
other types of domestic violence, “mutual violent control,” which he describes as “the true 
mutuality of two people fighting for general control over the relationship” (JOHNSON 2008, 
supra at 12) and “violent resistance,” which he defines as “the use of violence to resist an 
intimate terrorist’s attempt to dominate the relationship” (Johnson 2009, supra at 282).  
However, Johnson does not consider mutual violent control to be a major category of 
domestic violence, because, as he explains, “whatever it’s [sic] dynamic, it is very rare.”  
JOHNSON 2008, supra at 24; Johnson 2009, supra at 294 n.1.  Similarly, according to 
Johnson, “for most heterosexual women, the usual size difference between them and their 
partners ensures that violent resistance will not help and may make things worse, so they 
abandon violence and focus on other means of coping.”  Johnson 2009, supra at 286.  
Accordingly, mutual violent control and violent resistance are not discussed further in this 
article.    
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tensions within the relationship.”84  Intimate terrorism, on the other hand, is 
characterized by mental abuse,85 with other types of abuse constituting only 
components86 of the perpetrator’s concerted “attempt to take complete 
control of or at least generally dominate the relationship.”87   
Johnson emphasizes that it is exceedingly important to distinguish 
between the different types of domestic violence, as otherwise important 
features of these two major types of domestic violence can be missed.88  He 
notes, for example, that some researchers in the past have used data 
regarding situational couple violence to support the erroneous conclusion 
that just as many women perpetrate intimate terrorism as men.89  Additional 
features of both situational couple violence and intimate terrorism are 
described below. 
1. Situational Couple Violence   
According to Johnson, most incidents of physical abuse in domestic 
relationships (ranging from a minor punch, slap, or scratch to homicide) are 
examples of situational couple violence.90  Again, Johnson reports that a 
perpetrator of situational couple violence engages in domestic violence 
solely in response to stressful situations that arise in the course of the 
relationship.91  As perpetrators of situational couple violence are not 
attempting to control their victims’ behavior on an ongoing basis,92 it 
logically follows that situational couple violence is characterized by 
occasional physical violence.93  Johnson furthermore notes that, in 
heterosexual couples, females commit forty-five percent of all events of 
situational couple violence and males effectuate fifty-five percent of such 
events.94   
It is important to recognize that situational couple violence is still a 
very serious societal problem.  Victims can suffer severe physical injuries 
and even death,95 and twenty-nine percent of females who are victims of 
situational couple violence at the hands of a male partner have suffered a 
severe injury at least once.96  Moreover, as Johnson concedes, physically 
 
 84. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282. 
 85. Id. at 284–85. 
 86. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285–86. 
 87. Id. at 282. 
 88. Id. at 283. 
 89. Id. at 283–84. 
 90. Id. at 287.  Johnson estimates that situational couple violence occurs three to four 
times more often than intimate terrorism.  Id. at 294, n.3.   
 91. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282, 287–88; JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 3, 11–
12. 
 92. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 287–88.   
 93. Id.     
 94. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 22. 
 95. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 288.  
 96. Id.; PowerPoint: Michael P. Johnson, Distinguishing Types of Domestic Violence, 
Paper Presented at Second International Conference on Violence Against Women, at 18  
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injuring another person (other than in self-defense) can never be viewed as 
healthy behavior.97  In fact, it is probably misleading to refer to this type of 
violence as “situational couple violence,” as that name implies that the 
couple, rather than the perpetrator, is responsible for the violence, and a 
better name for it would simply be “situational violence.”  However, in this 
article, the term “situational couple violence” is used in order to maintain 
continuity with Johnson’s categories of domestic violence. 
Lastly, situational couple violence appears to possess three additional 
characteristics distinguishing it from intimate terrorism.  To begin with, the 
great majority of serious physical injuries and deaths attributable to 
domestic violence occur at the hands of an intimate terrorist rather than at 
the hands of a perpetrator of situational couple violence.98  Additionally, 
some perpetrators of situational couple violence appear to be able to take 
responsibility for their own behavior and over time learn how to react to 
stressful events in a nonviolent manner.99  Finally, situational couple 
violence does not appear to be transmitted throughout generations of a 
family, as children exposed to situational couple violence do not possess a 
higher risk of committing situational couple violence or intimate terrorism 
in their own adult relationships than children who have not been exposed to 
any type of domestic violence.100 
2. Intimate Terrorism   
To repeat, Johnson maintains that an intimate terrorist’s use of physical 
violence is simply one aspect of an intimate terrorist’s seemingly relentless 
effort to completely control a domestic relationship.101  In other words, 
intimate terrorism is a course of conduct that consists primarily (and 
sometimes exclusively) of mental abuse, and the intimate terrorist tends to 
utilize physical abuse and sexual abuse merely as instruments to further his 
or her regime of control.102  Of course, it is logical that an intimate terrorist 
primarily engages in mental abuse, because mental abuse erodes the 
victim’s self-esteem and ultimately his or her autonomy to challenge the 
intimate terrorist’s regime of control.103  That is, as Steve Biko’s quote at 
 
(May 30, 2011) available at personal.psu.edu/mpj/2011%20Montreal.pptx (last accessed 
Sept. 27, 2012) (clarifying that “severe injury” means “injury requiring hospitalization”).       
 97. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 281.     
 98. Id. at 285. 
 99. Id. at 291; see also Jennifer E. Daly & Susan Pelowski, Predictors of Dropouts 
Among Men Who Batter: A Review of Studies with Implications for Research and Practice, 
15 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 137, 138 (2000). 
 100. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 283. 
 101. Id. at 282–88; JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 7–12, 40–41.   
 102. Id.  
 103. CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, Substance Abuse Treatment and 
Domestic Violence, in TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL (TIP) SERIES, NO. 25, 27 (U.S. 
Substance Abuse & Mental Health Serv’s Admin. ed., 1997), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64431 (“NONPHYSICAL abuse generally targets the 
victim’s sense of self-esteem, well-being, and autonomy.”) (emphasis added); T. L. 
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the beginning of this article implies, it is much easier for an oppressor to 
control his or her victim by convincing the victim that his or her 
subjugation is justified than by constantly physically coercing the victim 
into a subservient position.104   
As indicated above, compared to situational couple violence, intimate 
terrorism also “is more likely . . . to produce injuries, long-term health 
effects, depression, posttraumatic stress, suicide, and homicide.”105  
Intimate terrorism, in fact, is the type of domestic violence that comes most 
readily to mind when one considers domestic violence, because it is the 
type of domestic violence that makes headline news, and the type that 
domestic violence shelters and health care workers encounter on a regular 
basis.106  Intimate terrorists often abuse a child living in their home in the 
same manner in which they abuse their intimate partner.107  They do so for 
two main reasons: to control their intimate partner through the child108 and 
prevent that child from challenging the intimate terrorist’s control through 
the child’s assertion of autonomy.109   
After years of being subjected to intimate terrorism, many victims live 
in a world of never-ending (but again, primarily mental) abuse that is both 
constantly denied by the terrorist and largely hidden from the outside 
world.110  Such a regime of abuse is akin to torture, brainwashing, bullying, 
and hazing.111  Unfortunately, programs designed to correct intimate 
terrorists’ aberrant behavior experience a low success rate.112  In addition, 
intimate terrorism appears to be the type of domestic violence transmitted 
from one generation to another within families.113  In particular, there is a 
strong positive correlation in males between childhood exposure to intimate 
terrorism and later engagement in intimate terrorism as adults.114  It is no 
exaggeration to state that intimate terrorism is the ultimate betrayal of trust 
 
BEAUCHAMP ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS  58 (4th ed. 1989) (“The 
autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan.  . . . A person with 
diminished autonomy, in contrast, is in at least some respect controlled by others or 
incapable of deliberating or acting on the basis of his or her desires and plans.”).  
 104. See Morton Deutsch, Oppression and Conflict, Plenary Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the Int’l Soc’y of Justice Research in Skovde, Swed. (June 17, 2002), available 
at http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/DeutschIOSJPaper.pdf (containing a good 
summary of the myths and propaganda that dominant groups throughout history have used 
to convince subjugated groups that their own domination is justified). 
 105. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285 (citing numerous studies). 
 106. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 2–3, 6. 
 107. Id. at 8, 26; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 284.  
 108. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 284. 
 109. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 8 (explaining that an intimate terrorist uses children 
to support his control in that “[f]irst of all, they, too, know he is the boss.”). 
 110. LUNDY BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT? 1–20, 49–52, 68–78, 83–87, 120, 245, 
and passim (2003). 
 111. See, e.g., JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 26. 
 112. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 291. 
 113. Id. at 283. 
 114. Id. 
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and ultimate abuse of power.  That is, an intimate terrorist is able to 
repeatedly abuse his or her victim(s) only because he is in an intimate 
relationship with his victim(s)115   
A few females are intimate terrorists.116  However, intimate terrorism in 
heterosexual couples is almost exclusively perpetrated by males against 
their female partners.117  Understandably, the male-dominated nature of 
intimate terrorism has led many feminist scholars and other domestic 
violence experts to conclude that paternalism is the main driving force 
behind this form of domestic violence.118  Given this male-on-female 
asymmetry of intimate terrorism, throughout the remainder of this article, 
when discussing the intimate terrorism form of domestic violence, only the 
male pronoun “he” is used when referring to the perpetrator and only the 
female pronoun “she” is used when referring to the victim.   
B. COSTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
“[I]t is generally agreed that the most under-reported crime is domestic 
violence.”119  Even so, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the 
U.S. Department of Justice reports that, in 2010, 1336 individuals were 
murdered by their spouse, former spouse, girlfriend, or boyfriend,120 and 
 
 115. Melanie Platt et al., A Betrayal Trauma Perspective on Domestic Violence, in 1 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 185, 206 (Greenwood Press E. 
Stark & Eve S. Buzawa eds., 2009) (“Victims of violence in intimate relationships are 
profoundly betrayed by someone they depend on.”); Bonnie Brandl et al., The Parallels 
Between Undue Influence, Domestic Violence, Stalking, and Sexual Assault, 17 J. ELDER 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 37, 40 (2005), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/administrative/law_aging/2011_aging_arta2251_undueIflu_tb.authcheckdam.pdf (stating 
that, in “UI [Undue Influence], domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault cases, . . . [t 
]he victim and exploiter are in an on-going relationship”) [hereinafter Brandl]. 
 116. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285; JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 20.  
 117. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 20, 26, 48; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285.   
 118. See, e.g., JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 1–4, 6.  While paternalism indeed appears 
to play a role in the development of an intimate terrorist, paternalism and the traumatic 
abuse of male children may work hand-in-hand in this process, as is explained further in 
Section V of this article. 
 119. See, e.g., Crime and Violence: Violence Against Women, ECE GENDER STATISTICS, 
U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (last updated Mar. 24, 2004), 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/gender/web/genpols/keyinds/crime/violence.ht 
m; see also Spouse/Partner Abuse Information, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE AND 
FAMILY VIOLENCE, http://www.nccafv.org/spouse.htm (last visited Feb. 10. 2013) (“[W]e 
know that spouse/partner abuse . . . is the most common unreported crime occurring in 
families from all economic, social, cultural, religious and educational backgrounds.”).  This 
underreporting of domestic violence has occurred for many years.  See, e.g., PATRICIA 
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., EXTENT, NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN SURVEY V (2000) (“Most intimate partner victimizations are not reported to the 
police.”), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/181867.htm.   
 120. Crime in the United States, 2010, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUST., Table 10, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime 
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the 2010 report entitled “National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence 
Survey,” published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, reveals that approximately 35.6% of women and approximately 
28.5% of men in the United States report having suffered physical violence, 
rape, and/or stalking by an intimate partner (IP) (defined as a current or 
former intimate partner)121 at some point in their lives.122  This same CDC 
report indicates that, in 2010 alone, approximately 686,000 incidents of 
rape,123 approximately 3,819,000 incidents of stalking,124 and 
approximately 37,126,000 incidents of psychological aggression,125 and 
 
-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl10.xls (indicating that, of the 7,272 murder victims for 
whom states had reported the victim’s relationship with the offender, 603 wives or former 
wives were murdered by their husbands or former husbands and 492 girlfriends were 
murdered by their boyfriends, for a total of 1095 females murdered by an intimate partner, 
whereas 110 husbands or former husbands were murdered by their wives or former wives 
and 131 boyfriends were murdered by their girlfriends, for a total of 241 males murdered by 
an intimate partner) [hereinafter 2010 FBI Statistics].  Note that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) does not include former boyfriends or girlfriends in its definition of 
intimate partners.  Id.; see also JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION, 2010 9 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
cv10.pdf; Measuring Intimate Partner (Domestic) Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last 
modified May 12, 2010), http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/measur 
ing.htm [hereinafter National Institute of Justice Report].  Note that, as a result of this 
omission, the number of intimate partner murders in 2010 likely was higher, because ex-
boyfriends are responsible for up to eleven percent of intimate partner murders committed 
by males and ex-girlfriends are responsible for up to three percent of intimate partner 
murders committed by females.  Id.  In addition, the number of intimate partner murders 
reported by the FBI for 2010 was based only on the data which states had conveyed to the 
FBI, and some of the remaining unclassified 7,822 murders in 2010 (see id.; 2010 FBI 
Statistics, supra at Table 3) most likely had been committed by an intimate partner.     
 121. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT, NAT’L CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL 37 
(2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf [hereinafter 
2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report].    
 122. Id. at 2, 38.  
 123. Id. at 42–43 (Figure is the sum of (686,000 estimated rapes of female victims by an 
intimate partner (IP) during 2010, as listed in Table 4.5 on page 42) plus (zero (0) estimated 
rapes of male victims by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.6 on page 43)).  
 124. Id. at 44–45 (Figure is the sum of (the estimated 3,300,000 acts of stalking committed 
against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as stated on page 44) plus (the estimated 
519,000 acts of talking committed against a male victim by an IP during 2010, as stated on 
page 45)). 
 125. Id. at 45 (This figure is sum of (the estimated 16,578,000 acts of psychological 
aggression committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.9 on 
page 46) plus (the estimated 20,548,000 acts of psychological aggression committed against 
a male victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.10 on page 46)).  Note that, in the 
2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, “psychological aggression” includes 
“expressive aggression” and “coercive control.”  Id. at 9.  Expressive aggression “includes 
acting [in a] dangerous [manner], name calling, insult[ing], and humiliati[ng], while 
[c]oercive control includes behaviors that are intended to monitor and control an intimate 
partner such as threat[ening] [to inflict some type of harm], interfere[ing] with family and 
friends, and limiting access to money.  Id. at 10.  
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approximately 14,817,000 incidents of physical violence126 occurred 
between IPs.  Approximately 5,429,000 of those estimated 14,817,000 
incidents of physical violence between IPs were incidents of severe 
physical violence (defined as acts more severe than slapping, shoving, or 
pushing, e.g., beating, burning, choking, suffocating, kicking, harming with 
a knife or a gun, slamming against something, and being hit with a fist or 
something else that is hard127).128   
Women suffered 82% of the above-stated 1,336 murders at the hands 
of an IP,129 58% of the incidents of severe physical violence,130 51% of all 
acts of physical violence,131 100% of the rapes,132 86% of the stalking 
 
 126. Id. at 44–45 (Figure is the sum of (the estimated 7,485,000 acts of physical 
violence—3,163,000 estimated acts of severe physical violence and 4,322,000 estimated 
acts of less severe physical violence—committed against a female victim by an IP during 
2010, as listed in Table 4.7 on page 44) plus (the estimated 7,332,000 acts of physical 
violence—2,266,000 estimated acts of severe physical violence and 5,066,000 estimated 
acts of less severe physical violence – committed against a male victim by an IP during 
2010, as listed in Table 4.8 on page 45)).   
 127. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 2, 10. 
 128. Id. at 44–45 (Figure is the sum of (the estimated 3,163,000 acts of severe physical 
violence committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.7 on 
page 44) plus (the estimated 2,266,000 acts of severe physical violence committed against a 
male victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.8 on page 45)).   
 129. 2010 FBI Statistics, supra note 120, at Table 10 (Figure is the ratio obtained by 
dividing (the estimated 1,095 females (603 wives or former wives plus 492 girlfriends) 
murdered by an IP during 2010) by the total estimated 1,336 individuals (the estimated 
1,095 females plus the estimated 241 males (110 husbands or former husbands plus 131 
boyfriends) murdered by an IP during 2010)).  Note, as stated above, that the FBI does not 
include former boyfriends or girlfriends in its definition of intimate partners.  Id.; see also 
National Institute of Justice Report, supra note 120.  As a result of this omission, the 
percentage of females murdered by an IP most likely is understated, because ex-boyfriends 
are responsible for up to eleven percent of intimate partner murders committed by males and 
ex-girlfriends are responsible for up to three percent of intimate partner murders committed 
by females.  2010 FBI Statistics, supra note 120, at Table 10; National Institute of Justice 
Report, supra note 120.   
 130. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 44–45 (Figure is the 
ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 3,163,000 acts of severe physical violence 
committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.7 on page 44) 
by the total estimated 5,429,000 acts of severe physical violence committed against either a 
female victim or a male victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 on 
pages 44–45.   
 131. Id. at 44–45 (Figure is the ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 7,485,000 acts of 
physical violence—3,163,000 severe acts and 4,322,000 less severe acts—committed 
against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.7 on page 44) by the total 
estimated 14,817,000 acts of physical violence committed against either a female victim or a 
male victim (the estimated 7,485,000 acts of physical violence committed against females 
plus the estimated 7,332,000 acts committed against males—2,266,000 severe acts and 
5,066,000 less severe acts—by an IP during 2010, as listed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 on pages 
44–45)).   
 132. Id. at 42–43 (Figure is the ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 686,000 rapes 
committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as listed in Table 4.5 on page 42) 
by the total estimated 686,000 rapes committed against either a female victim or a male 
victim (the 686,000 estimated rapes committed against a female victim plus the zero 
estimated rapes committed against a male victim) by an IP during 2010, as listed in Tables 
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incidents,133 and 45% of the incidents of psychological aggression134 
perpetrated by either a heterosexual or same-sex IP during 2010.135  
Moreover, approximately 8.7% of women have been subjected to both rape 
and physical violence by an IP,136 approximately 14.4% have been 
subjected to both physical violence and stalking, and approximately 12.5% 
have been subjected to rape, physical violence, and stalking.137 In contrast, 
92% of men who have been subjected to domestic violence by either a 
heterosexual or same-sex IP have suffered only physical violence,138 while 
6.3% have suffered physical violence and stalking.139   
Certainly, domestic violence is a serious problem for men as well as 
women.  In 2010, 2% of all men experienced severe physical violence 
perpetrated by an IP140 (compared with 2.7% of all women141), 4.5% of all 
men suffered non-severe physical violence by an IP142 (compared with 
3.6% of all women143), 0.5% of all men experienced stalking by an IP144 
(compared with 2.8% of all women145), 2.5% of all men experienced sexual 
violence other than rape by an IP146 (compared to 2.3% of all women),147 
and 18.1% of all men experienced psychological aggression by an IP148 
 
4.5 and 4.6 on pages 42–43).  Note that  no estimated rapes were reported for males, 
because either the relative standard error in the sample was more than 30% or the cell size 
was equal to or smaller than 20.  Id. at 43 (Table 4.6).  
 133. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 42–43 (Figure is the 
ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 3,300,000 acts of stalking committed against a 
female victim by an IP during 2010, as stated on page 44) by the total estimated 3,829,000 
acts of stalking committed against either a female victim or a male victim (the 3,300,000 
estimated acts of stalking committed against a female victim plus the 519,000 estimated acts 
of stalking committed against a male victim) by an IP during 2010, as stated on pages 44–
45).  Note that  no estimated rapes were reported for males, because either the relative 
standard error in the sample was more than 30% or the cell size was equal to or smaller than 
20. Id. at 43 (Table 4.6).  
 134. Id. at 42–43 (Figure is the ratio obtained by dividing (the estimated 16,578,000 acts 
of psychological aggression committed against a female victim by an IP during 2010, as 
listed in Table 4.9 on page 46) by the total estimated 37,126,000 acts of psychological 
aggression committed against either a female victim or a male victim (the 16,578,000 
estimated acts of psychological aggression committed against a female victim plus the 
20,548,000 estimated acts of psychological aggression committed against a male victim) by 
an IP during 2010, as listed in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 on page 46).   
 135. Id. at 41. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 45 (Table 4.8). 
 141. Id. at 44 (Table 4.7). 
 142. Id. at 45 (Table 4.8). 
 143. Id. at 44 (Table 4.7). 
 144. Id. at 45. 
 145. Id. at 44. 
 146. Id. at 43 (Table 4.6). 
 147. Id. at 42 (Table 4.5).  
 148. Id. at 44 (Table 4.7). 
 148. Id. at 46 (Table 4.10).  
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(compared with 13.9% of all women149).  At the same time, the fact that a 
significant number of female victims suffer various types of violence at the 
hands of an intimate partner suggests that females are more likely than 
males to suffer from intimate terrorism150 whereas it appears that most male 
victims suffer from the milder (but still very serious and occasionally 
lethal) situational couple violence.151  As the U.S. Department of Justice 
stated in 2010, “‘violence is instrumental in maintaining control and . . . 
more than 90 percent [sic] of ‘systematic, persistent, and injurious’ 
violence is perpetrated by men.”152   
As indicated, the above-discussed FBI statistics on intimate partner 
murders committed in 2010, as well as the CDC study on nonlethal acts of 
domestic violence committed in 2010, encompass domestic violence 
committed by same-sex intimate partners,153 and a report published by the 
National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP) in 2012 confirms 
that domestic violence is a very serious problem in same-sex couples.154  In 
fact, this report reveals that the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer 
and HIV-affected (LGBQH) community suffered a very alarming 300.17% 
increase (from 6 to 19) in intimate partner homicides between 2010 and 
2011, with males, gays and lesbians, and people of color suffering a 
disproportionate percentage of these homicides.155   
In addition, researchers estimate that, every year, between one and two 
million Americans age sixty-five years or older are “injured, exploited, or 
otherwise mistreated by someone on whom they depended for care or 
protection.”156  Most alarmingly, a number of studies reveal that 
 
 149. Id. at 46 (Table 4.9). 
 150. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 13–23.   
 151. Id. 
 152. National Institute of Justice Report, supra note 120 (citing Michael S. Kimmel, 
‘Gender Symmetry’ in Domestic Violence: A Substantive and Methodological Research 
Review, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1331 (Nov. 2002)).  
 153. 2010 FBI Statistics, supra note 120, at Supplementary Homicide Reports, Table 10; 
2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 91, 100–03. 
 154. National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, Intimate Partner Violence 2011: 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and HIV-Affected (2012), http://www.avp.org 
/storage/documents/Reports/2012_NCAVP_2011_IPV_Report.pdf [hereinafter 2011 
NCAVP Report]; see also DIANE R. DOLAN-SOTO & SARA KAPLAN, NYC GAY AND LESBIAN 
ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT 3 (2005), http://www.avp.org/publications/reports/2005 
nycdvrpt.pdf [hereinafter DOLAN-SOTO].    
 155. 2011 NCAVP Report, supra note 154, at 7–8. 
 156. COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL STATISTICS & COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE, ELDER 
MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA 1 (Richard J. 
Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace, eds., 2003); see also Pamela B. Teaster et al., The 2004 
Survey of State Adult Protective Services: Abuse of Adults 60 Years of Age and Older, THE 
NAT’L CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE 5 (2006), http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/ncearoot/main_site/ 
pdf/2-14-06%20FINAL%2060+REPORT.pdf (reporting that Adult Protective Services in 
24 states had substantiated 88,455 of the 192,243 claims of elder abuse, neglect, or 
exploitation in 2004 which they investigated, a substantiation rate of over 46%); Fact Sheet: 
Elder Abuse Prevalence and Incidence, NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE 1 (2005), 
http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/main_site/pdf/publication/FinalStatistics050331.pdf (stating that 
WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2013  6:05 PM 
486 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:2 
approximately 2,000 children under the age of eighteen die from child 
abuse or neglect each year,157 at least 3.3 million children of all ages are 
exposed to domestic violence annually,158 and approximately 2.8 million 
children live in a household in which at least one member of the household 
age twelve or older experienced violent crime (defined as rape, sexual 
assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault).159  
The physical, mental, and financial cost of domestic violence for its 
victims and for society at large are enormous.  To begin with, even though 
approximately forty percent of victims of nonfatal intimate partner violence 
do not report such events to the police,160 law enforcement costs related to 
domestic violence are quite substantial.  It is estimated that at least one-
third of all calls made to local police departments concern domestic 
violence,161 and some researchers have stated that most police calls concern 
domestic violence.162  In New York City alone, “the police recorded more 
than 226,000 domestic violence incidents in 2005—an average of roughly 
620 domestic violence incidents per day,”163 and its law enforcement costs 
 
only 1 in 14 incidents of elder abuse in domestic settings (excluding self-neglect), are 
reported to authorities) (citations omitted.).  
 157. LESLIE DELONG & NANCY W. BURKHART, GENERAL AND ORAL PATHOLOGY FOR THE 
DENTAL HYGIENIST 23 (Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins 2007) (reporting that “as many as 
5,000 children are fatalities of child abuse and neglect each year) [hereinafter DELONG, 
GENERAL AND ORAL PATHOLOGY].     
 158. SHARMILA LAWRENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE POLICY: RESEARCH 
FINDINGS THAT CAN INFORM POLICIES ON MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELL-BEING, NAT'L 
CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY 5 (2002) (citing L. Carter et al., Domestic Violence and 
Children: Analysis and Recommendations, 9 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 4–20 (1999)) 
[hereinafter Carter].  Note that Lawrence stated that between 3.3 million and ten million 
children are exposed to domestic violence annually.  However, the authors of the study cited 
by Lawrence stated in their own study that the 3.3 million figure “is based on a study sample 
that did not include two groups particularly at risk for domestic violence—families with 
children under age three and families in which parents were divorced. This study also used 
an overly narrow definition of domestic violence.”  Carter, supra, at 15–16.  In addition, 
these same authors stated in their own study that “[t]he 10 million figure is derived from a 
study conducted in 1992 that used retrospective, self-report methods to survey individuals 
about the existence of domestic violence in their families.”  Id. at 16.  These two comments 
imply that the 3.3 million figure is on the low side and the ten million figure may be on the 
high side as an estimate of the number of U.S. children exposed to domestic violence 
annually.   
 159. Erica L. Smith & Jennifer L. Truman, Prevalence of Violent Crime among 
Households with Children, 1993–2010, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4472.    
 160. Shannan Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence in the United States, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, Office of Justice Programs, 2007, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
ipvus.pdf.  
 161. Loretta J. Stalans, Family Harmony or Individual Protection? Public 
Recommendations About How Police Can Handle Domestic Violence Situations, 39 
American Behavioral Scientist 433 (1996).  
 162. Machaela M. Hocktor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State, 85 CAL. L. 
REV. 643, 646 (1997).  
 163. City Spending on Domestic Violence: A Review, NYC Independent Budget Office, 1, 
2 (2007), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/DomesticViolenceSpending.pdf. 
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related to domestic violence that year totaled nearly forty-four million 
dollars.164   
In addition, a very conservative estimate of the total health care costs 
attributable to domestic violence each year is $5.8 billion.165  More than 
1,400,000 hospital emergency room visits per year are attributable to 
domestic violence,166 and the American Medical Association reported that, 
in 1992, “domestic violence account[ed] for at least 21,000 
hospitalizations, 99,800 days in the hospital, and 39,000 visits to personal 
physicians annually in the United States.”167  Furthermore, in addition to 
the immediate health care required immediately following a domestic 
violence event, a number of researchers have discovered that victims of 
domestic violence suffer much higher rates of physical, mental, and 
reproductive health problems over the course of their lives than non-
victims.168   
For example, the prevalence of asthma, irritable bowel syndrome, 
diabetes, frequent headaches, chronic pain, difficulty sleeping, and activity 
limitations is significantly higher among women who have suffered 
physical violence at the hands of an intimate partner or been raped or 
stalked by any perpetrator.169  Male victims of domestic violence also 
suffer much higher rates of frequent headaches, chronic pain, difficulty 
sleeping, and activity limitations.170  Even if a victim experiences only 
psychological abuse (as sometimes occurs in cases of intimate terrorism171), 
he or she tends to suffer a much higher number of physical and mental 
problems than non-victims over the course of his or her life.172   
While some of the long-term health problems suffered by domestic 
violence victims are attributable to a specific physical injury received 
during a domestic violence incident (e.g., walking difficulties traceable to 
having had one’s back broken during such an incident) and certain other 
 
 164. Id. at 1. 
 165. Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences 
.html  [hereinafter CDC Study: Consequences] ($4.1 billion estimated for medical and 
mental health care costs in 1995, updated to 2003 dollars (multiplying $4.1 billion for such 
costs in 1995 by 1.034)); see also DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S DIVISION OF 
VIOLENCE PREVENTION, Costs of Intimate Partner Violence against Women in the United 
States 40 (TABLE 12) (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/ipv 
book-final-feb18.pdfhttp://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/ipvbook-final-feb18.pdf 
[hereinafter DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S DIVISION OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION].  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. (citing Harris Meyer, The Billion Dollar Epidemic, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 6, 1992, 
at 7).  
 168. See, e.g., 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 62; CDC 
Study: Consequences, supra note 165. 
 169. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 62. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Supra text accompanying notes 101–04.  
 172. CDC Study: Consequences, supra note 165.   
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problems may be attributable to risky coping behaviors that some victims 
adopt, the higher prevalence of a number of health problems suffered by 
domestic violence victims seems to be attributable to biological changes 
caused by chronic stress associated with domestic violence.173  Specifically, 
chronic stress appears to impair one’s cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, 
endocrine, and immune systems, primarily through the disregulation of 
certain hormones, such as adrenaline and cortisol.174  As Rita Smith, 
Executive Director of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 
once remarked, “living in a dangerous and stressful environment has long-
term health impacts.  It’s like living in a war zone[.]”175   
The losses employers suffer as a result of lost lives, absences, and 
decreased productively are likewise very substantial.  In a 2005 survey 
conducted by the Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence, 44% of full-
time employees stated that they had personally experienced the effects of 
domestic violence at work and 21% of full-time employees revealed that 
they themselves were victims of domestic violence.176  Furthermore, 64% 
of the domestic violence victims indicated that their work productivity had 
decreased due to their victimization, with 57% of these victims indicating 
that they were distracted at work, 45% of these victims indicating that they 
feared others in the workplace would discover their victim status, 40% of 
these victims indicating that they were concerned their intimate partner 
 
 173. 2010 CDC Intimate Partner Violence Report, supra note 121, at 61; see also CDC 
Study: Consequences, supra note 165 (citing numerous studies). 
 174. See, e.g., Michele C. Black, Intimate Partner Violence and Adverse Health 
Consequences: Implications for Clinicians, 5:5 AM. J. LIFESTYLE MED. 428, 429–31(2011).  
In this article, the author explains that: 
[d]uring the past 2 decades, research has substantially improved our 
understanding of the physiology that underlies the association between 
violence victimization and an array of adverse health outcomes . . . .  During 
the stress response, the body releases a host of chemical mediators, for 
example adrenaline and noradrenaline, cortisol, catecholamines, 
glucocorticoids, pro- and anti-inflammatory cytokines, serotonin, systemic 
hormones (e.g., insulin), pituitary hormones, and a number of 
neurotransmitters.   
 
These mediators are interconnected in a network of regulation; when any 
one mediator increases or decreases, there are compensatory changes in the 
other mediators.  Whereas this increased physiologic activity in response to 
challenge is protective in the short run (e.g., the release of hormones that act 
on multiple neural and endocrine receptors to produce the adaptive 
physiologic fight or flight response), the long-term effects of prolonged 
stress (e.g., increased heart rate or blood pressure over extended periods) 
takes a toll on the human body. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 175. Will Dunham, Quarter of U.S. Women Suffer Domestic Violence, REUTERS.COM, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/07/us-violence-domestic-usa-idUSN07378963200 
80207 (last accessed Dec. 10, 2012). 
 176. National Benchmark Telephone Survey on Domestic Violence in the Workplace, 
CORPORATE ALLIANCE TO END PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (Oct. 2005), http://www.ncdsv.org/ 
images/CAEPVSurvey.WorkPlace.pdf [hereinafter National Benchmark Telephone Survey]. 
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might harass them at work, 34% of these victims indicating that they were 
fearful their intimate partner would unexpectedly visit them at work, 24% 
indicating that they found it difficult to complete their assignments on time, 
and 21% indicating that they had lost a job on account of their 
victimization.177   
Interestingly, in this same study, 31% of victims’ co-workers reported 
that they felt obligated to perform victims’ work or make excuses for their 
failure to complete their work, 27% of such co-workers stated that they in 
fact frequently performed victims’ work, 25% of such co-workers admitted 
that they resented the victims on account of their negatively-impacted work 
situations, and 38% acknowledged they were at least somewhat fearful that 
their safety at work was threatened as a result of the victims’ situation.178   
Victims’ higher rates of absenteeism and tardiness at work have been 
documented in a number of studies,179 and a 2003 study published by the 
National Center for Injury Prevent and Control within the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services reported that each year victims of severe 
domestic violence lose nearly 8 million days of paid work—the equivalent 
of more than 32,000 full-time jobs—as well as almost 5.6 million days of 
household productivity.180  A very conservative estimate of the turnover 
and decreased productivity losses attributable to domestic violence every 
year is $2.5 billion,181 while the Bureau of National Affairs has estimated 
that these costs for employers are between $3 billion to $5 billion each 
year.182  The American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence 
has stated that total employer costs for absenteeism, employer turnover, 
reduced productivity, higher health insurance premiums, and administrative 
 
 177. National Benchmark Telephone Survey, supra note 176, at 1, 3. 
 178. Id. at 2. 
 179. See, e.g., Carol A. Reeves & Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly, Study of the Effects of Intimate 
Partner Violence on the Workplace (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
227266.pdf (reporting that “lifetime IPV victims were more likely to be tardy and absent 
than were non-victims”); J. Swanberg et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Employment and the 
Workplace: Consequences and Future Directions, 4 Trauma, Violence & Abuse 1, 9–10 
(2005), http://www.caepv.org/membercenter/files/TVASwanberg_Logan_Macke%20(3).pdf 
(stating that “[r]esearch [has] found that between 23% and 54% of employed partner 
violence victims reported being absent  from work because of the abuse, with between 4% 
and 6% reporting that this happened frequently” . . . [and] “the studies conducted to date . . . 
suggest that 50% to 65% of partner violence victims reported being late for work or leaving 
work early because of the victimization”).  
 180. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S DIVISION OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, supra note 
165, at 7. 
 181. CDC Study: Consequences, supra note 165 ($1.8 billion estimated for lost 
productivity of employees suffering non-lethal injuries plus lost lifetime earnings of 
murdered employees in 1995, updated to 2003 dollars (multiplying $1.8 billion for such 
costs in 1995 by 1.034)). 
 182. BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER  23 VIOLENCE AND STRESS: THE 
WORK/FAMILY CONNECTION, 2 (Aug. 1990). 
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costs attributable to domestic violence are $4 billion to $5 billion per 
year.183  
Domestic violence is also a significant contributor to job loss,184 
divorce,185 poverty,186 and homelessness,187 and the U.S. Justice 
 
 183. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, A GUIDE FOR 
EMPLOYERS: VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (1999). 
 184. See, e.g., Barbara Johnson, Reducing Intimate Partner Abuse: National, State, and 
Local Strategies for Prevention of Domestic Violence, Minnesota Center Against Violence 
and Abuse 2 (2002), http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/barbara/barbara.html 
(explaining that embarrassment over recurring injuries can lead to absenteeism, secrecy, and 
isolation, frequent periods of infirmary and dysfunctional coping mechanisms of addictive 
behavior cause many victims from retaining steady employment, and abused partners often 
voluntarily abandon their jobs, homes, and personal possessions in order to escape abuse); 
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health, Women’s Safety & Health Issues at Work, available at http://health.groups.yahoo. 
com/group/globalocchyg-list/message/180 (accessed Dec. 11, 2012) (reporting that 
“homicide is the leading cause of death for females in the workplace, accounting for 40% of 
all female workplace deaths. Twenty-five percent of female victims were assaulted by 
people known to them, and 16% of women workplace homicides are a result of domestic 
violence”); Domestic Violence: Prevalence and Implications for Employment Among 
Welfare Recipients, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE 19 (1998) (revealing that “between 35% 
and 56% of employed battered women were harassed at work by their batterers; 55% to 
85% missed work because of domestic violence; and 24% to 52% lost their jobs as a result 
of the abuse”); see also Nina W. Tarr, Employment and Economic Security for Victims of 
Domestic Abuse, 16 REV. OF L. & SOC. JUSTICE 351 (2007) [hereinafter Tarr]. 
 185. PETER JAFFE ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (2002) (“Numerous divorce studies that ask women why they 
ended their relationship find rates of domestic violence well about the rates in the general 
population.”);  Paul R. Amato & Denise Previti, People’s Reasons for Divorcing: Gender, 
Social Class, the Life Course, and Adjustment, 24 J. FAMILY ISSUES 602, 602–04, 615 (2003) 
(stating that “marital discord and divorce are gendered experiences, with wives more likely 
to initiate a divorce than husbands, physical and emotional abuse are common reasons why 
women seek divorce (as illustrated in Table 1), and 0% of men and 9.5% of women listed 
“physical or mental abuse” as a motivating factor in their divorce (as illustrated in Table 3)); 
Xenia P. Montenegro, The Divorce Experience: A Study of Divorce at Midlife and Beyond, 
AARP MAGAZINE, 14, 20–21 (2004) http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/divorce.pdf 
(concluding, based on a study of people between the ages of 40 and 69, “[w]omen usually 
initiate the divorce,” “[v]erbal, physical, or emotional abuse is the foremost reason for 
divorce[,]” and “[v]ictims of physical or verbal use . . . are much more apt to ask for the 
divorce”).     
 186. Eleanor Lyon, Welfare, Poverty and Abused Women: New Research and Its 
Implications, Building Comprehensive Solutions to Domestic Violence, NATIONAL 
RESOURCE CR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 4, 7–8 (Oct. 2000) (stating that abused women “were 
more likely to have been unemployed when they wanted to be working, to have lower 
personal income, and to have received AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid in the past year”); 
see also BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 40 (citing Eleanor Lyon, Poverty, Welfare and Battered 
Women: What does the research tell us?, THE NAT’L RESOURCE CENTER ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE (1997) http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/welfare/welfare.pdf.) (pointing 
out that abused women are also more likely than others to . . . have partners who oppose or 
interfere with school or employment, and to have more frequent periods of unemployment 
and welfare receipts”); Tarr, supra note 184, at 371–80 (discussing how victims of domestic 
violence often lose their jobs due to the perpetrator’s interference with their jobs or their 
pursuit of legal actions against their abuser and often abandon their jobs in order to escape 
from their abuser); Erica Pearson, Heavy Price of Domestic Abuse: Victims Not Only Beaten 
But Often Left in Debt by Their Tormentors, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, http://www.nydailynews. 
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Department Institute has estimated that, when medical costs, indirect costs, 
and diminished quality of life costs are taken into account, adult victims of 
domestic violence suffer economic costs of $67 billion dollars per year 
(stated in 1993 U.S. dollars).188   
Finally, although domestic violence “is disproportionately concentrated 
in population subgroups that are stressed by poverty, [it] . . . is present in 
all social strata and ethnic groups[.]”189  In sum, domestic violence in this 
country and around the world190 appears to be an epidemic that is spiraling 
out of control.191 
 
 
IV. MAJOR THEORIES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
com/new-york/domestic-violence-takes-financial-toll-article-1.1172451 (discussing how 
domestic violence perpetrators often saddle their victims with enormous debts).  
 187. See, e.g., 2011 Hunger and Homelessness Survey: A Status Report on Hunger and 
Homelessness in America’s Cities, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 23, 80 (2011), 
http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/2011-hhreport.pdf (revealing that, across the 29 
cities which participated in the 2011 survey, 13% of the homeless population in these cities 
were victims of domestic violence); U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, 2002 HUNGER AND 
HOMELESSNESS SURVEY 82 (2002) (stating that “[d]omestic violence was identified by 11 
cities as a primary cause of homelessness”); see also CDC Study: Consequences, supra note 
165 (stating that “[v]ictims of IPV (intimate partner violence)] sometimes face . . . 
[h]omelessness” and citing a number of studies); Committee Opinion on Intimate Partner 
Violence, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS 2 (2012), 
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on%20Health%20Ca
re%20for%20Underserved%20Women/co518.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20121125T1707214097(“stat
ing that “d]estruction of the family unit often results in loss of financial stability or lack of 
economic resources for independent living, leading to increased populations of homeless 
women and children”) (Citation omitted.)) [hereinafter ACOG Committee Opinion]. 
 188. Ted R. Miller et al., Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look, National Institute 
of Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 23 (1996) available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/ 
victcost.pdf. 
 189. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH, VIOLENCE BY 
INTIMATE PARTNERS 99 (2002) [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH ORG.]; BUZAWA, supra note 33, 
at 40; ACOG Committee Opinion, supra note 187, at 1; Spouse Abuse/Partner Abuse 
Information, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.nccafv.org/spouse.htm. 
 190. See, e.g., Violence Against Women and Girls Still a Global Epidemic, UNICEF (May 
31, 2000), www.unicef.org/newsline/00pr45.htm); Mary Kimani, Taking on Violence 
Against Women in Africa: International Norms, Local Activism Start to Alter Laws, 
Attitudes, AFRICA RENEWAL (July 2007), http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/ 
afrec/vol21no2/212-violence-aganist-women.html (reporting that Kofi Annan, then 
Secretary-General of the U.N., stated in 1999 that “violence against women knows no 
boundaries of geography, culture or wealth . . . [and] is perhaps the most shameful human 
rights violation . . . [and] perhaps the most pervasive”). 
 191. See, e.g., Press Release, Domestic Abuse Against Women is Epidemic in America, 
Shalala Says, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services (Mar. 11, 1994), 
http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/1994pres/940311.txt (reporting that then-U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala referred to domestic abuse against 
women as ‘terrorism in the home’ and “called for ‘a national awakening to this 
unacknowledged epidemic in America’”). 
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As indicated above, the phenomenon of domestic violence literally 
appears to be tearing the society of the United States apart.  Halting the 
perpetuation of domestic violence throughout succeeding generations of 
families is imperative for both the federal government and each state 
government, as any society can have no more important task than the 
protection of its youth.192  Accordingly, legislators in each jurisdiction in 
the United States should make every attempt to thoroughly understand the 
causes of domestic violence and then address those causes in the 
jurisdiction’s laws. 
Over the years, a number of theories of domestic violence have been 
proposed,193 although several of these theories overlap with others194 and a 
number of them are focused on explaining the asymmetrical nature of 
male-on-female violence in heterosexual relationships.195  In an article of 
this length, it is not possible to discuss all of the different theories of 
domestic violence that have been proposed, but the major theories of 
domestic violence are summarized below. 
One of the early theories of domestic violence was the “mental defect” 
theory, which held that a perpetrator of domestic violence possesses a 
physical brain abnormality or a serious mental illness, such as 
schizophrenia, which essentially causes him to experience a break from 
reality.196  Some theorists also posited that a victim of domestic violence 
likewise possesses a physical brain abnormality or serious mental illness,197 
 
 192. This sentiment has been expressed in many different ways throughout history.  
Nelson Mandela, for example, stated that “[t] here can be no keener revelation of a society’s 
soul than the way in which it treats its children.”  President Nelson Mandela, Speech at the 
Launch of the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, Mahlamba’nlopfu, Pretoria (May 8, 1995), 
available at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1995/sp950508.html.  
Similarly, when the United States Senate dedicated a building to former U.S. Senator Hubert 
Humphrey, he remarked that “[t]he moral test of government is how that government treats 
those who are in the dawn of life, the children; those who are in the twilight of life, the 
elderly; and those who are in the shadows of life—the sick, the needy and the handicapped.”  
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Speech at the Dedication of the Headquarters of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 4, 1977), available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/276362/Hubert-H-Humphrey. 
 193. See, e.g., JOAN MCCLENNEN, SOCIAL WORK AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 222–25 (Springer 
Publishing Company 2010) [hereinafter MCCLENNEN]. 
 194. Id.; see also David A. Wolfe & Peter G. Jaffe, Emerging Strategies in the Prevention 
of Domestic Violence, 9 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN 133, 134 (Winter 1999) 
[hereinafter Wolfe & Jaffe]. 
 195. MCCLENNEN,  supra note 193, at 222–25.  
 196. BATTERER MANIPULATION AND RETALIATION IN THE COURTS: A LARGELY 
UNRECOGNIZED PHENOMENON SOMETIMES ENCOURAGED BY COURT PRACTICES 47–48 (Joan 
Zorza, ed.  2002) [hereinafter Zorza]; Eli H. Newberger et al., Child Abuse: The Current 
Theory Base and Future Research Needs, 22 J OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 
262, 266 (1983) (citing R. J. Gelles, Violence in the Family: A Review of Research in the 
Seventies, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 873, 873 (1980) (stating that “research in the ‘60’s 
tended to view domestic violence as rare and confined to mentally disturbed and/or poor 
people . . . .”)).   
 197. Zorza, supra note 196, at 47–48.  
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which others have attributed to researchers mistaking a victim’s resulting 
mental injuries for a rationale explaining why she would choose to remain 
in an abusive relationship in the first place.198  People who suffer from 
brain injuries and diseases that affect specific sections of the brain, such as 
the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala, may experience difficulty in 
regulating their emotions199 and do, in fact, possess a higher than average 
propensity to commit domestic violence.200  However, the “mental defect” 
theory fell out of favor when many, if not most, domestic violence 
perpetrators did not appear to suffer from any physical brain abnormality or 
be out of touch with reality.201  In all likelihood, the “mental defect” theory 
is best explained as an example of the human tendency to simply label 
incomprehensible human behaviors as “insane.”202 
Researchers over the years have also suggested various biological and 
chemical explanations of domestic violence, with testosterone being “the 
most researched and proven link to violent behavior.”203  As testosterone 
level is positively associated with aggression and violence,204 one 
advantage of the “testosterone” theory is that it could explain the higher 
incidence of male-on-female violence that occurs in heterosexual 
relationships, given that males generally possess higher testosterone levels 
than females.205  Similarly, several researchers have theorized that domestic 
violence is attributable to unusual levels of serotonin, dopamine, and/or 
other naturally occurring hormones, and some studies have indeed shown 
that unusual levels of serotonin and/or dopamine are positively correlated 
with aggression toward oneself and others, substance abuse, exaggerated 
depression as a result of precipitating life stressors, and suicide.206  In fact, 
 
 198. Zorza, supra note 196, at 47–48. 
 199. See, e.g., JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN 177 (1998); Research Links Brain 
Damage and Violent Crime – USC Studies Point to Underlying Causes of Violent Crime in 
Young Offenders, SCIENCE DAILY, Sept. 13, 1997, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/ 
1997/09/970913073401.htm [hereinafter USC Studies] (stating that “[t]he prefrontal cortex 
is involved in the inhibition of aggressive behavior . . . [and] [s]tudies have shown that 
damage to the region correlates with impulsiveness and unpredictable, uncontrolled 
actions”); NICKY ALI JACKSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 520–21 (2007). 
 200. USC Studies, supra note 199.  
 201. Domestic Violence – Explore the Issue: Theories of Violence, U. OF MINNESOTA 
HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY & MINN. ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2003), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/svaw/domestic/link/theories.htm (summarizing Zorza, 
supra note 196, at 47–48, and reporting that “[b]atterers attack only their intimate partners 
[or other family members]. People who suffer from mental illnesses such as schizophrenia 
do not limit their violence to their intimate partners.”). 
 202. See, e.g., D. L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250, 250 
(Jan. 19, 1973). 
 203. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 39. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See, e.g., Dongiu Seo et al., Role of Serotonin and Dopamine System Interactions in 
the Neurobiology of Impulsive Aggression and its Comorbidity with Other Clinical 
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“[m]ost researchers have reported that a high percentage of domestic 
violence offenders use illegal drugs or consume excessive quantities of 
alcohol, at rates far beyond the general population . . . [,]”207 and some 
writers have theorized that the chemical composition of alcohol and other 
narcotics alters human’s brain chemistry to such an extent that people who 
otherwise would not perpetrate domestic violence end up doing so.208 
However, it is important to understand that a positive correlation 
between a factor and domestic violence does not establish that the factor 
causes domestic violence.  A number of studies have actually “suggested 
that the relationship between alcohol and domestic violence is indirect and 
a function of attitudes supporting the use of violence.”209  In addition, 
researchers have conceded that testosterone alone certainly cannot explain 
all cases of domestic violence, because many individuals, including 
successful businessmen and professional athletes, possess a higher than 
average level of testosterone, and yet they do not all commit domestic 
violence.210  Likewise, neither serotonin nor dopamine, nor any other 
biological or chemical factor that has been identified to date, can explain a 
significant percentage of domestic violence cases.211   
Socio-biologists, who attempt to explain gender-linked human 
behavior, due to the natural selection of traits that guarantee the human 
species’ survival,212 have also offered a theory of domestic violence.213  
Specifically, they have proposed that, due to the fact that a child’s paternity 
is not easily identifiable (unlike his or her maternity), males over time 
developed an aggressive posture vis-à-vis their intimate female partners so 
as to limit their partners’ interactions with other males, thereby reducing 
other males’ opportunities to impregnate their intimate female partners.214  
Psychologists, however, have pointed out several problems with this 
theory.  For example, as one commentator has noted, this theory does not 
 
Disorders, 13 AGGRESSIVE VIOLENT  BEHAV. 383, 383 (Oct. 2008); V. M. Linnoila, M. 
Virkkunen, 53 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 46 (Oct. 1992). 
 207. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 37.  
 208. See, e.g., Robert A. Nash, The Serotonin Connection, 11 THE J. OF ORTHOMOLECULAR 
MED. 35, 39 (1996) available at http://www.orthomolecular.org/library/jom/1996/articles 
/1996-v11n01-p035.shtml  (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (stating that “[t]his paper goes on to 
show that low serotonin is associated with poor impulse control and most likely leads to 
violence to self and others in susceptible individuals”). 
 209. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 38.   
 210. ELIZABETH KANDEL ENGLANDER, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE 76–77 (Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates 2006). 
 211. See, e.g., Wolfe & Jaffe, supra note 194, at 134 (stating that “[t]here are several 
different, and at times, overlapping theories of causation”). 
 212. See, e.g., D.C. ROWE, THE LIMITS OF FAMILY INFLUENCE: GENES, EXPERIENCE AND 
BEHAVIOR (1994); David M. Buss, Evolutionary Psychology: A New Paradigm for 
Psychological Science, 6 PSYCH.  INQUIRY 1, 9–10 (1995). 
 213. See, e.g., DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN 
MATING 16, n. 19 (2003).   
 214. Id. 
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explain why only a small minority of men actually inflict violence on their 
mates, why some women are the violent aggressor in heterosexual 
relationships, why lesbian couples inflict violence on each other, or why 
men do not instead attack males whom they perceive as sexual threats.215   
In addition, numerous researchers have noted that, across a broad range 
of societies, domestic violence occurs more often in low-income families 
than in high-income families.216  Some studies have suggested that this 
phenomenon is explained by the unusually high number of stressful 
situations that low-income families face.217  Some writers have posited that 
domestic violence occurs more often in such families because males in 
these families suffer a masculine identity crisis when they cannot support 
their families and they tend to take their frustration out on their intimate 
female partners.218  Still other researchers suggest that the apparent inverse 
relationship between domestic violence and income may be explained 
simply by “the additional obstacles that poor women face to leaving rather 
than a greater propensity of poor men to batter.”219  In any case, given that 
domestic violence “affect[s] individuals in every community, regardless of 
age, economic status, race, religion, nationality or educational 
background[,]”220 poverty appears to be at most a factor contributing to 
domestic violence, rather than a comprehensive explanation of this aberrant 
behavior.221   
 
 215. DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN 
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 31–33 (The Guilford Press 2007) [hereinafter DUTTON].   
 216. See, e.g., Rachel Jewkes, Intimate Partner Violence: Cause and Prevention, 359 THE 
LANCET 1423, 1424 (Apr. 20, 2002) (citing M.C. Ellsberg et al., Wife Abuse Among Women 
of Childbearing Age in Nicaragua, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 241–44 (1999) [hereinafter  
Jewkes]; S.L. Martin et al., Domestic Violence in Northern India, 150 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL 
417, 417–26 (1999); R. BACHMAN & L.E. SALTZMAN, WASHINGTON: BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE 
DESIGNED SURVEY 1, 4 (1995); G.T. Hotaling & D.B. Sugarman, An Analysis of Risk 
Markers in Husband to Wife Violence: The Current State of Knowledge, 1 VIOLENCE VICTIM 
101, 114 (1986); RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: THE 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988); see also BUZAWA, 
supra note 33, at 40. 
 217. See, e.g., JOHN HAMEL & TONIA L. NICHOLS, FAMILY INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: A HANDBOOK OF GENDER-INCLUSIVE THEORY AND TREATMENT 349, 501–02 
(2006) [hereinafter HAMEL & NICHOLS]; EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN 
ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 59 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007). 
 218. See, e.g., Jewkes, supra note 216, at 1424.  
 219. See, e.g., LUNDY BANCROFT, JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: 
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 30 (2d ed., 2012). 
 220. Tami Lorbecke, The Story of Domestic Violence and Tribal Child Support, in 33:10 
Child Support Report (Oct. 2011), Administration of Children and Families, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ocse/csr1110_0.pdf (last accessed Jan. 21, 2013) (citing Domestic Violence 
Facts, National Coalition Against Violence, 2007, available at 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (last accessed Jan. 5, 
2013)).     
 221. See also SUSAN WEITZMAN, NOT TO PEOPLE LIKE US: HIDDEN ABUSE IN UPSCALE 
MARRIAGES 3–17 (Basic Books 2000) (comprehensive study of 14 middle and high-income 
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A theory of domestic violence that was especially popular in the 1960s 
and 1970s was the “learned behavior” theory, which proposes that abusers 
and victims alike are merely modeling the behavior of their childhood role 
models.222  The learned behavior theory of domestic violence is very 
attractive, both because it implies that today’s domestic violence 
perpetrators were once victims and because it suggests that domestic 
violence can be abolished through education.  It is this theory that is most 
often proffered as the explanation for inter-generational transmission of 
domestic violence in certain families.223  Unfortunately, the “learned 
behavior” theory, just like all of the other above-discussed theories, at most 
appears to provide only a partial explanation of domestic violence, in that 
while exposure to domestic violence during childhood is positively 
correlated with involvement in domestic violence in adulthood,224 most 
people who are exposed to domestic violence in their youth do not 
perpetrate domestic violence as adults.225  
Today, the two dominant theories of domestic violence are the family 
dynamics theory and the feminist theory.226  The family dynamics theory is 
a specific application of general systems theory,227 which holds that one 
should analyze any organic situation from the perspective of how each 
action causes reactions from each of the other dynamic elements rather than 
from a simple linear perspective.228  Essentially, the family dynamics 
theory conceptualizes violence in domestic relationships as the expression 
of violence in response to normal stresses in family life by dysfunctional 
families.229   
The feminist theory, in general, maintains that violence in domestic 
relationships is an outgrowth of patriarchal systems of male dominance in 
 
female victims of domestic violence conducted by author after she had encountered 
hundreds of such victims and learned that ‘“spouse assault by wealthy and powerful men 
rarely leads to police intervention’” . . . “and in more prosperous neighborhoods, spacious 
homes and large lots made it unlikely that neighbors or friends would learn about and report 
the abuse[ ].”  WEITZMAN, supra, at 8.).  
 222. See, e.g., HAMEL & NICHOLS, supra note 217, at 501.    
 223. See, e.g., MARGI LAIRD MCCUE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 13–
14 (2d ed. ABC-CLIO 2008) [hereinafter MCCUE]. 
 224. DUTTON, supra note 215 at 48–52.    
 225. Id.; see also MCCUE, supra note 223, at 13–14. 
 226. Diane L. Zosky, The Application of Object Relations Theory to Domestic Violence, 
27 CLINICAL SOC. WORK. J. 55, 55 (1999) [hereinafter ZOSKY]. 
 227. See, e.g., Family Systems Theory – Basic Concepts/Propositions, Challenges and 
Future Directions, http://family.jrank.org/pages/599/Family-Systems-Theory.html (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2013) (“Family systems theory’s heritage emerged from the work of Ludwig 
Von Bertalanffy’s work on general systems theory which offered the world of the mid-
twentieth century a different way of viewing science.”). 
 228. ZOSKY, supra note 226, at 57. 
 229.  MCCUE, supra note 223, at 12 (“The family systems model looks at the function of 
the entire family.”).   
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the society at large.230  Feminist theorists maintain that it is paternalism that 
permits heterosexual males to abuse their intimate female partners in the 
first place and that such abuse, in turn, reinforces the female partners’ 
subservient status vis-à-vis their male abusers.231  In short, feminist 
theorists hold that domestic violence is primarily an instrument which 
males utilize to retain power and control over females in their personal 
lives.232  
Like the above-discussed theories of domestic violence, however, 
neither the family dynamics theory nor the feminist theory of domestic 
violence can explain a majority of domestic violence cases.  For example, 
critics of the family dynamics theory argue that it does not explain why 
women suffer a disproportionately high percentage of the physical injuries 
and fatalities caused by domestic violence incidents within heterosexual 
relationships.233  Further, critics claim that this theory falsely suggests that 
the victim of domestic violence, who usually is female, is equally as 
culpable as her abuser, who usually is male, for the perpetuation of 
domestic violence in the United States.234   
At a minimum, the premise of the family dynamics theory that 
domestic violence is a “family problem” is troubling because it suggests 
that a domestic violence perpetrator is not entirely responsible for his or her 
own behavior.235  This concept is contrary to the philosophy of personal 
responsibility, which is the lynchpin of the U.S. criminal justice system.236  
Ironically, it appears that the family dynamics theory could even promote a 
perpetual cycle of domestic violence; each time the victim objects to the 
 
230.  MCCUE, supra note 223, at 12 (explaining that the feminist theory, in general, holds 
that “[a] patriarchal society supports male power, female submission, and inequities that 
lead to violence against intimate partners”).   
 231. See, e.g., Barbara Hart, Reading: Why Men Batter Women: An Analysis of Male 
Violence, IOWA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ICADV TRAINING MANUAL FOR 
CRIME VICTIM COUNSELORS 15–16, available at http://icadv.org/pdf/Victim%20Counselor 
%20Manual.pdf. 
 232. See, e.g., Alison Cunningham et al., Theory-Derived Explanations of Male Violence 
Against Female Partners: Literature Update and Related Implications for Treatment and 
Evaluation 20–26, LONDON FAM. COURT CLINIC (1998). 
 233. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 129–37.    
 234. PEGGY PAPP, COUPLES ON THE FAULT LINE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THERAPISTS 154 
(2001) (“In the family theory field, feminist family therapists began to question the notion 
of reciprocity that was central to systems theory.”) [hereinafter PAPP]; see also MCCUE, 
supra note 223, at 12 (stating that some commentators maintain that the family systems 
theory “places partial blame on the victim”). 
 235. See, e.g., Michele Bograd, Family Systems Approaches to Wife Battering: A Feminist 
Critique, 54 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 558, 558 (Oct. 1984). 
 236. See, e.g., MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 263 (New York 
Univ. Press 2002) (pointing out that “[criminal] [o]ffenders must be persons . . . they must 
possess the capacity for autonomy . . . . This makes sense because . . . [c]rime . . . is nothing 
but the exercise of that capacity [for autonomy] against, or to the detriment of, another 
person”) [hereinafter DUBBER].    
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perpetrator’s abuse, the theory appears to justify an abusive response by 
pointing an accusatory finger back at the victim.237  In sum,  
the natural difficult[y] in applying this model [of domestic 
violence] to the real world is that virtually all conduct not 
immediately acceding to the wishes of the other party might be 
viewed as “provocative” or “antagonistic” [to the abuser].  
[However,] [i]n most households this is rarely followed by 
violence.  So this model does not explain those instances in which 
violence erupts[.]238  
Critics of the feminist theory, on the other hand, argue that the theory 
unfairly portrays domestic violence as a crime committed solely or almost 
entirely by men against women in heterosexual relationships and minimizes 
the role that other factors, such as witnessing domestic violence and 
dysfunctional family dynamics, can play in the perpetuation of domestic 
violence.239  That is, while it is certainly the case that women in cultures 
that condone violence against women suffer a disproportionately high share 
of domestic violence incidents,240 proponents of the feminist theory must 
concede241 that it does not explain why all males in heterosexual 
relationships do not abuse their female partners.242  The feminist theory 
also does not explain a number of significant categories of domestic 
violence, such as violence committed by females against males in 
heterosexual relationships243 and violence committed against intimate 
partners in same-sex relationships.244 Additionally, the feminist theory of 
domestic violence does not explain domestic violence directed at a non-
intimate partner, such as an elderly relative or a child.245   
Apart from the psychological theory of domestic violence (discussed in 
depth below), the last major theory of domestic violence is that offered by 
Michael Johnson of Pennsylvania State University, whose work was 
 
 237. See, e.g., William G. Herron et al., Sources of Family Violence, 3 J. SOC. DISTRESS & 
THE HOMELESS 213 (1994). 
 238. BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 50. 
 239. PAPP, supra note 234, at 157 (“Critics of this feminist approach cite the lack of 
attention paid to the frequency with which women return to their abusive partners . . . . 
Often what they want is to remain in the relationship, but without the violence.  And a pure 
feminist approach seems to miss the underlying relationship dynamics that may contribute 
to the cycle of violence.”). 
 240. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 189, at 99.  
 241. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 36–40. 
 242. Id. at 38–39. 
 243. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 122; 140–49.    
 244. DOLAN-SOTO, supra note 154, at 3.  
 245. DELONG, GENERAL AND ORAL PATHOLOGY, supra note 157, at 22 (reporting that 
“[t]ypical data show that as many as 3 [sic] million children each year are reported to child 
protective services (CPS) agencies in the U.S.  . . ., as many as 2,000 [sic] children are 
fatalities of child abuse and neglect each year[,] . . . and [e]lderly abuse is at least as 
common as child abuse”).     
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discussed in the previous section of this article.246  Johnson argues that 
there are two major types of domestic violence:247 situational couple 
violence (which he describes as domestic violence which arises out of 
“particular conflicts or tensions within the relationship”248) and intimate 
terrorism (which he describes as a “[male] attempt to . . . generally 
dominate the [heterosexual] relationship”249).  Furthermore, he argues that 
the family dynamics theory largely explains situational couple violence and 
the feminist theory of domestic violence largely explains intimate 
terrorism.250  Through his insight that there are two primary types of 
domestic violence, Johnson has made a major contribution to our 
understanding of domestic violence.  For example, as discussed above, he 
has revealed that conflating these two different types of domestic violence 
can lead researchers to reach misleading conclusions, such as that female-
on-male violence occurs as frequently as male-on-female violence in 
heterosexual relationships.251  In addition, his insight helps clarify why 
each of the above-discussed theories of domestic violence appears to 
explain only certain cases of domestic violence.   
From the perspective of this article, however, Johnson’s insight 
suggests an even more significant fact regarding domestic violence: 
intimate terrorism is characterized by mental abuse, while situational 
couple violence is characterized by physical abuse.252  The psychological 
theory explained below clarifies the significance of this distinction and 
furthermore suggests that both of Johnson’s two types of domestic violence 
are likely caused by trauma experienced by the abuser during childhood.253  
Hence, it appears that Johnson’s two types of violence may best be viewed 
as two points along a continuum of psychological trauma, suggesting that 
the psychological theory of domestic violence is the most comprehensive 
theory of domestic violence that has been proposed to date.   
V. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 
 In this article, the “psychological” theory of domestic violence 
refers to the theory that one of the main causes of domestic violence, if not 
the primary cause, is the fact that perpetrators of domestic violence tend to 
be persons whose individuation process was interrupted by their own 
exposure to domestic violence (and typically intimate terrorism) during 
 
 246. See supra text accompanying notes 83–118.  
 247. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282.  
 248. Id.   
 249. Id. at 283–84. 
 250.  JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 19, 25, 32, and 63. 
 251. See supra text accompanying notes 88–89. 
 252. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282, 284–85. 
 253. See infra Section V.B.  
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childhood.254  This theory could also be referred to as the “trauma” theory 
of domestic violence.  In this section, the normal development of the 
human brain and mind is first discussed.  Then, the effects of childhood 
exposure to domestic violence, and especially intimate terrorism, on the 
normal development of the human brain and mind are summarized.  
Finally, the male-on-female asymmetric incidence of intimate terrorism in 
heterosexual couples is explained.  
A. NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN BRAIN AND MIND  
 Until just a few decades ago, scientists believed that the various 
physical structures of the human brain grew larger but were otherwise 
genetically determined at the time of an infant’s birth.255  Techniques and 
technologies employed by researchers in recent years, however, have 
revealed that “large areas of . . . [one’s] brain don’t begin to develop until 
after . . . [he or she is] born.”256  The significance of this fact for this article 
is that an infant’s physical brain structures and functions can be 
compromised by events that occur during this post-birth development 
process, especially in the first few years of life.257  For example, the right 
orbitofrontal system of the brain, which is key to regulating one’s 
emotions, develops and shapes the brain’s circuits during the period from 
approximately ten to twelve months to sixteen to eighteen months after 
birth.258 
Of course, psychologists have known for many years that the human 
mind or “psyche” is not fully formed at an infant’s birth,259 and Sigmund 
Freud and Carl Jung in the early 1900s proposed the first major theories of 
human psychological development.260  While many different theories of 
 
 254. ZOSKY, supra note 226, at 58–59; Diane L. Zosky, Disruptions in the Separation-
Individuation Process of Domestically Violent Men: An Empirical Examination of Mahler’s 
Theory, 12 J. OF HUM. BEHAV. IN THE SOC. ENV’T 43, 44 (Mar. 4, 2006); D.J. Sonkin & D. 
Dutton, Treating Assaultive Men in Attachment Perspective, 7 J. OF AGGRESSION, 
MALTREATMENT AND TRAUMA 105 (2003) [hereinafter Sonkin & Dutton]. 
 255. See, e.g., NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF 294–96 (2007) 
[hereinafter DOIDGE].  
 256. Id. at 306, 343. 
 257. Id. at 225–29, 307, 343–44.  In addition, if certain physical structures and functions 
of an infant’s brain are defective or have been compromised at the time of an infant’s birth, 
these structures or functions may be able to repair or heal themselves during the post-birth 
development phase.  Id. at 258–71.   
 258. Id. at 225–29, 343–44. 
 259. See, e.g., WILLIAM DAMON & RICHARD M. LERNER, 1 HANDBOOK OF CHILD 
PSYCHOLOGY: THEORETICAL MODELS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 946 (2006) (discussing how 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his book EMILE: OR, ON EDUCATION (1979) (original work 
published 1762), did not propose a systematic theory or description of age changes, but 
nonetheless contemplated that a human being’s psyche continues to develop at least until he 
or she is an adolescent).  
 260. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, Three Essays on Sexuality, in THE PELICAN FREUD 
LIBRARY (1977) [hereinafter FREUD]; C. J.  JUNG, PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2003) 
[hereinafter  JUNG]; MARIO JACOBY, INDIVIDUATION AND NARCISSISM: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
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psychological development have been proposed since, developmental 
psychologists tend to generally subscribe to either the Freudian or the 
Jungian theory of mind development.261  Furthermore, as demonstrated 
below, these two theories of human psyche development are very similar.   
Freud and Jung agreed that a mature human psyche is composed of 
both a “conscious” component and an “unconscious” component.262  In 
addition, they agreed that a mature human mind is capable of performing 
the following three major functions: engaging in rational thought, adhering 
to a moral code (or conscience), and recognizing and expressing 
emotions.263   
Freud and Jung agreed that a newborn human being does not possess a 
fully developed psyche.264  That is, no infant is born with the capacity to 
speak a particular language, such as Russian or French, adhere to any 
particular moral or cultural code, or express distinct emotions, such as joy 
and sadness.  Freud and Jung’s theories of maturation of the human psyche 
demonstrate how each of the three major functions of the psyche develops 
through an elaborate process whereby its development is dependent on the 
development of the other two functions.265   
The normal maturation of the human psyche proceeds essentially as 
follows.  To begin with, at the moment of an infant’s birth, the infant does 
not possess any sense of existing as a “separate being” from his or her 
primary caregiver.266  Shortly thereafter, however, the infant’s primary 
caregiver makes an appeal to the infant’s emotional capacity,267 and, after 
the two “share” emotions for several months, the normal infant’s psyche 
has developed to the point where he or she is amenable to learning a 
language.268  Through the process of learning a language, the infant’s 
 
SELF IN JUNG AND KOHUT 96 (1991) (Jung described the development of the ‘self’ as the 
‘individuation’ process) [hereinafter JACOBY].   
 261. JACOBY, supra note 260, at ix–x, 33–40, 47–49 (1991); Tom Colls, Myths of the Mind, 
BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8318000/ 
8318707.stm; Kendra Cherry, Freud and Jung, ABOUT, http://psychology.about.com/od 
/sigmundfreud/ig/Sigmund-Freud-Photobiography/Freud-and-Jung.htm. 
 262. See, e.g., FREUD, supra note 260; JUNG, supra note 260, at xxxviii–xxxxix.  
 263. CHRIS BARKER, CULTURAL STUDIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 20–21 (2003) (citing and 
discussing FREUD) [hereinafter BARKER]; CARL GUSTAV JUNG, THE THEORY OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 54, 105 (Nabu Press 2010) [hereinafter JUNG, THEORY OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS].  
 264. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 260. 
 265. BARKER, supra note 263, at 21–22; 17 C.G. Jung, The Development of Personality, in 
COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG 165–87 (Gerhard Adler trans., 1921) [hereinafter Jung, 
Development of Personality].  In addition, as noted above, psychologists and neurologists 
now understand that the development of the human psyche is influenced by, and, in turn, 
influences, the on-going development of the physical structures and functions of the brain.  
DOIDGE, supra note 255, at 225–29, 307, 343.  
 266. BARKER, supra note 263, at 21–22; JACOBY, supra note 260, at 96; Jung, 
Development of Personality, supra note 265, at 172. 
 267. JACOBY, supra note 260, at 96–97. 
 268. Id. 
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ability to engage in rational thought is fostered, as any language contains a 
logical structure.269  Furthermore, through this process, the infant learns 
aspects of his or her culture, including its moral code,270 and develops a 
greater capacity to communicate with the caretaker and others.   
Then, after the infant is able to communicate at least in at least a 
rudimentary form, the infant’s primary caregiver appeals again to the 
infant’s emotional capacity by encouraging the infant to explore the world 
away from the caretaker.271  Freud maintained that most infants have 
completed this first “narcissistic phase” (colloquially referred to as the 
“terrible twos”) within eighteen to twenty-four months of age.272  From the 
time when a child is approximately five years old until he or she is 
approximately twelve or thirteen years old, a child simply further develops 
each of the three major functions of the child’s psyche.273  Finally, the child 
enters the second “narcissistic phase” (often referred to as an individual’s 
“rebellious teenage years”).274  During this second narcissistic phase, the 
child explores various cultures in the larger society and exercises his or her 
autonomy on a more or less constant basis.275  If, as a result of this second 
narcissistic phrase,276 a child ultimately possesses a fully autonomous 
“personality” capable of confidently asserting itself in the world, he or she 
is said to have completed the “narcissistic transformation” process, in terms 
of Freudian psychic development theory277 or the “individuation” process, 
in terms of Jungian psychic development theory.278 
Psychologists have emphasized that, during both of the above-
described “narcissistic phases” but especially during the first such phase, it 
is critically important for the infant’s caregivers to permit him or her to 
exercise his or her autonomy while providing frequent assurances that the 
 
 269. JACOBY, supra note 260, at 96–97. 
 270. See, e.g., MADAN SARUP, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO POST-STRUCTURALISM AND 
POSTMODERNISM 8–10 (1993).  Cultural theorists have pointed out that a child’s conscience, 
in particular, is developed through appeals to both his or her capacity to appreciate emotions 
(i.e., ability to empathize with others’ emotions) as well as his or her capacity to engage in 
rational thought (i.e., ability to learn the society’s moral code).  See, e.g., BRIGID DANIEL, 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT FOR CHILD CARE AND PROTECTION WORKERS 236 (Brigid Daniel et al. 
eds., 1999). 
 271.  See, e.g., BARKER, supra note 263, at 21–22.  
 272. Id. 
 273. Id.; Jung, Development of Personality, supra note 265, at 165–87; PETER GAY, 
FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 147 (1998). 
 274. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE PENGUIN FREUD READER 357–59 (Adam Phillips ed., 
2006).  
 275. BARKER, supra note 263, at 21–22; Jung, Development of Personality, supra note 
265, at 165–87. 
 276. Recent research has revealed that the average person does not complete this process 
and become fully emotionally mature until approximately twenty-five years of age.  See, 
e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Brain Immaturity Could Explain Teen Crash Rate, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52687-2005Jan31.html.   
 277. SIGMUND FREUD, THE FREUD READER 639 (Peter Gay ed., 1995). 
 278. JACOBY, supra note 260, at 96.      
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caregivers will remain a stable fixture in his or her new existence.279  This 
constant encouragement and soothing is needed, according to 
psychologists, because the child feels very excited but also very frightened 
of the larger world beyond his or her comfort zone.280  
Furthermore, during the first narcissistic phase in particular, it is 
essential that the infant’s (typically strong) emotions be reflected back to 
him or her, as otherwise the infant may not learn how to recognize, express, 
and regulate his or her emotions.281  If a child’s emotions are constantly 
ignored or denied, he or she ultimately becomes numb to those emotions.282  
Once a child has failed to develop the capacity to recognize his or her 
emotions, he or she most likely will also be unable to establish firm 
psychological boundaries between his or her self and others, which the 
hallmark of an autonomous personality.283  In addition, if a child cannot 
recognize his or her own emotions, he or she in all likelihood will be 
unable to recognize others’ emotions and develop empathy.284  Moreover, a 
child who is bereft of empathy most likely will be unable to internalize his 
or her society’s moral code, or, in other words, develop a conscience.285   
B. THE EFFECTS OF CHILDHOOD EXPOSURE TO INTIMATE TERRORISM 
As explained, the goal of an intimate terrorist is to completely control 
his or her intimate partner, and he or she can accomplish this goal only by 
completely controlling his or her domestic situation.286  The intimate 
terrorist’s assertion of control over almost every aspect of such a 
household, by definition, is intended to thwart the assertion of autonomy of 
any other member of the household, and that certainly includes any child 
living in the home.287  Furthermore, the intimate terrorist’s weapons of 
choice primarily are mental—including, for example, insults, derogatory 
names, humiliating and unfair punishments, false accusations, involvement 
of the victim in criminal or immoral activities, and the constant elevation of 
 
 279. PHYLLIS TYSON & ROBERT L. TYSON, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORIES OF 
DEVELOPMENT: AN INTEGRATION 101–05 (1993). 
 280. Id. 
 281. See, e.g., ALICE MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY: TRACING CHILDHOOD TRAUMA IN 
CREATIVITY AND DESTRUCTIVENESS 60 (1990) [hereinafter MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY].  
 282. Id. 
 283. CHARLES WHITFIELD, BOUNDARIES AND RELATIONSHIPS: KNOWING, PROTECTING AND 
ENJOYING THE SELF 54 (1994). 
 284. MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY, supra note 281, at 60. 
 285. See, e.g., Jennifer Copley, Why Most People Are Not Psychopathic, SUITE 101 (Aug. 
9, 2008), http://personalitydisorders.suite101.com/article.cfm/why_most_people_are_not_ 
psychopathic; see also Conscience, ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/gale-psychology-
encyclopedia/conscience (defining conscience as “[t]he moral dimension of human 
consciousness, the means by which humans modify instinctual drives to conform to laws 
and moral codes”). 
 286. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 88, 94; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 282, 285–
86. 
 287. Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 284.   
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his needs above the victim’s needs – and such abuse fails to validate a 
child’s emotions and undermines the child’s self-esteem.288  In the story 
presented at the commencement of this article, Josh’s father engages in all 
of the above types of mental abuse.289  
The numerous mental injuries suffered by children in Josh’s situation 
have been documented by many different researchers over many years.290  
Such injuries include: the inability to recognize, express, and regulate one’s 
emotions;291 the inability to self-soothe following upsetting events;292 
significant cognitive impairments;293 dissociative states;294 lack of self-
esteem;295 depression;296 the inability to trust others;297 unprovoked 
aggression toward others;298 and failure to respect others’ rights and 
boundaries.299  In addition, the child’s developing brain structures and 
functions are damaged.300  
Psychologists typically have relied on either “object relations theory” 
or “attachment theory” within the general field of psychology to explain 
how a child exposed to intimate terrorism and such mental injuries would 
cause the child’s individuation process to be interrupted and predispose 
him to commit intimate terrorism himself.301  Very generally, object 
relations theory traces an insecure self and ambivalence in relationships to 
intermittent frustration by one’s mother figure during early childhood and 
failure to complete the individuation process.302  Similarly, attachment 
theory traces an insecure self to the fracture in a basic socio-biological 
need, that of physical attachment to one’s primary caregiver.303  
It would be uncharacteristic of an intimate terrorist to apologize for his 
abuse or attempt to soothe the trauma which a child suffers as a result of 
 
 288. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 88, 94; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 285–86.   
 289. See supra Section I.  
 290. See id; see also, e.g., Carter, supra note 158, at 1 (citing, among other studies, J.L. 
Edleson, Children’s Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
839 (Aug. 1999); J. Wolak & D. Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence, in 
Partner Violence: A Comprehensive Review of 20 Years of Research (J.L. Jasinski & L.M. 
Williams eds., 1998)).    
 291. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Understanding the Effects of Maltreatment on 
Brain Development, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2009) 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/brain_development/effects.cfm#emotional.   
 292. Id.  
 293. Id. 
 294. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE – FROM 
DOMESTIC ABUSE TO TERRORISM 102 (1997). 
 295. Carter, supra note 158, at 6.  
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. DOIDGE, supra note 255, at 225–29, 343–44. 
 301. See, e.g., Sonkin & Dutton, supra note 254, at 105.   
 302. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 126–27. 
 303. Id. at 150–531. 
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witnessing his abuse.304  Intimate terrorists tend to lack empathy,305 believe 
their children should meet their (the intimate terrorists’) needs,306 and be 
preoccupied with maintaining control over their partner and their home.307  
Moreover, the ability of the intimate terrorist’s partner to comfort such a 
child may be compromised by the intimate terrorist’s abuse.308  As a result, 
a child growing up in such an atmosphere may very well be unable to 
complete the individuation process and become an autonomous individual, 
develop his rational thought processes, or recognize his or others’ 
emotions.309   
Donald Dutton made several significant contributions to the 
psychological theory of domestic violence in his 2007 book, The Abusive 
Personality.310  He compiled and analyzed the behavioral traits of a large 
number of domestic violence perpetrators, concluding that they tend to 
suffer from traumatic stress, as is often caused by exposure to intimate 
 
 304. See, e.g., Lundy Bancroft & Jay G. Silverman, Assessing Risk to Children From 
Batterers (2002), http://www.lundybancroft.com/?page_id=261 (“It should be noted that a 
large proportion of batterers are unable to create or support most of the critical healing 
elements [that children need in order to recover from suffering or witnessing the batterer’s 
abuse] . . . Domestic violence perpetration has its roots in a definable set of attitudes, 
beliefs, and behavioral patterns.  These characteristics include among others the man’s 
belief in his right to use violence against a partner to impose his will, his sense of 
entitlement within the family, his patterns of controlling and manipulative behaviors, 
disrespect for his partner and lack of empathy for her feelings, and his externalizing of 
responsibility for his actions”) (internal citations omitted.); H. Lien Bragg, Child Protection 
in Families Experiencing Domestic Violence, Office on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 15–20 (2003) https://www.childwelfare. 
gov/pubs/usermanuals/domesticviolence/domesticviolence.pdf (stating that “[d]omestic 
violence is a pattern of coercive and assaultive behaviors that include physical, sexual, 
verbal, and psychological attacks and economic coercion that adults or adolescents use 
against their intimate partner”) [hereinafter Bragg].  Id. at 29–30 (explaining that 
perpetrators of domestic violence tend to cultivate a favorable public image and blame their 
abuse on their intimate partner and deny, minimize and justify their abuse in general).  Id. at 
31–32 (revealing that common characteristics of perpetrators as fathers include 
authoritarianism, preoccupation with maintaining control over their partner and meeting 
their own emotional needs, irresponsibility toward, and lack of involvement with, their 
children, undermining of their victim’s parenting efforts, self-centeredness, and 
manipulation of their victim and children for the purpose of maintaining power in the 
home).   
 305. See, e.g., Nancy VerSteegh, Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence: Implications 
for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379, 1392 (2005).   
 306. Id.  
 307. Bragg, supra note 304, at 30–31. 
 308. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 136–37; 196–97; see also Peter G. Jaffe & Claire V. 
Crooks, Understanding Women’s Experiences Parenting in the Context of Domestic 
Violence: Implications for Community and Court-Related Service Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, (Feb.  2005), http://www.vaw.umn.edu/ 
documents/commissioned/parentingindv/parentingindv.html; Alytia A. Levendosky & 
Sandra A. Graham-Bermann, Parenting in Battered Women: The Effects of Domestic 
Violence on Women and Their Children, 16 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 173, 187 (2001).  
 309. See supra notes 279–87, 290–303, and accompanying text. 
 310. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 215. 
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terrorism in one’s childhood.311  Furthermore, their symptoms of stress 
were so unmistakable and similar to abused children’s symptoms of stress 
that he realized that “[c]learly there . . . [is] more than mere modeling going 
on in abusive families[.]”312   
Additionally, Dutton determined that the behavior traits of perpetrators 
of domestic violence appear to fall into one of three types of well-
recognized “Cluster B” personality disorders313— avoidant, borderline, and 
anti-social personality—that can occur as a result of abuse experienced or 
witnessed in childhood.314  Specifically, according to Dutton, abusers who 
lack impulse control and engage in domestic violence on an occasional 
basis (perpetrators of situational couple violence, in Johnson’s typology) 
often suffer from avoidant personality disorder, whereas abusers who 
engage in domestic violence on a routine basis, in a cold and calculating 
manner (perpetrators of intimate terrorism, in Johnson’s typology) often 
suffer from antisocial disorder or borderline personality disorder.315   
Finally, Dutton discussed several “protective factors” or “positive 
events” that help prevent a child exposed to intimate terrorism from 
evolving into an intimate terrorist himself.316  These factors include: 
“having one supportive adult in an otherwise hostile early environment, 
being in an emotionally supportive family as an adult, or involvement in 
psychotherapy as an adolescent or young adult.”317  While he conceded that 
it may take some time to conclusively prove the psychological theory of 
domestic violence, the evidence that he presented in support of this theory 
is quite strong and he “believe[s] it is just a matter of time until . . . a 
comprehensive lifespan developmental portrait of the long-term 
consequences of early abuse [can be presented].”318   
C. THE MALE-ON-FEMALE ASYMMETRIC INCIDENCE OF INTIMATE 
TERRORISM IN HETEROSEXUAL COUPLES  
As mentioned above, one of the factors that Dutton listed as protecting 
children exposed to domestic violence from developing into an intimate 
terrorist is “having one supportive adult in an otherwise hostile early 
development.”319  The world-renowned psychologist Alice Miller went so 
far as to state that “[t]he absence or presence of a helping witness in 
childhood determines whether a mistreated child will become a despot who 
 
 311. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 197–209. 
 312. Id. at 126. 
 313. The APA publishes the DSM-IV-TR, which classifies aberrant behavior into various 
personality disorders. DSM-IV-TR at 8.  
 314. DUTTON, supra note 215. 
 315. Id. at 8–16.   
 316. Id. at 51–52. 
 317. Id. 
 318. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 209. 
 319. Id. at 51–52. 
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turns his repressed feelings of helplessness against others or an artist who 
can tell about his or her suffering.”320  Unfortunately for boys, this 
protective factor appears to be much more available to girls than boys, 321 
as “[boys] . . . are taught to apologize for their weaknesses.  [Girls] . . . for 
their strengths[.]”322  For many boys, they perceive their only choices to be 
turning into an angry, controlling abuser themselves or retreating into 
themselves, where they “begin[ ] the task of expunging every possible 
source of shame from [their] identity.”323   
The male-on-female asymmetry of abuse has been variously attributed 
to males’ higher levels of testosterone,324 paternalistic societal norms that 
justify men’s control over women,325 and/or male children witnessing and 
then later modeling their father’s abusive behavior of their mother.326  Each 
of these theories (the biological, feminist, and learned behavior theory, 
respectively327) most likely at least partially explains this asymmetry.  At 
the same time, while further research certainly needs to be conducted on 
this point, Dutton’s psychological (or “trauma”) theory of domestic 
violence,328 in light of society’s inadequate soothing of abused boys’ 
trauma due to its the credo that “boys don’t cry; they must be ‘toughened, 
[both] physically and mentally,’”329 seems to provide a more 
comprehensive explanation for this asymmetry, at least to this writer.  In 
particular, unlike each of the above-mentioned three alternative 
explanations,330 it answers why some boys who witness their father abusing 
their mother turn into  intimate terrorists themselves, while other such boys 
(who likewise possess similar testosterone levels and live in a similarly 
paternalistic society) do not.   
 
 320. MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY, supra note 281, at 60. 
 321. See, e.g., id. at 55, 192 (explaining that boys learn early in life that it is more 
acceptable to convert their fear of abandonment into anger, as anger is a more appropriate 
emotion to display than fear); DAVID B. WEXLER, WHEN GOOD MEN BEHAVE BADLY: 
CHANGE YOUR SELF, CHANGE YOUR BEHAVIOR 57–61 (2004) (discussing “the credo of 
toughening boys up, physically and mentally”) [hereinafter WEXLER].  
 322. See sources cited supra note 2.     
 323. DUTTON, supra note 215, at 192, 209 (noting that the latter “process is no more 
clearly represented than in the case of the entertainer Michael Jackson, who, in response to 
an abusive childhood, attempted to expunge every aspect of his visual identity, including his 
race, through repeated operations on his nose and skin bleaching”). 
 324.  BUZAWA, supra note 33, at 39.  
 325. Amy Elizabeth Lappen, The Neglected Side of Domestic Violence: Case Studies of 
Female Aggressors [sic] in Intimate Partnerships 12 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Univ. S. Cal.) (on file with author). 
 326. Walter S. DeKeseredy & Martin D. Schwartz, Theoretical and Definitional Issues in 
Violence Against Women, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 11 (Claire 
Renzetti et al. eds, 2d ed. 2010). 
 327. See supra notes 203, 222, 230–32, 324–26.  
 328. Supra Section V.  
 329. Wexler, supra note 321, at 60. 
 330. See supra text accompanying notes 324–27.  
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This section has discussed how exposure to intimate terrorism in one’s 
childhood has particularly deleterious effects on a child’s developing brain 
and mind, precisely because this type of domestic violence is characterized 
by mental abuse.  It has also explained how exposure to the trauma of 
intimate terrorism in one’s childhood appears to predispose a child (and 
especially a male child) to developing into an intimate terrorist himself or 
herself.  Finally, this section has noted that intimate terrorism appears to be 
the mechanism through which domestic violence is perpetrated throughout 
generations of American families.  In sum, with respect to domestic 
violence, “the primary risk to . . . children is the intimate terrorist.”331 
The next section reveals that some states include a few forms of mental 
abuse in the statutory definition of domestic violence which their family 
courts utilize during child custody proceedings.332  However, the few forms 
of mental abuse included in these particular definitions of domestic 
violence could be categorized as 1) threats of future physical harm or 
sexual assault; 2) nonconsensual contacts with the victim, and 3) invasions 
of the victim’s privacy,333 which certainly do not encompass all of the types 
of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist typically inflicts on his intimate 
partner and other household members.334  Moreover, given that no state 
requires a person to obtain pre-authorization to contact or infringe the 
privacy of a current intimate partner, at least the last two categories of 
mental abuse incorporated in such statutory definitions of domestic 
violence—unauthorized contacts with the victim and invasions of the 
victim’s privacy—are premised on the notion that the intimate relationship 
between the domestic violence perpetrator and his victim(s) has terminated.  
In short, it appears that state legislatures intentionally excluded most of the 
forms of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s) 
from the definitions of domestic violence which family courts utilize in 
child custody cases.335   
Finally, the state legislatures’ almost complete exclusion of the forms 
of mental abuse suffered during an intimate relationship from their 
definitions of domestic violence suggests that the legislators erroneously 
believe it is impossible for a person to mentally abuse an intimate partner if 
that intimate partner is an autonomous adult who has chosen to remain in 
the relationship.  This belief ignores scientific evidence that the autonomy 
 
 331. Michael P. Johnson, Apples and Oranges in Child Custody Disputes: Intimate 
Terrorism vs. Situational Couple Violence, 2 J. CHILD CUSTODY 43, 51 (2005).  
 332. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 371–418, discussing Cal. Fam. Code § 3044.   
 333. Id.334. See supra Section I (events which occurred to Josh, the teenager in the story 
presented at the commencement of this article) and text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87, 
101–15. 
 334. See supra Section I (events which occurred to Josh, the teenager in the story 
presented at the commencement of this article) and text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87, 
101–15. 
 335. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 371–418, discussing Cal. Fam. Code § 3044.   
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of an adult victim can be eroded by an intimate terrorist’s persistent mental 
abuse.336  Furthermore, this belief is inconsistent with numerous studies 
documenting the many understandable reasons why an adult victim of 
intimate terrorism often chooses not to terminate such a relationship.337  
Not infrequently, foremost among these reasons is the victim’s well-
founded fear that the intimate terrorist will kill or seriously injure her or her 
children if she does so.338  Most important, all state legislatures mandate 
that family courts decide each child custody case in accordance with the 
best interests of the child.  Yet, the statutory definitions of domestic 
violence which these courts must follow exclude most acts of intimate 
terrorism even though such acts may have significantly harmed the child.  
The next section of this article reviews such statutory definitions of 
domestic violence in some detail.   
VI. DEFINITIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UTILIZED IN 
THE FIFTY STATES 
A major premise of this article is that each state’s laws for combating 
and treating domestic violence should be based on the most accurate 
information available regarding the causes and consequences of domestic 
violence.  Only if these laws are based on such information can they 
provide the most effective interventions and remedies possible for the 
many victims of domestic violence.  To that end, this section of the article 
reviews the various state statutory definitions of domestic violence and 
assesses the extent to which they reflect the above-discussed contributions 
made by the field of psychology to our understanding of domestic violence.   
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that “[t]he U.S. legal system’s 
treatment of domestic violence has evolved a long way from the ‘rule of 
thumb’ and the principle that children are always the exclusive property of 
the father upon the dissolution of a marriage, regardless of the reason for 
 
 336. See, e.g., LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 69–73, 360–61 
(3d ed. 2009); see also supra text accompanying notes 101–104, 110–111. 
 337. The Facts about Domestic Violence, Minn. Ctr. Against Violence & Abuse (2010) 
http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/inbriefs/domesticviolence/domesticviolence.html#tjad
en1998 (“Victims of domestic violence experience many barriers when leaving abusive 
relationships. These include fear of the abuser, believing the abuser will take their children, 
hoping the abuser will change, embarrassment, shame and self-blame about their situation. 
Limited financial options, lack of transportation, lack of knowledge the services exist, and 
lack of proximity to those services are also factors.”).  
 338. In fact, an intimate terrorist’s tendency to increase his violence when the victim 
attempts to separate from him is so common that domestic violence experts have dubbed 
this phenomenon “separation assault.”  Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: 
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991); Martha R. Mahoney, 
Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 79 
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk, eds., 1994) (noting that more than half of 
domestic violence homicides are committed after the victim leaves the relationship).  
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the dissolution.”339  Since the U.S. Congress’s enactment of the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA)340 in 1994, several states have enacted 
domestic violence laws,341 and many victims of domestic violence have 
benefitted as a result.342   
At the same time, much work remains to be done to provide the 
majority of domestic violence victims with effective legal assistance.  
Today, most states’ domestic violence laws are a bewildering jumble of 
inconsistent, incomplete and nonsensical provisions.  This morass reflects 
society’s deep misunderstanding and confusion regarding domestic 
violence.  In California, for example, “domestic violence” is regulated in 
the Penal Code,343 the Health and Safety Code,344 the Welfare and 
Institutions Code,345 the Family Law Code, 346 the Civil Code,347 and the 
 
 339. Claire Wright, Confronting Domestic Violence Head On: The Role of Power in 
Domestic Relationships, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 21, 21 (citing James Gillray, Judge 
Thumb, or Patent Sticks for Family Corrections: Warranted Lawful! (Nov. 27, 1872), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/cph.3c14396/; Marian Bussey & Jean 
Biesecker, Protecting the Rights of Children in Disputed Custody Cases: Mental Health and 
Legal Considerations, 16 FAMILY ATT’Y 34, 34 (citing R.A. GARDNER, FAMILY EVALUATING 
IN CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION (1982)).  “The phrase rule of thumb originated in the 
common-law rule that a husband could beat his wife without legal sanction if he used a rod 
not thicker than his thumb.”  MARTHA ALBERSTON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: 
THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 218, n. 9 (1994) (citing Davidson, Wife 
Beating: A Recurring Phenomenon Throughout History, in BATTERED WOMEN: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 18–21 (M. Roy ed., 1977)).  See also 
THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HEAD ON: THE 
ROLE OF POWER IN DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS, Brochure for Ninth Annual Women and the 
Law and Ruth Bader Ginsburg Lecture (Feb. 27, 2009) (on file with the Thomas Jefferson 
Law Review).  
 340. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 
Stat. 1902.   
 341. See, e.g., Domestic Violence: Encyclopedia of Everyday Law, ENOTES, 
http://www.enotes.com/everyday-law-encyclopedia/domestic-violence (last visited Jan. 19, 
2013); Leslye Orloff & Olivia Garcia, Dynamics of Domestic Violence Experienced by 
Immigrant Victims, ch. 1.1 in BREAKING BARRIERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS 
AND RESOURCES FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANTS 1, 6, 8–9 (Women’s Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, 2004), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/ our-work/immigrant-
women-program/breaking-bariers.html (explaining that immigrant women and children are 
particularly vulnerable to domestic violence due to an abuser’s threat that he can have her 
deported (possibly without her children), their lack of family and other support networks in 
the United States, their unfamiliarity with the English language and the United States legal 
system and discussing how the VAWA permits immigrant women and children to obtain 
legal status in the United States without the abuser’s assistance and provides immigrant 
victims of domestic violence with a variety of social services).   
 342. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Commemorates Fifteen Years of 
Violence Against Women Act (Sept. 14, 2009) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/ 
September/09-ag-953.html (stating that “[i]n the past 15 years [since the passage of the 
VAWA], countless lives have been saved, the voices of survivors have been heard, families 
have been protected, and the criminal justice community has been trained on the complex 
responses to domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence and stalking”). 
 343. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13700(a), 13700(b) (Deering 2010). 
 344. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124250(a)(1) (Deering 2010). 
 345. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18291 (Deering 2010).  
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Civil Procedure Code.348  The first four codes contain different definitions 
of domestic violence.349  In addition, “abuse,” “child abuse,” and “elder 
abuse” are addressed in a number of different code sections, some of which 
contain conflicting definitions.350 
While it will take a concerted effort and a fair amount of time to 
rationalize this area of the law, state legislatures should address the most 
pressing concerns of domestic violence as soon as possible.  The 
psychological explanations of the causes and effects of domestic violence 
suggest that because children are the most vulnerable victims of domestic 
violence, there are two particularly pressing issues that states should 
address.  These are (1) the failure of most child custody schemes to treat a 
party’s prior commission of domestic violence as a rebuttable presumption 
against awarding custody to that party; and (2) the failure of the 
overwhelming majority of states to include in their definition of domestic 
violence for child custody proceedings the type of mental abuse perpetrated 
by an intimate terrorist.351 
As stated above, in every state a family court is required to make a 
child custody decision in accordance with “the best interest of the child,”352 
and, in many states, a party’s prior commission of domestic violence is a 
factor which the court must or may consider in this determination.353  
However, only one-half of the states stipulate that a parent’s prior 
commission of domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
court’s grant of custody of the child to a party who has committed domestic 
violence would not be “in the best interest of the child.”354  Furthermore, in 
at least seven of these states, a family court is required to respect a 
competing rebuttable presumption in favor of granting joint custody to the 
child’s parents.355  Therefore, in those seven states, the rebuttable 
presumption in favor of joint custody tends to effectively rebut the 
 
 346. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6203, 6211 (Deering 2010). 
 347. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.6(a) (Deering 2010). 
 348. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (Deering 2010). 
 349. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13700(a), 13700(b) ((Deering 2010) and CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124250(a)(1) (Deering 2010), with CAL. WELF. & INST. § 18291 
(Deering 2010) and CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6203, 6211 (Deering 2010).   
 350. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (Deering 2010); see also, e.g., CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 18951(e) (Deering 2010) (contrasting definitions of “child abuse”).    
 351. See, e.g., Child Custody and Domestic Violence by State, AM. BAR ASS’N  COMM’N 
ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Feb. 2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/domviol/docs/Custody.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABACDV]; Custody 
Decisions in Cases with Domestic Violence Allegations, AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
legalservices/probono/childcustody/domestic_violence_chart1.authcheckdam.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2013) [hereinafter ABACD]. 
 352. ABACDV, supra note 351. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
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rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a party who has 
committed domestic violence.356   
Several of the state child custody statutes that do include a rebuttable 
presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence 
stipulate that only an act of domestic violence committed within the last 
few years will trigger the presumption.357  In addition, some of these 
statutes further limit the presumption to situations in which the perpetrator 
committed repetitive acts of physical violence.358  Finally, the presumption 
in some such states only concerns the perpetrator’s physical custody of the 
child, when a perpetrator can continue to abuse the other party as well as 
the child concerned through his or her legal custody of the child.359 
A. CALIFORNIA’S DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FOR USE IN CHILD 
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS  
Many commentators believe that Section 3044 of the California Family 
Code provides some of the strongest protections against domestic violence 
in the child custody context.360  It provides that: 
Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child 
has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking 
 
 356. ABACDV, supra note 351. 
 357. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010) 
(presumption is triggered only if party has a history of perpetrating domestic violence 
“during the two years preceding the date of the filling the suit or during the pendency of the 
suit”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(j) (2009) (presumption is triggered only if the 
domestic violence in question occurred “within a reasonable time proximate to the 
proceeding”).  
 358. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (2008) (presumption that joint custody is 
not in best interests of child arise “if one (1) of the parents is found by the court to be a 
habitual perpetrator of domestic violence . . . .”); ABACD, supra note 351; ABACDV, 
supra note 351. 
 359. See, e.g., Pa. Coalition Against Domestic Violence, PCADV Briefing to House 
Judiciary Committee 19 (2009), http://www.pcadv.org/Resources/Briefing_ 
CustodyReform.pdf (stating that “[j]oint custody is simply not appropriate in cases where 
one is parent abusive.  Joint custody is dangerous to abused parents and their children 
because it forces continued contact and interaction even where the abusive parent poses a 
known risk of continued abuse.” (citing Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-
Custody Versus Sole Custody Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J. FAM. 
PSYCHOLOGY 91–102 (2002)); see also Nat’l Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, 
MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 33 (1994), http://www.ncjfcj. 
org/images/stories/dept/fvd/pdf/modecode_fin_printable.pdf (“In every proceeding where 
there is . . . determination by the court that domestic or family violence has occurred raises a 
rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of  the 
child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody with the 
perpetrator of family violence.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, FAMILY LAW SECTION, MODEL JOINT 
CUSTODY STATUTE, § 1 (Aug. 1989) http://www.abanetorg/child/joint-custody.doc (“Joint 
custody is inappropriate in cases in which spouse abuse, child abuse, or parental kidnapping 
is likely to occur.”). 
 360. See, e.g., Marie De Santis, California Passes Tough New Domestic Violence Laws, 
WOMEN’S JUSTICE CENTER, http://www.purpleberets.org/violence_new_law.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
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custody of the child or against the child or the child’s siblings 
within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to 
a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to 
the best interest of the child, pursuant to Section 3011.  This 
presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the 
evidence.361 
. . .  
For purposes of this section the requirement of a finding by the 
court shall be satisfied by, among other things, and not limited to, 
evidence that a party seeking custody has been convicted within 
the previous five years, after a trial or a plea of guilty or no contest, 
of any crime against the other party that comes within the 
definition of domestic violence  . . . .362  
The requirement of a finding by the court shall also be satisfied if 
any court, whether that court hears or has heard the child custody 
proceedings or not, has made a finding . . . based on conduct 
occurring within the previous five years.363 
Both the five-year period for review and the power granted to a family 
court to conduct its own domestic violence investigation provided in 
Section 3044 of the California Family Code are particularly powerful tools 
for combating domestic violence.364  These provisions recognize that even 
if a domestic violence incident occurred a few years in the past and no legal 
tribunal declared the incident to constitute domestic violence at the time, 
such an event can effectively intimidate family members and obviate a 
perpetrator’s need to engage in physical violence in more recent years.365  
In addition, these provisions reflect the fact that a victim often is too 
intimidated to pursue domestic violence charges while he or she is co-
 
 361. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (Deering 2010). 
 362. Id. at § 3044(d)(1). 
 363. Id. at § 3044(d)(2). 
 364. See supra text accompanying notes 357, 358, 360; see also Lisa Bolotin, When 
Parents Fight: Alaska’s Presumption Against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of 
Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 263, 276, 281, 284 (2008) (arguing that although 
Alaska’s presumption against an award of joint custody to a domestic violence perpetrator 
could provide even greater protection for children in certain respects, a number of aspects of 
its presumption provide relatively strong protections for children and also pointing out that 
California’s presumption, with respect to these same aspects, is at least as child-protective 
as Alaska’s) [hereinafter Bolotin]. 
 365. See, e.g., Jan Elizabeth Brown, Debunking The Myths: Anyone Can Be an Abuser or 
Victim, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 3, 2009 2:14PM), http://blogs.courant.com/overcoming_ 
battered_lives/2009/09/debunking-the-myths-anyone-can.html (“[R]egarding physical 
abuse, battered women’s advocates have stated that male abusers do not necessarily need to 
use physical force in order to control their victims once power and control is established.  
Neither do abusive women.”). 
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habiting with the perpetrator and therefore it’s logical that a victim might 
raise the matter in court for the first time during the course of a custody 
dispute.366   
Moreover, Section 3044 of the California Family Code explicitly states 
that California’s preference that a child maintain frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents cannot rebut the presumption against granting 
sole or joint custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence.367  
Only a few of the other state statutes that recognize a rebuttable 
presumption against granting custody to a domestic violence perpetrator 
contain an explicit statement to this effect.368  Section 3044 of the 
California Family Code even specifies the categories of evidence that can 
rebut the presumption against granting custody to a perpetrator of domestic 
violence.369  Examples of such evidence include the perpetrator’s 
completion of a batterer’s treatment program, the perpetrator’s compliance 
with the terms and conditions of any protective order or restraining order, 
the perpetrator’s completion of a program of alcohol or drug abuse 
counseling, and the perpetrator’s completion of a parenting class (assuming 
the court believes such counseling or class was warranted).370  
In all of the above-mentioned respects, Section 3044 of the California 
Family Code serves as a model for how child custody courts should treat 
domestic violence.  However, the definition of domestic violence 
incorporated in section 3044 is deficient because it does not explicitly 
include any and all forms of mental abuse.371  Section 3044(c) of the 
California Family Code provides that, with respect to the presumption 
against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence,  
a person has “perpetrated domestic violence” when he or she is 
found by the court to have intentionally or recklessly caused or 
attempted to cause bodily injury to that person or to another, or 
sexual assault, or to have placed a person in reasonable 
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to 
another, or to have engaged in any behavior . . . for which a court 
 
 366. Ruth Wilson Zamierowski, Why Does a Woman Stay in a Violent Relationship? The 
Very Real Risks of Leaving a Batterer, SUITE 101 (Aug. 20, 2009), http://physical-
abuse.suite101.com/article.cfm/why_does_a_woman_stay_in_a_violent_relationship#ixzz0
TPR6ZRJH (“When a woman leaves an abusive relationship, it does not mean that the 
violence will end.  In fact, the violence and the risks to her and her children often 
escalate.”).  
 367. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(b) (Deering 2010).   
 368. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 598.41.1(b) (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2007).  
 369. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(b) (Deering 2010).   
 370. Id.  
 371. See infra text accompanying notes 372–418.  California Family Code § 3044 also 
would be improved if the presumption against awarding custody to a party who has 
committed domestic violence were not triggered solely by acts of domestic violence 
committed against another party to the custody proceeding, the child concerned, or the 
child’s siblings.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (Deering 2010). 
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may issue an ex parte order pursuant to section 6320 to protect the 
other party seeking custody of the child or to protect the child and 
the child’s siblings.372  
To be sure, causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, committing 
sexual assault, and placing a person in reasonable apprehension of 
imminent serious bodily injury to that person or another can cause 
significant mental harm to a victim.  Still, as discussed above, an intimate 
terrorist mentally abuses his victim in a myriad of ways that are designed to 
control his victim.373  As discussed above, such acts, include, for example, 
routinely ignoring the victim’s needs and desires, calling the victim 
derogatory names, humiliating the victim in private and public, and 
requiring the victim to account for every second of time that she spends 
outside of the perpetrator’s presence,374 and few, if any, of these acts appear 
to be encompassed within the language of Section 3044(c) of the California 
Family Code.  In fact, as the above-quoted language from section 3044(c) 
makes clear, the only possibility that such forms of mental abuse are 
included in section 3044(c)’s definition of domestic violence is if they are 
the type of activities that a court can enjoin under Section 6320 of the 
California Family Code.375   
Section 6320 of the California Family Code is a component of 
California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA),376 which was 
intended to provide victims with a broad range of legal protections against 
domestic violence.377  A section 6320 protection order in particular is 
intended to facilitate the temporary or permanent separation of the 
domestic violence perpetrator and victim, while also protecting the victim 
from any further acts of domestic violence by the perpetrator.378  To that 
end, section 6320 provides that an ex parte “protective order may be issued 
to a petitioner upon a showing of ‘reasonable proof of a past act or acts of 
abuse,’”379 specifically enumerated in section 6320 as:  
molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually 
assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, including, but not 
limited to, annoying telephone calls as described in Section[sic] 
653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property, contacting, 
either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a 
 
 372. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(c). 
 373. See supra text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87, 101–15. 
 374. Id. 
 375. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (Deering 2010). 
 376. Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 6200). 
 377. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1498 (2009). 
 378. Id. at 1494 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 6300; Gonzalez v. Munoz, 156 Cal. App. 4th 
413, 421 (2007)).   
 379. Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200). 
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specific distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other 
party . . . .380 
In ascertaining the proper interpretation of any California statute, 
including section 6320, one must be mindful that, in California: 
[the] “fundamental task is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers 
so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.381 [Citation.]” (Estate 
of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 910, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 24 
P.3d 1191.). [In addition, one begins] “by examining the statutory 
language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.’ 
[Citations.] If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we 
presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain 
meaning of the language governs. [Citations.] If there is ambiguity, 
however, we may then look to extrinsic sources, including the 
ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. 
[Citation.]”382   
In addition, Section 13 of the California Civil Code clarifies that 
California follows the statutory construction principle that, unless the 
statute in question indicates otherwise, one can “[p]resume that the 
legislature uses the same term consistently in different statutes.”383  The 
California Supreme Court has held, however, that, in applying any rule of 
statutory construction, “the fundamental concern . . . [is] the ascertainment 
and furtherance of legislative intent.”384   
Accordingly, as Section 3044 of the California Family Code contains a 
specific definition of domestic violence for use in child custody 
proceedings, definitions of domestic violence in other California statutes 
are irrelevant regarding the legislature’s meaning of domestic violence in 
Section 3044 of the California Family Code.  On the other hand, as the 
Legislature, in Section 6320 of the California Family Code, did not 
specifically define any of the acts of abused listed therein, definitions of 
those acts in other California statutes may very well provide guidance as to 
the meaning of those acts.   
In light  of California’s statutory construction rules, it is clear that the 
acts of “attacking,” “striking,” “sexually assaulting,” “battering,” and 
“destroying personal property,” each of which is an act of physical 
violence, do not encompass the various types of mental abuse which an 
intimate terrorist regularly inflicts on his victim(s) during the course of a 
 
 380. Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1498 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320). 
 381. Id. at 1497. 
 382. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1497 (2009). 
 383. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 
341, 418 (2010) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 13 (West 2007)).   
 384. Parsley v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 9 Cal. 3d 934, 945 (1973) (internal 
citations omitted.). 
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domestic relationship.  In addition, Section 646.9 of the California Penal 
Code defines the crime of stalking as 1) the repeated following or 
harassment of a person, 2) “a credible [explicit or implicit] threat with the 
intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the 
safety of his or her immediate family,” and 3) conduct which would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and in fact causes 
the victim to suffer such emotional distress, and the California Civil Code 
similarly defines the tort of stalking as 1) a course of conduct by which the 
defendant intends to follow, alarm, or harass the plaintiff, 2) as a result of 
which the plaintiff reasonably fears for his or her safety or the safety of an 
immediate family member, and 3) the defendant either a) makes a credible 
(explicit or implicit) threat with the intent to place the plaintiff in 
reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of an immediate family 
member, or b) violates a restraining order.385  Given these statutes’ 
requirements that the perpetrator must intend to cause the victim to suffer 
severe emotional pain and also must make a credible threat to the physical 
safety of the victim or an immediate family member of the victim (or, 
alternatively, violate a restraining order, in the case of the tort of stalking), 
the word “stalking” in Section 6320 of the California Family Code also 
does not encompass all of the various forms of mental abuse which an 
intimate terrorist commits against his victim(s).  Furthermore, the acts of 
“telephoning,” “contacting,” and “coming within a specified distance of . . . 
the other party” listed in section 6320 are premised on the notion that the 
intimate relationship between the perpetrator and his victim has terminated, 
because intimate partners regularly telephone and contact one another and 
typically are in close physical proximity with each other.  Accordingly, 
these actions likewise do not encapsulate all of the various forms of mental 
abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s).   
Accordingly, the only acts listed in Section 6320 of the California 
Family Code which could encompass the various forms of mental abuse 
which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s) during an intimate 
relationship are “molesting,” “threatening,” “harassing,” and “disturbing 
the peace of the other party.”  Unfortunately, as is further explained below, 
it appears that none of these acts is broad enough to include the various 
forms of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s) 
either.   
 
 385. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (Deering 2010);  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (Deering 2010); 
see also Lambers Royakkers, The Dutch Approach to Stalking Laws, 3 Cal. Crim. L. Rev. 2, 
¶ 23 (2000), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjcl/vol3/iss1/2 (accessed Mar. 
27, 2013) (stating that a flaw in California's definition of the crime of stalking is that “the 
stalker must evoke fear in any reasonable person that he/she or his/her next of kin are in 
danger of physical violence or of being killed”); David J,. Loundy, Online Stalking, in 2 THE 
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA, 812 (John Wiley & Sons Hossein Bidgoli eds., 2004) (indicating 
that the tort of stalking in California likewise requires that the defendant's actions must 
cause the victim to fear for his or her physical safety).   
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Neither section 6320 nor any other section of the California Family 
Code defines the terms “threatening,” “molesting,” “disturbing the peace 
of,” or “harassing.”386  Other California code sections, as well as various 
court cases, however, provide some clarification of these terms.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case discussing section 
6320, indicated that the term “threatening” in section 6320 refers simply to 
“credible threats of violence.”387   
In the case of In re Marriage of Nadkarni,388 the California Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth District defined the term “disturbing the peace of the 
other party” in section 6320 as “conduct that destroys the mental or 
emotional calm of the other party.”389  While this definition, on its face, 
appears broad enough to include an intimate terrorist’s mental abuse of his 
victim(s), the court’s opinion indicates that the act of “disturbing the peace 
of the other party,” in the context of Section 6320 of the California Family 
Code, assumes the separation of the parties.390   
In Nadkarni, the petitioner alleged that her former spouse had 
“access[ed], read[ ], and publicly disclos[ed] . . . her confidential 
emails,”391 “used the information obtained from her e-mail account to 
subpoena the records of third parties, including her business contacts [for 
use in a pending child custody dispute], and to find out what social events 
she would be attending.”392 She elaborated that the petitioner had ‘“told 
others that he knew which social events I would be attending within the 
past three months.”393  She also stated that “she feared that he would 
continue to use the ‘private and privileged’ information that he had 
obtained from her e-mails ‘to control, harass, and abuse’ her if he were not 
enjoined from such conduct[,]”394 specifically “us[ing] this information to 
harm her business and livelihood, her reputation in the community and her 
personal relationships.”395  The respondent’s various actions, according to 
the petitioner, had caused her “‘shock’ and ‘embarrassment,’ . . . fear [of] 
the destruction of her ‘business relationships,’ and . . . fear for her 
 
 386. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 50-155 (Deering 2010) (defining 
certain terms used in CAL. PENAL CODE § 646).   
 387. Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 2009)  (stating that “every 
portion of a protective order issued under section 6320 ‘involves protection against credible 
threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury’”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)).   
 388. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (2009). 
 389. Id. at 1497. 
 390. See infra text accompanying notes 400–08.  
 391. Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1498–99.  
 392. Id. at 1490. 
 393. Id. at 1490. 
 394. Id. at 1492. 
 395. Id. 
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safety,”396 especially given that her former spouse had physically abused 
her during their marriage.397   
On appeal, the petitioner furthermore asserted that, “[h]ad she been 
able to be heard on the merits, the [trial] court would have heard testimony 
about how [the respondent’s] . . . conduct [had] harassed her, disturbed her 
peace, invaded her privacy, frightened her and intimidated her.”398  After 
acknowledging that its scope of review was limited to determining if the 
trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s 
application for a protective order under section 6320,399 the court of appeals 
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s application and 
remanded the case back to the trial court for a hearing on the merits of her 
claim.  Specifically, the court of appeals held that the respondent’s conduct 
of “accessing, reading and publicly disclosing her confidential e-mails”400 
constituted either “contact[ ] [with] . . . the [petitioner] . . . . ‘directly or 
indirectly, by mail or otherwise’”401 or “destr[uction] . . . [of her] . . . 
mental or emotional calm . . .” and hence a “disturb[ance] . . . [of] her 
peace,”402 thereby warranting the trial court’s issuance of a permanent 
restraining order pursuant to Section 6320 of the California Family Code if 
the petitioner proved her allegations.403   
While the court did not explicitly state that the actions of “contacting 
 . . . the other party” and “disturbing the peace of the other party” in Section 
6320 of the California Family Code are premised on the parties’ separation, 
the court addressed only these two specific actions in section 6320,404 even 
though the petitioner also had alleged that the respondent’s conduct 
constituted several other of the proscribed actions listed in section 6320 as 
well.405  Additionally, each of these actions arguably is premised on the 
parties’ separation (e.g., when two parties share an intimate relationship, 
their ongoing contact with one another is assumed and furthermore no 
California court has held that a party to an intimate relationship could be 
held accountable for “disturbing the peace” of the other party to that 
relationship.)  In addition, the parties in Nadkarni were themselves 
separated at the time of the respondent’s alleged conduct.406   
Moreover, in its opinion, the court of appeals seems to consider the 
gravamen of the petitioner’s complaint to be the respondent’s access to her 
 
 396. Id. at 1499. 
 397. Id. at 1490, 1496.  
 398. Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1496. 
 399. Id. at 1495. 
 400. Id. at 1498.   
 401. Id. at 1496–97. 
 402. Id. at 1498–99. 
 403. Id. at 1496–97, 1499. 
 404. Id. at 1497–99. 
 405. See, e.g., id. at 1488, 1490.  
 406. Id. at 1487. 
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confidential emails and public disclosure of the same.407  That is, the court 
of appeals seems to emphasize the respondent’s alleged infringement of the 
petitioner’s privacy,408 even though the court does not explicitly 
acknowledge that this is the case, and no California court has held that a 
person possesses a cause of action against an intimate partner for 
infringement of his or her privacy.  Of course, if the act of “disturbing the 
peace of the other” in Section 6320 of the California Family Code is 
premised on the parties’ separation, then by definition this act does not 
encompass the  mental abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his 
victim(s) during the course of an intimate relationship.  In sum, even after 
Nadkarni, it’s far from certain that the act of “disturbing the peace of the 
other,” listed in Section 6320 of the California Family Code, is broad 
enough to encompass the mental abuse which an intimate terrorist regularly 
inflicts on his victims during an intimate relationship.   
Finally, neither “molesting” nor “harassing,” the two remaining acts 
listed in Section 6320 of the California Family Code, appear to include the 
acts of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist inflicts on his victim(s) 
during an intimate relationship.  The California Supreme Court has 
clarified that the phrase “to molest another” in the California Penal Code 
means “to interfere with or meddle with unwarrantably so as to injure or 
disturb.”409  It has also stated that “molestation is a willful injury inflicted 
upon another by interference with the user of rights as to person or 
property.”410  The court’s association of the word “molest” with the word 
“disturb,” its use of the word “unwarranted” when describing the type of 
interference or meddling that constitutes “molestation,” and its definition of 
“molestation” in terms of infringements to the victim’s rights to 
personhood or property all suggest that the act of “molesting” (like the act 
of “disturbing the peace of the other party”) in Section 6320 of the 
California Family Code is premised on the  perpetrator’s nonconsensual or 
unauthorized contact with the victim.  According, the act of “molesting” 
similarly appears not to be broad enough to include the acts of mental 
abuse which an intimate terrorist commits against his victim(s) during the 
course of an intimate relationship.  
Finally, given that Section 6320 of the California Family Code does not 
define the act of “harassing,” definitions of “harassing” or “harassment” in 
other California statutes may provide guidance as to the meaning of this act 
 
 407. See, e.g., id. at 1488 (referring to the respondent’s alleged “use of personal 
information accessed through [the petitioner’s] . . . email”), 1492 (stating that [the 
petitioner] . . . feared that [the respondent] . . .  would continue to use the private and 
privileged information that he had obtained”).  
 408. Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1496. 
 409. People v. Lopez, 19 Cal. 4th 282, 290 (1998) (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L 
DICTIONARY (2d. ed.)). 
 410. Lopez, 19 Cal. 4th at 290. 
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in section 6320.411  Section 527.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure 
defines “harassment” in the civil law context, as:  
unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and 
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously 
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no 
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, 
and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the 
plaintiff.412   
. . . “Course of conduct” is a pattern of conduct composed of a 
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a 
continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an 
individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or 
sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, 
including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, 
interoffice mail, fax, or computer e-mail . . .413   
To be sure, an intimate terrorist’s acts of mental abuse constitute a 
“course of conduct” directed at his victim(s)414 and the above-quoted 
definition of “harassment” in section 527.6 of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure similarly includes a “course of conduct” directed by the  
perpetrator at a specific victim.  However, the above-stated definition of 
“harassment” indicates that the California Legislature intended for the 
phrase “course of conduct” in the context of “harassment” to possess a 
relatively narrow scope.  That is, the above-quoted definition of “course of 
conduct” provides that a complainant claiming that the respondent has 
perpetrated such a “course of conduct” must prove not only that an 
“average” or “typical” person would have suffered substantial emotional 
distress as a result of the perpetrator’s course of conduct but that he or she 
in fact suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of the perpetrator’s 
course of conduct.  Moreover, all of the examples of “course of conduct” 
provided in the above-quoted definition involve either a credible threat of 
violence,415 unauthorized contact with the victim, or infringement of the 
victim’s privacy.  Therefore, as California follows the statutory 
 
 411. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 50-155.     
 412. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b)(3) (Deering 2010).  
 413. Id. § 527.6(b)(1). 
 414. See supra text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87, 101–15. 
 415. Again, a “stalker” in California is defined as “[a]ny person who willfully, 
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses another person and 
who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or 
her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family . . . .”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) 
(Deering 2010).   
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construction principle of ejusdem generis,416 these examples suggest that 
the California Legislature intended that only credible threats of violence, 
unauthorized contact with the complainant, or infringements of the 
complainant’s privacy constitute the type of conduct which would rise to 
the level of “harassment.”   
Based on all of the above, the terms “threatening,” “disturbing the 
peace,” “molesting,” and “harassing” in Section 6320 of the California 
Family Code together appear to refer only to the specific mental harm 
which a victim suffers on account of a domestic violence perpetrator’s 
credible threats of physical harm, unauthorized contacts with the victim, or 
infringements of the victim’s privacy, and a number of statutory 
construction principles support this conclusion.  As noted above, a 
California statute must always be interpreted in accordance with the 
context and the Legislature’s purpose,417 and while the Legislature’s clear 
intent in enacting the DVPA,418 of which Section 6320 of the Family Code 
is a part, was to provide victims of domestic violence with a broad range of 
remedies,419 as discussed above, the language of section 6320 strongly 
suggests that the Legislature considered domestic violence to consist of 
physical harm, threats of physical harm, and acts premised on the 
separation of the parties (such as unauthorized contact with the victim and 
infringement of the victim’s privacy).  
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the case of Alanis-
Alvarado v. Holder,420  
some acts [listed in Section 6320], such as telephoning one’s 
domestic partner, or coming within a specified distance of him 
or her, do not typically constitute violence, threats, or 
 
 416. The term “ejusdem generis” means “of the same kind, class, or nature.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990).  The doctrine of ejusdem generis “presumes that if the 
Legislature intends a general word to be used in its unrestricted sense, it does not also offer 
as examples peculiar things or classes of things since those descriptions then would be 
surplusage.”  Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Svcs., 23 Cal. 4th 116, 141 (2000).  “‘Ejusdem generis 
applies whether specific words follow general words in a statute or vice versa. In either 
event, the general term or category is “restricted to those things that are similar to those 
which are enumerated specifically.’”  People v. Giordano, 42 Cal. 4th 644, 660 (2007) 
(internal citations omitted.); see also Trinity Services, Inc. v. Marshall, 593 F.2d 1250, 1258 
(1978) (“It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that where specific words 
precede or follow general words in an enumeration describing a particular subject, the 
general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects 
enumerated by the specific words.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 417. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (Deering 2010) (“[P]rovisions [of the Code] are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect its objects  . . . .”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 13 (Deering 2010) 
(“Words and phrase are construed according to the context . . . .”); see also Parsley v. 
Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 9 Cal.3d 934, 945 (1973) (stating that, in applying any 
rule of statutory construction, “the fundamental concern . . . [is] the ascertainment and 
furtherance of legislative intent.”) (internal citations omitted.)  
 418. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6200-6409 (West 2010). 
 419. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1498 (2009). 
 420. Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2009).    
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harassment.  Indeed, such conduct is entirely expected in 
normal interactions.  But Petitioner’s argument ignores the 
crucial context: At the time of his conduct, he was subject to a 
protective order.  As noted above, courts may issue a 
protective order only upon a showing of a past act of abuse.  
When a court has enjoined a person from, for example, 
telephoning his domestic partner in the context of a domestic 
violence protective order, the injunction involves protection 
against threats and harassment.421  
The California Legislature also explicitly included the term “mental 
suffering” in its definitions of other types of familial abuse,422 such as 
“child abuse”423 and “dependent adult abuse”424 but did not include this 
term in Section 6320 of the California Family Code.  In light of this fact, 
the statutory construction principle of “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,” 
which means “to express one thing is to exclude another,”425 supports the 
conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to include all forms of 
“mental suffering” in section 6320, but rather intended to include only 
those forms of mental suffering caused by the specific acts listed therein.  
As discussed above, it appears that the specific acts (apart from physical 
injury and sexual assault) listed in section 6320 include only credible 
threats of physical violence, unauthorized contact with the victim, and 
infringement of the victim’s privacy.   
In a child custody proceeding, the California Legislature distinguishes 
between “child abuse,” which a family court must simply consider in 
accordance with Family Code section 3011(b)426 and “domestic violence,” 
which triggers a presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator 
thereof in accordance with section 3044(a).427  Furthermore, the Legislature 
explicitly includes “mental suffering” in its definition of “child abuse,”428 
but, as discussed above, it does not explicitly include “mental suffering” in 
its definition of “domestic violence.” If the definition of “domestic 
violence” in section 3044(c)—and specifically, the terms “threatening,” 
“molesting,” “disturbing the peace,” and “harassing” in section 6320—
 
 421. Id. at 839 (internal citations omitted).  
 422. This is supported by the principle (related to “inclusio unius est exclusion alterius”) 
that “[a] broad reading[] of statutory provisions [should be avoided] if . . . [the legislature] 
has specifically provided for the broader policy in more specific language elsewhere.”  
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Foreword: 
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 99 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge]. 
 423. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.3 (West 2010). 
 424. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.07 (West 2010). 
 425. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 432 (2d ed. 2001); see 
also Eskridge, supra note 422, at 97. 
 426. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(b) (West 2010). 
 427. Id. § 3044(a). 
 428. See infra note 448 and accompanying text.  
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were interpreted to include mental abuse per se in any case, then arguably 
the Family Code provisions distinguishing between child abuse and 
domestic violence arguably would be rendered ineffective.429  The well-
established principle of statutory construction requiring that each provision 
of a statute should be given effect430 argues against such an interpretation.   
For all of these reasons, it appears that the type of mental abuse 
perpetrated by an intimate terrorist during the course of a domestic 
relationship is not included in any of the acts listed in Section 6320 of the 
California Family Code.  Hence, it likewise appears that this type of mental 
abuse is not included in the definition of “domestic violence” in section 
3044(c), which triggers a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody 
to a domestic violence perpetrator.  Unfortunately, therefore, the mental 
abuse that an intimate terrorist perpetrates, despite the severe harm caused 
by this type of abuse, does not appear to be sufficient to raise a rebuttable 
presumption against awarding sole or joint custody to an intimate terrorist 
in California.431 
B. OTHER STATES’ TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CHILD 
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS 
The definitions of domestic violence utilized by other states in child 
custody proceedings are similarly deficient.  For example, Arkansas’s 
domestic relations law (of which its custody statute is a part) defines 
“domestic abuse” (which it uses interchangeably with “domestic 
violence”),432 as: 
(A) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of 
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family 
or household members; or  
 
 429. “Child abuse” is also defined to include “neglect.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2 
(West 2010). Therefore, even if “domestic violence” as defined in California Family Code 
section 3044(c) were interpreted so as to include “mental suffering” per se, “child abuse” 
still would be distinguished from “domestic violence” based on its inclusion of “neglect.’”  
However, as the Legislature could have easily clarified that the only distinction between the 
two terms was the inclusion of the additional term “neglect” in “child abuse” but did not do 
so, this suggests that it meant to exclude “mental suffering” per se from the definition of 
“domestic violence” as well.     
 430. Select Base Materials v. Bd. of Equal., 51 Cal. 2d 640, 645 (Cal. 1959); Weber v. 
Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 15 Cal. 2d 82, 85–86 (Cal. 1940); see also Stafford v. Realty Bond 
Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 (Cal. 1952) (every provision should be interpreted with 
reference to the entire law of which it is a part); CAL. CIV. CODE § 13 (West 2012) (“Words 
and phrases are construed according to the context and . . . technical words and phrases . . . 
as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law . . . are to be construed 
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.”); see also Eskridge, 
supra note 422, at 98 (citing various cases discussing the statutory construction principle 
that interpretation of “a provision in a way that would render other provisions of the Act 
superfluous or unnecessary” should be avoided). 
 431. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a), (c) (West 2010).  
 432. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c)(1) (West 2010) (using the term “domestic 
violence”); Id. § 9-13-101(c)(2) (using the term “domestic abuse”). 
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(B) Any sexual conduct between family or household members, 
whether minors or adults, that constitutes a crime under the laws of 
this state . . . .433 
Similarly, Indiana defines “domestic or family violence” in its family 
law, including its child custody law, as follows: 
[E]xcept for an act of self defense, the occurrence of one (1) or 
more of the following acts committed by a family or household 
member: 
(1) Attempting to cause, threatening to cause, or causing physical 
harm to another family or household member without legal 
justification. 
(2) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical harm 
without legal justification. 
(3) Causing a family or household member to involuntarily engage 
in sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress. 
(4) Beating, torturing, mutilating, or killing a vertebrate animal 
without justification with the intent to threaten, intimidate, coerce, 
harass, or terrorize a family or household member . . . .434   
Oklahoma’s child custody law likewise provides that domestic violence 
is:  
[A]ny act of physical harm, or the threat of imminent physical 
harm which is committed by an adult, emancipated minor, or minor 
child thirteen (13) years of age or older against another adult, 
emancipated minor or minor child who are family or household 
members or who are or were in a dating relationship.435   
In its child custody law, South Dakota refers to “domestic abuse” and 
defines “domestic abuse” as “physical harm, bodily injury, or attempts to 
cause physical harm or bodily injury, or the infliction of fear of imminent 
physical harm or bodily injury between family or household members.”436   
At least two states, Alaska and Minnesota, include the term “terrorist 
threatening” or “terroristic threatening” among the activities that constitute 
domestic violence.  For example, Alaska defines domestic violence as:  
one or more of the following offenses or an offense under a law or 
ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to these 
 
 433. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(3)(A)-(B) (West 2010). 
 434. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-42 (West 2010). 
 435. OKLA. STATE. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1(1) (West 2009). 
 436. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (2007); see also ABACDV, supra note 351.   
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offenses, or an attempt to commit the offense, by a household 
member against another household member:  
(A) a crime against the person . . . ;  
(B) burglary . . . ;  
(C) criminal trespass . . . ;  
(D) arson or criminally negligent burning . . . ;  
(E) criminal mischief . . . ;  
(F) terrorist threatening . . . ;  
(G) violating a protective order . . . ; or  
(H) harassment . . . .437   
Similarly, Minnesota law provides that domestic violence  
means the following, if committed against a family or household 
member by a family or household member: (1) physical harm, 
bodily injury, or assault; (2) the infliction of fear or [sic] imminent 
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or (3) terroristic 
threats, . . . , criminal sexual conduct, . . . or interference with an 
emergency call . . . .438   
However, it is clear that neither the term “terrorist threatening” in 
Alaska’s definition of domestic violence nor the term “terroristic 
threatening” in Minnesota’s definition of domestic violence encompasses 
the type of mental abuse which an intimate terrorist perpetrates against his 
victim(s) on a routine basis.  Minnesota law specifically defines “terroristic 
threatening” as “threaten[ing], directly or indirectly, to commit any crime 
of violence with purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard 
of the risk of causing such terror . . . [,]”439 and even the intentional 
infliction of severe mental harm is not considered a crime of violence in 
Minnesota.440  Similarly, sections 18.66.990(3) and 25.24.150(c) of the 
 
 437. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2006).  
 438. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(2)(a)(1)-(3) (West 2009).    
 439. Id. § 609.713(1).   
 440. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34200, 
BURNING CROSSES, HANGMAN’S NOOSES, AND THE LIKE: STATE STATUTES THAT PROSCRIBE 
THE USE OF SYMBOLS OF FEAR AND VIOLENCE WITH THE INTENT TO THREATEN 4, n.14, 
(2007), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/ 
RL34200_10052007.pdf (suggesting that a “terroristic threat” in section 609.713 of 
Minnesota’s Annotated Statutes proscribes threats of death, serious injury or property 
destruction); PAUL STARETT WALLACE, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31314, ANTI-HOAX 
LEGISLATION IN THE 107TH CONGRESS: ADDRESSING PROBLEMS SINCE SEPTEMBER 2001 12 
(2002) available at http://opencrs.com/document/RL31314/2002-03-01 (noting that 
Minnesota Annotated Statutes § 609.713 prohibits bomb scares); see also Leslie Yalof 
Garfield, The Case for a Criminal Law Theory of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
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Alaska Code define “terrorist threatening” as very specific acts of physical 
violence or a threat thereof.441  Accordingly, this term likewise does not 
include the mental abuse, which an intimate terrorist typically inflicts on 
his victim(s).   
On its face, the term “harassment” in Alaska’s definition of domestic 
violence, like the term “harassment” in California’s definition of domestic 
violence, appears to be broad enough that it may include all of the types of 
mental abuse that an intimate terrorist tends to engage in.  However, 
Alaska’s statutory scheme specifically provides that “harassment,” in its 
definition of domestic violence, is a subset of the crime of harassment in 
the second degree,442 specifically:  
telephon[ing] another and fail[ing] to terminate the connection with 
intent to impair the ability of that person to place or receive 
telephone calls; . . . mak[ing] repeated telephone calls at extremely 
inconvenient hours; . . . and mak[ing] an anonymous or obscene 
telephone call, an obscene electronic communication, or a 
telephone call or electronic communication that threatens physical 
injury or sexual contact . . . .443  
The terms “criminal trespass,” “criminal mischief,” and “violating a 
protective order” in Alaska’s definition of domestic violence, quoted 
above, are all similarly unavailing in this regard.  “Criminal trespass” is 
defined as either “enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully (1) on land with 
intent to commit a crime on the land; or (2) in a dwelling[ ]”444 or 
“enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully (1) in or upon premises; or (2) in a 
 
Distress, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF 33, 33 (2009), available at http://digitalcommons.pace. 
edu/lawfaculty/571 (“[T]he law redresses those who suffer injury from harmful speech 
through a series of seemingly innocuous remedies, including financial remuneration or 
retribution through minimal criminal penalties.”). 
 441. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.807(a)(1)-(3) (2007) (defining “terrorist threatening” in the 
first degree as knowingly sending or delivering a “bacteriological, biological, chemical, or 
radiological substance or an imitation [of such substance] . . . and, as a result, (1) plac[ing] a 
person in reasonable fear of physical injury to another person; (2) caus[ing] evacuation of a 
building, public place or area, business premises, or mode of public transportation or (3) 
caus[ing] serious public inconvenience”); Id. § 11.56.810(a)(1)–(3), (b) (defining “terrorist 
threatening” in the second degree as “knowingly mak[ing] a false report that a circumstance 
(1) dangerous to human life exists or is about to exist and (A) a person is placed in 
reasonable fear of physical injury to any person; (B) causes evacuation of a building, public 
place or area, business premises, or mode of public transportation; (C) causes serious public 
inconvenience; or . . . (2) exists or is about to exist that is dangerous to the proper or safe 
functioning of an oil or gas pipeline or supporting facility, utility, or transportation or cargo 
facility . . .”).  
 442. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.66.990(3)(H), 11.61.120(a)(2)–(4) (2006).  
 443. Id. § 11.61.120(a)(2)–(4). 
 444. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.320(a)(1)–(2) (2007) (stating the definition of criminal 
trespass in the first degree). 
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propelled vehicle.”445  “Criminal mischief” is defined as damaging various 
types of public or private property with no right or reasonable ground to 
believe one has the right to do so.446  Finally, “violating a protective order” 
in Alaska’s definition of domestic violence means violating a domestic 
violence protective order that specifically prohibited the respondent from: 
Threatening to commit or committing domestic violence, stalking, 
or harassment; . . . 
telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating directly or 
indirectly with the petitioner; . . . 
[entering] . . . the residence of the petitioner, regardless of 
ownership of the residence; . . . 
appearing at the residence, school, or place of employment of the 
petitioner or any specified place frequented by the petitioner or any 
designated household member; . . .  
entering a propelled vehicle in the possession of or occupied by the 
petitioner; . . .  
using or possessing a deadly weapon if the court [found] the 
respondent was in the actual possession of or used  a weapon 
during the commission of the domestic violence; or . . .  
[refusing] to surrender any firearm owned or possessed by the 
respondent if the court [found] that the respondent was in the actual 
possession of or used a firearm during the commission of the 
domestic violence[.] 447  
In short, just as is the case with respect to the definition of domestic 
violence contained in California’s child custody law, the only acts of 
mental abuse that appear to be included in other states’ definition of 
domestic violence for child custody purposes are a perpetrator’s credible 
threat of physical violence, a perpetrator’s unauthorized contact with the 
victim, and a perpetrator’s invasion of the victim’s privacy.   
The failure of the great majority of states to take mental abuse 
seriously, even in the child custody context, is perhaps most clearly 
evidenced by their careful distinction between “child abuse” and “domestic 
violence” in their child custody laws.  That is, most states, like California, 
tend to explicitly include mental suffering or mental injury in their 
definition of “child abuse.”448  However, even those states that recognize a 
 
 445. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.330(a)(1)–(2) (2007) (stating the definition of criminal 
trespass in the second degree). 
 446. Id. § 11.46.475–486. 
 447. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.740(a)(1), 18.66.100(c)(1)–(7) (2012). 
 448. All states except Georgia and Washington include some form of emotional 
maltreatment in their definition of child abuse or neglect.  Definitions of Child Abuse and 
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rebuttable presumption against granting custody to a perpetrator of 
“domestic violence” tend to provide that a party’s past child abuse must 
only be considered by a family court in determining the custody 
arrangement that is in the best interests of the child.449  These states do not 
stipulate that a party’s past child abuse triggers the presumption against 
awarding custody to that party.450  In other words, they provide that 
 
Neglect: Summary of State Laws, Child Welfare Information Gateway, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, July 2009, at 3, available at www.childwelfare.gov/systemw 
ide/laws_policies/statutes/defineall.cfm (accessed July 10, 2010).  “Approximately 32 States 
. . . provide specific definitions of emotional abuse or mental injury to a child.”  Id. at 3–4.  
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (West 2010) (“[T]he term ‘child abuse or neglect’ 
includes physical injury or death inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child by 
another person, sexual abuse . . . , neglect . . ., the willful harming or injuring of a child or 
the endangering of the person or health of the child, as defined in section 11165.3, and 
unlawful corporal punishment or injury . . . .”); Id. § 11165.3 (“[T]he willful harming or 
injuring of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a child,” means “a situation 
in which a person willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon, 
unjustifiable pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully 
causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed a situation in which his or 
her person or health is endangered.”); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(2) (2007) (“‘[C]hild abuse 
or neglect’ means the physical injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual 
exploitation, or maltreatment of a child under the age of 18 by a person under circumstances 
that indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby;  in this 
paragraph, ‘mental injury’ means an injury to the emotional well-being, or intellectual or 
psychological capacity of a child, as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment 
in the child’s ability to function[.]”); Id. § 47.17.290(9) (“‘[M]ental injury’ means a serious 
injury to the child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment in the child’s 
ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner and the existence of that 
impairment is supported by the opinion of a qualified expert witness[.]”).   
 449. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 2010) (“In making a determination of the 
best interest of the child in a proceeding described in Section 3021, the court shall, among 
other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the following: . . . (b) Any history of abuse by 
one parent or any other person seeking custody against any of the following: (1) Any child 
to whom he or she is related by blood or affinity or with whom he or she has had a 
caretaking relationship, no matter how temporary. . . As used in this subdivision, ‘abuse 
against a child’ means ‘child abuse’ as defined in Section 11165.6 of the Penal Code and 
abuse against any of the other persons described . . . means ‘abuse’ as defined in Section 
6203 of this code.”); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(7) (2006) (“The court shall determine 
custody in accordance with the best interests of the child . . . In determining the best 
interests of the child the court shall consider . . . any evidence of domestic violence, child 
abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of violence between 
the parents . . . .”).   
 450. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (West 2010) (“Upon a finding by the court that a 
party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party 
seeking custody of the child or against the child or the child’s siblings within the previous 
five years, there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal 
custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the 
best interest of the child, pursuant to Section 3011.”); Id. § 3044(c) (“For purposes of this 
section, a person has ‘perpetrated domestic violence’ when he or she is found by the court to 
have intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to cause bodily injury, or sexual assault, 
or to have placed a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to 
that person or to another, or to have engaged in any behavior involving, but not limited to, 
threatening, striking, harassing, destroying personal property or disturbing the peace of 
another, for which a court may issue an ex parte order pursuant to Section 6320 to protect 
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[p]sychological and emotional abuse, absent commission of a 
crime or infliction of physical harm, do [sic] not constitute 
domestic violence. . . .  Psychological and emotional abuse may 
still be considered when a judge makes his custody determination 
if the abuse affects the child’s well-being, but evidence of 
psychological and emotional abuse will be balanced against other 
factors . . . .451 
In fact, Missouri is the only state that both includes mental abuse in its 
definition of “child abuse” and at the same time recognizes a rebuttable 
presumption against awarding custody to a party who has committed “child 
abuse” as so defined.452   
 
the other party seeking custody of the child or to protect the child and the child’s siblings.”); 
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (2006) (“There is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who 
has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a 
domestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint 
legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child.”); Id. § 25.24.150(h) (“A parent has a 
history of perpetrating domestic violence under (g) of this section if the court finds that, 
during one incident of domestic violence, the parent caused serious physical injury or the 
court finds that the parent has engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence.”); 
Id. § 18.66.990(3)(A)–(H) (“[D]omestic violence’ and ‘crime involving domestic violence’ 
mean one or more of the following offenses or an offense under a law or ordinance of 
another jurisdiction having elements similar to these offenses, or an attempt to commit the 
offense, by a household member against another household member: (A) a crime against the 
person . . . (B) burglary . . . (C) criminal trespass . . . (D) arson or criminally negligent 
burning . . . (E) criminal mischief . . . (F) terrorist threatening . . . (G) violating a protective 
order . . . or (H) harassment . . . .”).     
 451. See Bolotin, supra note 364, at 280.  
 452. MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050.5 (2012) (“In making an award of custody, the court shall 
consider all relevant factors including the presumption that the best interests of the child will 
be served by placing the child in the custody and care of the nonabusive parent . . .”); Id. § 
452.375.13 (“If the court finds that domestic violence or abuse, as defined in section 
455.010 has occurred, the court shall make specific findings of fact to show that the custody 
or visitation arrangement ordered by the court best protects the child and the parent or other 
family or household member who is the victim of domestic violence . . .”); Id. § 
455.010(1)(a)–(f) (“‘Abuse’ includes but is not limited to the occurrence of any of the 
following acts, attempts or threats against a person who may be protected pursuant to this 
chapter[:] . . . ‘Assault’ . . . ‘Battery . . . ‘Coercion’ . . . ‘Harassment’ . . . “Sexual assault’  
. . . ‘Unlawful imprisonment’ . . . .”); Id. § 455.502(1) (“As used in sections 455.500 to 
455.538, the following terms mean: (1) ‘Abuse’, any physical injury, sexual abuse, or 
emotional abuse inflicted on a child other than by accidental means by an adult household 
member, or stalking of a child . . . .”) (repealed 2011).  Moreover, the psychological theory 
of domestic violence reveals that the states’ distinction in treatment between the mental 
abuse of a child and the mental abuse of an adult in states’ child custody schemes itself 
appears to be non-defensible.  That is, this distinction in treatment presumably is based on 
the rationale that an adult can choose to terminate an emotionally abusive relationship 
whereas a child cannot.  Cf. DUBBER, supra note 236, at 9–10 (stating that “the core 
[principle] of criminal law . . . [is that] violent interpersonal crime [is] . . . the ultimate 
violation of one person’s autonomy by another . . . Victims who assume the risk of suffering 
criminal harm have long prevented, or at least lessened, the offender’s criminal liability.”).  
Yet, the psychological theory of domestic violence teaches that, in cases of intimate 
terrorism, the intimate terrorist’s pervasive campaign of mental abuse, which is designed to 
control his victim(s), can severely diminish the autonomy of even an adult victim.  See 
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C. FAILURE OF STATES TO INCLUDE INTIMATE TERRORISM IN THEIR 
DEFINITIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UTILIZED IN CHILD CUSTODY 
PROCEEDINGS  
States’ definitions of domestic violence for use in child custody cases 
tend to include only credible threats of physical violence, unauthorized 
contacts with the victim, and invasions of the victim’s privacy as forms of 
mental abuse, in addition to various forms of physical and sexual 
violence.453  As discussed above, both the former partner and a child of a 
perpetrator of situational couple violence could fear that the perpetrator 
might commit some additional act of physical violence in the future 
because situational couple violence consists primarily of episodic physical 
violence,454 and fear of potential future attack could cause them mental 
distress.455  However, as illustrated above, even though children exposed to 
intimate terrorism are at risk of suffering much more severe mental and 
physical harm,456 the definitions of domestic violence in the states’ child 
custody laws largely fail to address an intimate terrorist’s regime of mental 
abuse.457  This failure is especially troubling, given that the psychological 
theory of domestic violence explains that intimate terrorism is the type of 
domestic violence that is transmitted throughout generations of American 
families.458   
Therefore, if a state hopes to begin to reverse the self-perpetuating 
process of intimate terrorism begetting intimate terrorism, it needs to 
incorporate the concept of intimate terrorism in its child custody laws.  At a 
minimum, a state should include mental abuse per se in the definition of 
 
supra note 336.  In addition, as stated above, domestic violence experts agree that victims of 
an intimate terrorist often choose to remain with their abuser as they are most at risk of 
being killed or suffering severe physical injuries when they attempt to escape his regime of 
control.  Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (explaining the empirical evidence that documents 
that the greatest risk of death and serious physical injury occurs when women try to leave 
their intimate terrorists and coining the term “separation assault” to refer to this 
phenomenon); see also NEIL WEBSDALE, UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC HOMICIDE 90 (1999) 
(explaining that an attempt to leave a violent partner along with one’s children is one of the 
most significant triggers for severe domestic violence and death).  Therefore, it is illogical 
for state legislatures to conclude that an adult victim who chooses to remain with an 
intimate terrorist for some period of time should not be heard to complain that she suffered 
mental abuse during that time period.  
 453. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 371–418, discussing CAL. FAM. CODE § 
3044; see also ABACDV, supra note 351. 
 454. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.  
 455. Cf. Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi 
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=susan_brenner,  at 6–7 (noting that a typical 
required element of the crime of “stalking” is a credible threat of future physical harm and 
some courts have noted that stalking statutes are intended to prevent “emotional harm to 
victims.”) (citations omitted.).  
 456. See supra text accompanying notes 98–115, 286–309. 
 457. See supra text accompanying notes 51–80, 83–87, 101–15. 
 458. See supra text accompanying note 331.   
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domestic violence used in its child custody cases.  In addition, the 
psychological theory of domestic violence suggests that each state would 
be well-advised to recognize a rebuttable presumption against awarding 
custody of a child to a party who has committed mental abuse per se.   
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO INCLUDING 
MENTAL ABUSE IN THE DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE  
During the last few years, psychologists have made great strides in 
developing and explicating the psychological theory of domestic 
violence.459  Their findings, however, have not been widely disseminated in 
the mainstream press, and hence many policy-makers are unaware of this 
theory.460  Accordingly, state legislators’ failure to include mental abuse 
per se in their states’ definitions of domestic violence461 may be largely due 
to their lack of familiarity with the psychological theory of domestic 
violence, and in particular the distinction between intimate terrorism and 
situational couple violence.   
Regardless, however, some state legislators may be concerned that 
including mental abuse per se in the definition of domestic violence would 
unnecessarily infringe their citizens’ state and federal privacy,462 free 
speech, and/or parental rights (the right to enjoy the companionship of 
 
 459. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 215, at 209 and passim (stating “it is just a matter of 
time until  . . . [longitudinal studies of abused children and retrospective studies of abusive 
adults] present a comprehensive lifespan developmental portrait of the long-term 
consequences of early abuse experiences”).  
 460. Kenneth Corvo et al., Evidence-Based Practice in Domestic Violence: Towards 
Evidence-Based Practice with Domestic Violence Perpetrators, 23–25 (Aug. 1, 2010), 
http://www.nfvlrc.org/docs/Corvo.Article.1.pdf (explaining that “[a] rich psychology of 
intimate violence perpetrators has developed since the first wave of treatment was 
developed.  Essentially this research has unearthed what emotions, cognitions and 
situational interactions intermingle to generate and support abusive behavior. . . . 
[However,] there is a lack of political support to reframe the issue so that implementing an 
evidence-based approach becomes feasible”).  
 461. The definition of domestic violence contained in states’ criminal laws also typically 
fails to include verbal or emotional abuse, apart from that derived from a credible threat of 
physical violence.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700 (West 2009).   
 462. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I, III, IX, and XIV; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 484 (1965) (“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity 
of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (stating that 
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . Various guarantees create zones of 
privacy[,]” and noting that the Third and Ninth Amendments provide additional sources of 
the right to privacy); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (quoting Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) 
(The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of the individual  to “establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience.”). 
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one’s child and raise him/her as one sees fit).463  Given that mental abuse is 
difficult to define and even more difficult to prove,464 this concern is 
understandable.  Accordingly, the constitutionality of a state law limiting or 
denying a party custody of a child on account of his or her past mental 
abuse is considered in some depth below.   
Turning first to an individual’s federal right to privacy, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has repeatedly identified the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution465 (in particular, the protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and self incrimination, respectively) as 
the main guarantees of an individual’s right to privacy.466  In addition, the 
 
 463. Only a biological parent or legal guardian of a child possesses “parental rights.”  See, 
e.g., James G. Dwyer, Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1418 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 534–35 (1925) (clarifying that parental rights are unlike other individual rights in that 
they are based solely on an individual’s status as a parent or legal guardianship of a child)); 
see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–55, to 
the effect that the “‘liberty of parents and guardians’ includes the right ‘to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control’”).   
 464. See, e.g., Peter Allen, Shouting at Your Wife May Get You a Criminal Record in 
France, MAILONLINE, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-
1240770/France-introduce-new-law-banning-psychological-violence-marriages.html 
(explaining that since psychological abuse leaves no visible scars, “[m]any believe the 
offence will be impossible to prove,” and indicating that the police and courts will not be 
able to distinguish “rudeness” from “psychological abuse”).  Still, it should be kept in mind 
that most crimes happen behind closed doors and yet crimes are routinely proven with 
circumstantial evidence.  See, e.g., Barry Liebowitz, Book ‘Em: Seven Days of Rage—The 
Deadly Crime Spree of the Craigslist Killer, CBSNEWS.COM, Sept. 18, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/09/17/crimesider/entry5318109.shtml (“[P]eople can 
hide their inner lives very well.”); Alice Green, Criminals Look Like Us, TIMESUNION.COM, 
July 17, 2009, http://blog.timesunion.com/alicegreen/category/prisons (“Most people are 
able to hide their illegal acts. . . .”); Steve Thompson, Circumstantial Evidence in Criminal 
Law, ASSOCIATEDCONTENT.COM, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/ 
71948/circumstantial_evidence_in_criminal_pg2.html?cat=17 (“Circumstantial evidence 
plays a large role in most criminal cases . . . Many of the most high profile cases in U.S. 
history have been based on circumstantial evidence.  For example, the trials of Timothy 
McVeigh (OKC bombing), Scott Peterson (murder of his wife), Charles Manson (murder of 
Sharon Tate) and others.”).  In addition, even proving that a particular person inflicted 
visible physical injuries tends to turn into a matter of “he said, she said” and physical abuse 
cases often are resolved on the basis of the parties’ credibility.  When Will They Ever Learn? 
Educating to End Domestic Violence: A Law School Report, American Bar Association 
Commission on Domestic Violence, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/etedv/incorp.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 
2010). This is due in part to the fact that “many [batterers] routinely deny the domestic 
violence and the severity of that violence.  When confronted with their abusive behavior, 
they tend to blame their partner for provoking it or refuse to accept responsibility for it.”  
THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION, 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/help_series/pdftxt/domestic 
violencevictimization.pdf.  Yet, all fifty states include physical abuse in their definition of 
domestic violence.  ABACDV, supra note 351.   
 465. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V. 
 466. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (“The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against all governmental invasions 
‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”).   
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Court has often cited the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution467 as a 
guarantee of an individual’s right to protection against government 
intrusion into the “private realm of family life.”468  The Court occasionally 
has cited the Ninth and Third Amendments to the U.S. Constitution469 
(specifically, the protection of rights retained by the people and the 
guarantee against occupation of one’s home by the military during 
peacetime) as further guarantees of an individual’s right to privacy in 
family matters.470   
There are also constitutional provisions that relate to an individual’s 
parental rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution471 as the primary 
guarantees of an individual’s parental rights.472  However, the Court has 
also identified the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (in particular, 
its references to the freedoms of speech, conscience, religion, and 
association) as either the main guarantee or one guarantee of an 
individual’s parental rights, especially in cases regarding a parent’s right to 
control his child’s education and religious upbringing.473  In addition, on 
 
 467. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 468. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).   
 469. U.S. CONST. amend. IX, III. 
 470. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (stating that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy[,]” and noting that the Third and 
Ninth Amendments provide additional sources of the right to privacy).   
 471. U.S. CONST. amend X, XIV. 
 472. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees the right of the individual . . . to establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to his own conscience.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 
(1982) (“[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 
(2000) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the 
care, custody, and control of their children.”); Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and Due 
Process, 1:2 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 123, 135 (1999) (citing Josephine Fiore, Comment, 
Constitutional Law: Burden of Proof—Clear and Convincing Evidence Required to 
Terminate Parental Rights, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 140, 141–142 (1982)  (in turn citing 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972), Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
639 (1968), Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and Meyer, 262 U.S. 
at 399 (“The right of parents to raise their children is fundamental and falls within the 
liberty interest defined by the fifth and the fourteenth amendments.”)); see also In re Gentry, 
369 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Mich. App. 1985) (“A parent’s right to the custody of his or her 
children is an element of ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States.”).   
 473. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(“T]he right to educate one’s child as one chooses is made applicable to the State by the 
force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
165–66 (1944) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (“The 
rights of children to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and 
to encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant sentiment and 
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several occasions, the Court has listed the Ninth Amendment (right to 
privacy in family matters) among the Constitutional guarantees of an 
individual’s parental rights.474   
The rights to privacy, to free speech, and to raise one’s child as one 
sees fit are all fundamental liberty interests,475 and the U.S. Supreme Court 
has emphasized that a parent’s right to raise his or her child as he or she 
sees fit “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court.”476  Accordingly, the Court has made clear that 
any federal or state law that infringes these rights is unconstitutional unless 
it “advance[s] a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means 
available.”477  This test is referred to as the “strict scrutiny” test.478   
 At the same time, the Court has made it unambiguously clear that a 
state, due to its parens patriae role,479 possesses a compelling interest in 
 
assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition here . . . [under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments].”)).  
 474. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (‘“It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’ . . . 
“The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . 
and the Ninth Amendment[.]”) (citations omitted); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) 
(“[T]he right [of personal privacy under the Ninth Amendment] has some extension to 
activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child 
rearing and education.”); see also Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (1977) (rev’d on 
other grounds, Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (1980) (“[T]he right of parents to the care, 
custody, and nurture of their children  . . . [is a] . . . fundamental right[ ] protected by the 
First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.”). 
 475. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (right to privacy); Barnett, 319 U.S. at 639 (right to free 
speech); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., 
concurring in judgment) (parental rights).  
 476. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
 477. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) (holding that a Texas law requiring a 
notary to be a U.S. citizen violates resident aliens’ fundamental equal protection rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); see also Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 485 (striking down Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives as 
violating an individual’s fundamental right to privacy); Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (citing Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 
231 (1987) (striking down New York’s “Son of Sam” law, which provided that an “entity” 
contracting with a person “accused or convicted of a crime” for the production of a book or 
other work describing the crime must pay to respondent Crime Victims Board any monies 
owed to that person under the contract” as unnecessarily limiting the fundamental free 
speech rights of the accused or convicted individual)).  
 478. Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219. 
 479. This phrase literally means [in Latin] “‘parent of the country[.],’” 118 INT’L L. 
REPORTS 472 (E. Lauterpacht, C.J. Greenwood eds., 2001) [hereinafter INT’L L. REPORTS] 
(quoting Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600, n. 8 (1982) (in 
turn quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979))).  In Snapp & Son, Inc., 
“Justice White explained that ‘[t]he parens patriae action has its roots in the common-law 
concept of the “royal prerogative[,]’” INT’L. L. REPORTS, supra, at 472 (quoting Snapp & 
Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 600), and he elaborated that “[t]his prerogative of parens patriae is 
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person 
or in the legislature [and] is a most beneficent function . . . often necessary to be exercised 
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safeguarding the physical and/or emotional welfare of minor children living 
within its boundaries.480  Accordingly, the Court has consistently held that 
a state custody law which infringes on individuals’ fundamental rights but 
is designed to promote the best interests of minor children is constitutional 
under the strict scrutiny test, so long as its infringement of those 
individuals’ rights is minimized as much as possible.481  In essence, the 
Court has held that the constitutionality of the law ultimately turns on 
whether it incorporates sufficient procedural protections to ensure that 
individuals’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights are not 
violated.482   
The general test of whether a law satisfies individuals’ Fourteenth 
Amendment procedural due process rights was set out by the Court in the 
1976 case of Mathews v. Eldridge.483  In Mathews, the Court held 
that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.484  
In cases in which a child custody law has been found to infringe on an 
individual’s parental rights, the Court’s assessment of the constitutionality 
of the law has largely depended on the procedural protections that the state 
has established to ensure the accuracy of its determinations regarding the 
plaintiff’s parental fitness and the “best interests of the child.485  Of course, 
this approach is logical, given that a state cannot possess a parens patriae 
 
in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect 
themselves.”  INT’L. L. REPORTS, supra, at 472 (in turn quoting Mormon Church v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)).     
 480. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).   
 481. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972) (striking down an Illinois law 
automatically terminating unwed fathers’ custody of their children upon the death of the 
children’s mother because it violated such fathers’ fundamental parental rights and 
furthermore did not provide each such father with an individualized hearing regarding his 
fitness as a parent). 
 482. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 848–49 (1977); Lassiter, 
452 U.S. at 27, 31; Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, passim.  
 483. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (upholding law terminating social security 
disability benefits without affording a hearing to the individual concerned).  
 484. Id. at 335. 
 485. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. at 848–49; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 
27, 31; Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, passim (all citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).   
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interest in restricting an individual’s parental rights unless doing so actually 
promotes the best interests of the child concerned.486   
The cases of Stanley v. Illinois487 and Santosky v. Kramer488 probably 
best elucidate the Court’s jurisprudence regarding constitutional challenges 
to state child custody laws.  At issue in Stanley was an Illinois state law 
that treated every unwed father as a nonparent of his children when the 
unwed mother of his children died.489  Joan and Peter Stanley never 
married but co-habited intermittently for eighteen years and during that 
time had three children.490  Upon Joan’s death, Stanley was considered a 
non-parent; accordingly their three children were automatically treated as 
wards of the state and placed in the care of court-appointed guardians.491  
Although Stanley technically was not adjudged an unfit parent at that 
hearing, the Court found that this was only because all unwed fathers were 
presumed at law to be unfit.492  Unwed mothers, married fathers, and 
divorced parents were not subject to this same presumption and could be 
separated from their children only after an individualized hearing regarding 
their fitness as a parent.493   
In weighing the three Eldridge factors, the Court reaffirmed that an 
individual’s parental rights are “essential” and noted that “[t]he integrity of 
the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”494  Furthermore, it found that even though 
Stanley was entitled to apply for the adoption or legal custody of his 
children, there was no guarantee that he would be granted either, especially 
in light of the fact that he had already been treated by the State of Illinois as 
an unfit parent.495  In addition, the Court pointed out that numerous 
restrictions are imposed on the legal guardian of a child that are not 
imposed on a natural or adoptive parent of a child.496  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that Stanley’s parental rights were “seriously prejudiced” by the 
above-described scheme.497   
The Court then considered the risk that, in the absence of an 
individualized hearing, some unwed fathers in Stanley’s position would be 
erroneously treated as unfit and the Court found that risk to be 
 
 486. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657–58 (1972) (commenting that “[t]he State’s interest 
in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father”).   
 487. Id. 
 488. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, passim (1982).  
 489. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650. 
 490. Id. at 646. 
 491. Id.  
 492. Id. at 650. 
 493. Id. at 658.  
 494. Id. at 651.   
 495. Id. at 648–49.   
 496. Id.  
 497. Id. 
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unacceptably high.498  In examining the third Eldridge factor, the Court 
considered the three interests which Illinois asserted its scheme served: 1) 
Illinois’s interest in protecting “‘the moral, emotional, mental, and physical 
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community’ and [2)] . . . 
‘strengthen[ing] the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing him 
from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the 
protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without 
removal . . .’”499 and 3) “[t]he establishment of prompt, efficacious 
proceedings.”500   
The Court stated that Illinois’s first interest was “legitimate,  . . . well 
within the power of the State to implement.  We do not question the 
assertion that neglectful parents may be separated from their children.”501  
However, the Court pointed out that, had Stanley been given the 
opportunity to make his case, he may have been found to be a fit parent, 
and, had this been so, the Statue’s statutory policy would have been 
furthered by leaving custody in him.”502  In other words, the Court found 
that Illinois’s statutory scheme was overbroad as a method of achieving this 
very important state interest.503  Lastly, the Court noted that “the 
establishment of prompt, efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state 
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional 
adjudication.”504  At the same time, the Court emphasized that Stanley’s 
interests in obtaining an individualized hearing of his parental fitness 
outweighed Illinois’s interest in not doing so because “the Constitution 
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”505  In conclusion, the 
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
guaranteed Stanley an individualized hearing on his fitness as a parent 
before Illinois could destroy his custodial rights to his children.506  In 
addition, the Court held that Illinois’s statutory scheme also violated 
Stanley’s equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
because Illinois provides hearings to all other parents besides unwed 
fathers.507  
At issue in Santosky was a New York statute which permitted an 
individual’s parental rights to be permanently terminated on the basis of a 
preponderance of evidence that he or she had “permanently neglected” his 
 
 498. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654–55 (“[S]ome [unwed fathers] are wholly suited to have 
custody of their children.  This much the State readily concedes, and nothing in this record 
indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglectful father who has not cared for his children.”) 
 499. Id. at 652 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, s 701-2). 
 500. Id. at 656. 
 501. Id. at 652. 
 502. Id. at 655. 
 503. Id. at 656–58. 
 504. Id. at 656. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. at 657–58. 
 507. Id. at 658. 
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or her child.508  In this case, in 1973, the Ulster County Child Welfare 
Department (Department), had first temporarily removed Tina Santosky 
from the custody of Annie and John Santosky II, her natural parents, and 
placed Tina with a foster family on the ground that the Santoskys had 
“neglected” her.509  Then, approximately ten months later, in 1974, Tina’s 
younger brothers, John III and Jed, were removed from the Santoskys’ 
custody and placed in foster homes for the same reason.510  Although the 
Santoskys’ children were removed from their parents’ care due to 
“neglect,” Tina and John III had suffered a number of physical injuries in 
the Santosky home.511  Finally, in 1978, the Department had petitioned the 
Ulster County Family Court to permanently terminate the Santoskys’ 
custodial rights to Tina, John III, and Jed, on the ground that the Santoskys 
had “permanently neglected” all of them.512  The Department’s apparent 
motivation in seeking to terminate the Santoskys’ parental rights was to 
permit the Santoskys’ children to be adopted by parties who would provide 
them with a stable home.513   
At the “permanent neglect” hearing, New York law required the 
Department to prove two main points.  First, with respect to each child, it 
was required to prove “that for more than a year after the child entered state 
custody, the [Department] . . . ‘made diligent efforts to encourage and 
strengthen the parental relationship.’”514  Second, with respect to each 
child, it was required to prove that the Santoskys “failed ‘substantially and 
continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of 
the child although physically and financially able to do so.’”515  At this 
hearing, the Santoskys challenged the constitutionality of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.516  The family court judge 
rejected this claim and proceeded to find, based on a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the Department had proven that the Santoskys had 
permanently neglected their children.517  At a subsequent dispositional 
hearing, the Family Court judge granted the Department’s petition to 
 
 508. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748–49 (1982). 
 509. Id. at 752. 
 510. Id. 
 511. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 781–82, n. 10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) Tina had suffered 
injuries in petitioners’ home including a fractured left femur, treated with a home-made 
split; bruises on the upper arms, forehead, flank, and spine; and abrasions of the upper leg  
. . . John Santosky III . . . was admitted to the hospital suffering malnutrition, bruises on the 
eye and forehead, cuts on the foot, blisters on the hand, and multiple pin pricks on the back.  
 512. Id. at 748–52. 
 513. Id. at 748 (“stating that “if convinced that ‘positive, nurturing parent-child 
relationships no longer exist,’ . . . the State may initiate ‘permanent neglect’ proceedings to 
free the child for adoption.”).  
 514. Id. at 748 (citing New York Family Court Act §§ 614.1.(c), 611) (McKinney 1975 
and Supp. 1981–1982) (hereinafter Fam. Ct. Act)). 
 515. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748–49 (citing Fam. Ct. Act § 614.1.(d)). 
 516. Id. at 751. 
 517. Id. at 751–52. 
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permanently terminate the Santoskys’ parental rights, stating that the order 
was in the best interests of the children.518   
The Santoskys appealed this decision to the New York Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling.519  The New 
York Court of Appeals dismissed the Santoskys’ further appeal on the 
ground that “no substantial constitutional question [was]  directly 
involved.”520  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari521 and reversed 
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals.522   
In its opinion, the Court clarified that, in a case involving the 
permanent termination of parental rights, a preponderance “standard 
reflects the judgment that society is nearly neutral between erroneous 
termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those 
rights.”523  The Court then methodically considered each of the three 
Eldridge factors.  First, with respect to the private interest affected by the 
challenged New York law, the Court stated that: 
[w]hether the loss threatened by a particular type of proceeding is 
sufficiently grave to warrant more than average certainty on the 
part of the factfinder turns on both the nature of the private interest 
threatened and the permanency of the threatened loss. . . . When 
the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks 
not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end 
it.  “If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of 
deprivation. . . . A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of 
the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a 
commanding one.”524 
Next, the Court considered the “risk of erroneous deprivation of private 
interests resulting from use of a ‘fair preponderance’ standard.”525  On this 
issue, the Court noted that, in a proceeding initiated by a state to 
permanently terminate an individual’s parental rights, a number of factors 
“combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding.”526  For example, 
the Court pointed out, when a state initiates a proceeding to permanently 
terminate an individual’s parental rights, it typically can assemble a very 
strong case against the individual, especially as it often has first placed the 
child in question in protective custody and then supervised the parent’s 
 
 518. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 752.  
 519. Id.  
 520. Id.  
 521. Id.  
 522. Id. at 747–48. 
 523. Id. at 765. 
 524. Id. at 758–59 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). 
 525. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761. 
 526. Id. at 762. 
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interactions with the child.527  The Court stated, “because the child is . . . in 
agency custody, the State even has the power to shape the historical events 
that form the basis for termination.”528  The Court also emphasized that a 
state can initiate a permanent neglect proceeding against an individual an 
infinite number of times and present additional proof at each succeeding 
proceeding, while a parent whose custodial rights have been terminated 
cannot later regain those rights even if the state agrees that he or she is a fit 
parent at that time.529   
Furthermore, the Court stated, such a proceeding “employ[s] imprecise 
substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the 
subjective values of the judge.”530  In addition, the Court noted, a 
preponderance of evidence standard focuses on “the quantity, rather than 
the quality, of the evidence.”531  Accordingly, under New York’s statutory 
scheme, “a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely 
on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic 
behavior.”532  At the same time, the Court stated, a requirement of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt at such hearings could be “an unreasonable 
barrier to . . . efforts to free permanently neglected children for 
adoption[,]”533 because much of the evidence considered at parental fitness 
hearings consists of medical and psychiatric evidence and such evidence 
does not lend itself to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.534   
Considering the third Eldridge factor, the Court considered the 
Government’s two interests in maintaining its preponderance of evidence 
standard of proof in termination proceedings: New York’s parens patriae 
interest in promoting the welfare of its minor children and its interest in 
minimizing the expense and effort required of the state in permanent 
termination proceedings.535  With respect to New York’s parens patriae 
interest, the Court stated that a higher standard of proof in termination 
proceedings actually promotes the state’s parens patriae interest because 
terminating a parent’s parental rights can only promote the best interests of 
the child if that parent is in fact an unfit parent.536  In addition, the Court 
 
 527. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763. 
 528. Id.  
 529. Id. at 764. 
 530. Id. at 762.  
 531. Id. at 764. 
 532. Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)). 
 533. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. 
 534. Id. (“Like civil commitment hearings, termination proceedings often require the 
factfinder to evaluate medical and psychiatric testimony, and to decide issues difficult to 
prove to a level of absolute certainty, such as lack of parental motive, absence of affection 
between parent and child, and failure of parental foresight and progress.”).   
 535. Id. at 766. 
 536. Id. at 767 (stating that “[a]t the factfinding, that goal [of providing the child with a 
normal home] is served by procedures that promote an accurate determination of whether 
the natural parents can and will provide a normal home”).  
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asserted, the risk of an erroneous termination of a parent’s custodial rights 
in New York was simply that the child would remain in the “uneasy status 
quo” of the foster care system because the state cannot initiate a permanent 
termination proceeding until the child has already been temporarily 
removed from the parent’s custody on account of the parent’s neglect.537  
With respect to New York’s interest in minimizing its expense and effort in 
parental termination proceedings, the Court stated that requiring New York 
family court judges to base their termination decisions on “clear and 
convincing evidence,” rather than on a preponderance of evidence, would 
not impose any measurable financial or administrative burden on New 
York because these judges were required to apply the higher standard in 
other proceedings and hence were familiar with it.538 
Given that the state’s interests in avoiding an erroneous decision not to 
terminate a parent’s rights were not nearly as strong as a parent’s interests 
in avoiding an erroneous decision to terminate his or her rights, the Court 
concluded that New York’s statutory scheme was inappropriate because a 
preponderance of evidence standard of proof indicates that the 
government’s interests and the private interests are essentially equal.539  In 
conclusion, based on all of the above-mentioned factors, the Court held that 
the termination of an individual’s parental rights satisfies the individual’s 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights only if the termination is 
supported by “at least clear and convincing evidence.”540   
In light of the above law, it’s possible that a state statute that would 
deny child custody after an affirmative determination by a family court that 
a party has mentally abused another in the past would not infringe the 
accused party’s federal privacy rights.  For many years, governments 
justified their failure to treat domestic violence as a crime on their stated 
desire not to intrude on the privacy of family relations inside the family 
home.541  However, beginning in the 1970s, after feminist scholars and 
 
 537. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765–66.  As Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices White and 
O’Conner) stated in his dissent, however, this aspect of the majority’s opinion appears 
flawed.  The risk of erroneous failure to terminate a parent’s custodial rights would include 
“the risk of permanent injury to the child either by return of the child to an abusive home or 
by the child’s continued lack of a permanent home.”  Id. at 788–89, n. 13.  In particular, in 
this regard the majority appears to have ignored the fact that if the state fails to prove its 
case in the permanent termination proceeding, under New York’s statutory scheme the 
Santoskys could then request a review of the court’s earlier temporary removal order and a 
reinstatement of their full custodial rights.  Id. at 766, n. 16 (citing Fam. Ct. Act § 632(b) 
(providing that “when State’s permanent neglect petition is dismissed for insufficient 
evidence, judge retains jurisdiction to reconsider underlying orders of placement”).  
 538. Id. at 767–68. 
 539. Id. at 765. 
 540. Id. at 748. 
 541. See, e.g., Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim 
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 160–61 (2003) 
(“Traditionally, acts of violence in the home were largely ignored by law enforcement, who 
viewed domestic violence as a ‘private’ matter, inappropriate for state intervention.”) 
WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2013  6:05 PM 
Summer 2013] TORTURE AT HOME 543 
victims’ rights advocates forcefully argued that governments’ reliance on 
the right to privacy to justify nonintervention in domestic violence 
incidents effectively granted individuals (typically males) the right to harm 
their fellow family members (typically females) with impunity so long as 
they did so within the family home, many jurisdictions took a more 
affirmative law enforcement stance against domestic violence.542  
Furthermore, it is now settled law that, when a victim of domestic violence 
has requested or consented to police presence in a private residence, either 
the victim has waived the perpetrator’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment privacy 
rights or infringement of the perpetrator’s rights is outweighed by the right 
of the victim to be free from harm.543  In sum, the general argument that 
government intervention in incidents of domestic violence infringes the 
privacy rights of the individuals involved has largely been refuted.544   
With respect to the specific proposal made in this article that mental 
abuse per se be included in the definition of domestic violence used in 
contested child custody proceedings, it is important to keep in mind that a 
contested child custody proceeding typically follows a divorce; 
importantly, the divorce has already abolished the family unit and family 
home to which the U.S. Constitution guarantees special privacy 
protection.545  Moreover, most of the evidence offered in a child custody 
 
(citations omitted); Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of 
Domestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 31, 34 (2010) [hereinafter Sack].  Ironically, for a time police personnel in the U.S. 
were encouraged to refrain from interfering in ‘domestics’ on the ground that “preservation 
of the family unit and promotion of domestic harmony required that the law not interfere in 
spousal relations.”  Id.  
 542. Sack, supra note 541, at 32–33 (“It was the women’s movement of the 1970s that 
brought attention to the prevalence of domestic violence, and which initiated reforms in civil 
and criminal justice policy to address such violence.”).   
 543. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115–19 (2006) (“We have . . . lived our whole 
national history with an understanding of ‘the ancient adage that a man’s home is his castle 
 . . .’ [but] ‘where the defendant has victimized the third-party . . . the emergency nature of 
the situation is such that the third-party consent should validate a warrantless search despite 
defendant’s objections.’’’)  (citations omitted.)  In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that if police possess probable cause to believe that physical harm to a person inside a 
private residence is imminent (e.g., based on neighbors’ complaints to police as well and/or 
audible sounds emanating from that residence), any infringement to the residents’ Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment privacy rights are outweighed by the government’s legitimate desire 
to prevent harm to that person and stop a crime in progress.  United States v. Hendrix, 595 
F.2d 883, 885–86 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that if the consent of the threatened 
co-occupant did not justify a warrantless search, the police entry nevertheless was allowable 
on exigent-circumstances grounds) (cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Randolph, 547 U.S. 
at 119).   
 544. See, e.g., Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or 
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1144–45 (1994); but see 
JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 36, 39, 45, 53 (2009).      
 545. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“[The Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments] apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the 
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life”) (quoted with approval in Griswold v. 
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proceeding in support of an allegation that one of the parties has committed 
mental abuse in the past consists of the testimony of one or more 
participant(s) in a domestic event in which the accused likewise was a 
participant.546  The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disclosure 
of information regarding an event by a participant in that event does not 
infringe the privacy rights of any other participant.547  This is because none 
of the participants possess a reasonable expectation that a fellow participant 
 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute that forbade the 
use of contraceptives violates the right to marital privacy guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution)); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that “[t]he integrity of 
the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . and the 
Ninth Amendment”).    For example, it is for this reason that the spousal testimonial 
privilege is abolished upon the couple’s divorce (Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 
(1954)) and neither the spousal testimonial privilege nor the spousal communications 
privilege is available in a civil action, including a divorce proceeding, between spouses (see, 
e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §972(a) (exception to testimonial privilege); Manela v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 4th 1139, 1147 (2009) (exception to confidential 
communications privilege provided in CAL. EVID. CODE §984(a) encompasses divorce 
proceeding)) or a criminal prosecution of one spouse for a crime (including domestic 
violence) committed against the other spouse (see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §972(e)(1)) 
(exception to spousal testimonial privilege); CAL. EVID. CODE §985(a) (exception to spousal 
confidential communications privilege). 
 546. As psychological abuse leaves no visible scars, psychological abusers tend to deny 
their abuse, and most types of domestic abuse, including mental abuse, takes place outside 
the public arena, evidence in mental abuse cases necessarily consists primarily of the 
testimony of the parties to various domestic events.  Peter Allen, Shouting at Your Wife May 
Get You a Criminal Record in France, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 1, 2012, http://dailymail. 
co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1240770/France-introduce-new-law-banning-psychological- 
violence-marriages.html. (emphasizing that psychological abuse leaves no scars, which 
makes it exceedingly difficult to prove that it has occurred); Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 
284 (explaining that one of the nonviolent control tactics which intimate partners often 
employ is denying their abuse); Violence and Abuse, Plymouth City Council, (Sept. 2, 
2012), available at http://www.plymouth.gov.uk/domestic_violence_and_abuse-2.pdf. 
(“Much of the abuse takes place in private, behind closed doors); see also AMERICAN BAR  
ASSOCIATION  COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC  VIOLENCE, Incorporating Domestic Violence 
Legal Issues into Law School Curricula, in WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? EDUCATING TO 
END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW SCHOOL REPORT, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov 
/ovc/publications/infores/etedv/incorp.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) (reporting that, “[i]n 
domestic violence cases, complex issues often arise regarding the credibility of 
witnesses[.]”).   
 547. U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (interpreting Title III of the Federal 
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–2522) and stating that “[f]or constitutional purposes, no different result is required 
if . . . [a participant] instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations . . . 
either (1) simultaneously records them . . . (2) or . . . simultaneously transmits [them]”); see 
also Rathbun v. U.S., 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (“We need not say that a man may never make a 
record of what he hears on the telephone by having someone else listen . . . as in the case at 
bar, even by allowing him to interpose a recording machine.”); Carol M. Bast, Conflict of 
Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone Conversations, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 147, 148 
(2009–2010) [[hereinafter Bast]. 
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to the event will not divulge information regarding the event to one or more 
nonparticipants.548   
The Court has specifically held that admission into evidence of a 
surreptitious recording of an event made by a participant does not infringe 
upon the federal privacy rights of any other participant to that event,549 
concluding that no participant in such an event possesses a reasonable 
expectation that another participant will not record it.550  Therefore, even if 
a state’s inclusion of mental abuse per se in its definition of domestic 
violence were to encourage people to make surreptitious recordings of 
domestic events for use in a potential custody dispute in the future, such 
recordings do not infringe the federal privacy rights of any of the 
participants to such events.551  In addition, forty-one of the fifty states 
(referred to as “one-party consent states”) agree that a participant to an 
event who surreptitiously records the event does not violate his or her 
fellow participants’ privacy rights.552  The remaining states (referred to as 
“two-party consent states”) generally prohibit surreptitious recordings 
unless all of the participants have agreed to the recording553 and provide 
 
 548. See, e.g., John H. Case, Gilbert B. Feibleman & Mark Gruber, Electronic 
Eavesdropping and Wiretapping: How 20th Century Technology Can Cause 21st Century 
Headaches for You and Your Client, 82 (2004), available at http://www.feiblemancase.com/ 
documents/2004_wiretapping_updated.pdf  (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Case].   
 549. White, 401 U.S. at 751.   
 550. Abraham Abramovsky, Surreptitious Record of Witnesses in Criminal Cases: A 
Quest for Truth or a Violation of Law and Ethics?, 57 TULANE L. REV. 1, 9, 34 (1982); see 
also New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Opinion 2003-02 http://www2.nycbar.org/ 
Publications/reports/show_html_new.php?rid=122 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“even 
though recording of a conversation without disclosure may to many people ‘offend a sense 
of honor and fair play,’ it is questionable whether anyone today justifiably relies on an 
expectation that a conversation is not being recorded by the other party, absent a special 
relationship with or conduct by that party inducing a belief that the conversation will not be 
recorded”). 
 551. White, 401 U.S. at 751.     
 552. Bast, supra note 547, at 148 (noting that four-fifths of the states agree with the 
federal government on this point); see also Richard Turkington, Protection for Invasions of 
Conversational and Communication Privacy by Electronic Surveillance in Family, 
Marriage, and Domestic Disputes Under Federal and State Wiretap and Store 
Communications Acts and the Common Law Privacy Intrusion Tort, 82 NEB. L. REV. 693, 
708 (2004) (stating that the Federal Wiretap Act “is mirrored in most state wiretap statutes”) 
[hereinafter Turkington].  
 553. Bast, supra note 547, at 148; see also Lane v. Allstate Insurance Co., 969 P.2d 938 
(Nev. 1998) (interpreting Nevada’s wiretap statute, which on its face appears to permit 
surreptitious recordings by participants, as requiring the consent of all parties to the 
recordings).  Note, however, that even most two-party consent states exempt certain events, 
such as crimes and other dangerous events.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.5 (West 
2010) (clarifying that “[n]othing in Sections 631, 632 prohibits one party to a confidential 
communication from recording the communication for the purposes of obtaining evidence 
reasonably believed to relate to the commission by another party to the communication of 
the crime of extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence . . . [and nothing] 
renders any evidence so obtained inadmissible . . . .”); Lee Ashley Smith, The Admissibility 
of Tape Recordings in Criminal Trials Involving Domestic Disputes: California’s 
Proposition 8 and Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 15 
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criminal and/or civil penalties for violations of this prohibition,554 with 
some such states mandating that such a surreptitious recording is 
inadmissible in any court proceeding.555  Therefore, it is unlikely that a 
two-party consent state’s inclusion of mental abuse in its definition of 
domestic violence would encourage its residents to make surreptitious 
recordings of domestic events.  Finally, note that most state courts have 
also held that one parent’s surreptitious recording of the interaction 
between her child and other parent does not violate the privacy rights of 
either her child or the other parent.556  For all of these reasons, a state’s 
inclusion of mental abuse in its definition of domestic violence is highly 
unlikely to infringe its citizens’ federal or state privacy rights.   
On the other hand, a state law authorizing a court’s denial of child 
custody to a party who had committed mental abuse per se in the past 
unquestionably would infringe that person’s First Amendment free speech, 
given that verbal abuse is a form of mental abuse.557  Furthermore, such a 
state law would infringe that party’s parental rights if he or she also were 
that child’s biological parent.  As both free speech rights and parental rights 
are fundamental rights guaranteed to every U.S. citizen by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Stanley558 and Santosky559 taught that, 
 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 227–28 (2004) (noting that the Victim’s Bill of Rights, 
otherwise known as Proposition 8, an initiative approved by California voters in 1982, 
effectively mandates that any recording obtained in violation of California’s two-party rule 
be admitted into evidence “in criminal trials subject only to federal exclusionary rules”).  
Therefore, certain surreptitious recordings of mental abuse do not even violate the privacy 
laws of two-party consent states. 
 554. Case, supra note 548, at 22–23. 
 555. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 to 5/14-6; 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-40. 
 556. See, e.g., Turkington, supra note 552, at 708–16 (citing Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 
154 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding parent’s recording based on rationale that doing so intrudes 
on the parties’ privacy rights no more than a parent’s eavesdropping on a child’s 
conversation via a home phone line extension (the “extension rationale”))); Newcomb v. 
Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536, (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing parent’s recording based on 
extension rationale); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(allowing all intra-family recordings pursuant to the since discredited “intra-family dispute 
exception rationale”); Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 1992) (under 
Federal Wiretapping Act, allowing custodial parent to vicariously consent to recording a 
phone conversation with a third party so long as s/he has a reasonable belief that the 
recording is in the best interest of the child (“vicarious consent doctrine”)); Pollock v. 
Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998) (under Federal Wiretapping Act, allowing 
parent’s recording based on vicarious consent rationale); Campbell v. Price, 2 F.Supp. 2d 
1186, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (under state wiretapping statutes, allowing parent’s recording 
based on a vicarious consent doctrine); Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) 
(same); State v. Diaz, 706 A.2d 264, 270 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. Div. 1998) (same); W. Va. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Res. ex rel Wright v. David L., 453 S.E.2d 646, 654 (W. Va. 
1994) (under both the Federal Wiretapping Act and state wiretapping statutes, allowing 
parent’s recording based on vicarious consent doctrine, while holding those provisions 
inapplicable to the facts of the case itself).   
 557. See supra text accompanying notes 59–61. 
 558. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 645 (1972).  
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if the constitutionality of such a state law were challenged, the courts 
would subject it to strict scrutiny; and any such law would survive such 
scrutiny only if it satisfied the test established by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Mathews v. Eldridge.560  Again, Eldridge requires that, in order to satisfy 
the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process 
guarantee, the law would have to guarantee each parent in a child custody 
proceeding the level of procedural due process dictated by the application 
of the following three factors: “the private interests affected by the 
proceeding; the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and  
the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged 
procedure.”561   
As the discussion of the holdings in Stanley and Santosky make clear, 
the private interests affected by a state’s denial of a parent’s child custodial 
rights are quite significant.562  In addition, the great significance of these 
private interests increases the risk that a family court will make an 
erroneous finding on the issue of a parent’s past mental abuse.563  At the 
same time, in a typical child custody proceeding, a family court is not 
deciding whether to permanently terminate either parent’s custodial 
rights,564 and in both Stanley and Santosky, the complainant was 
challenging a law that could result in the permanent termination of his 
 
 559. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745 (1982). 
 560. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
 561. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754; Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.   
 562. As the Court in Santosky stated, “Lassiter declared it ‘plain beyond the need for 
multiple citation’ that a natural parent’s ‘desire for, and right to, the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children’ is an interest far more precious than any 
property right.”  455 U.S. at 758 (quoting  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 
(1981) (in turn quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651)).   
 563. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761–66.  
 564. In the great majority of child custody cases (typically initiated following a divorce), a 
family court does not permanently terminate either parent’s custodial rights but rather only 
determines the legal and physical custodial arrangement that will best promote the best 
interests of the child at that point in time.  See, e.g., A.R.S. § 25-411(A)(2007) (At any time 
after one year has expired from the date of the previous custody order, a person may make a 
motion to modify a custody order.)  One could argue that the distinction between a family 
court’s temporary denial of child custody to a parent based on a finding of his or her past 
mental abuse and the permanent termination of a parent’s custodial rights is more illusory 
than real, given that family courts try to promote a stable living environment for a child and, 
to that end, are generally reluctant to modify a custody order.  In fact, the family courts in 
some states are only permitted to amend a custody order if the moving party can establish 
that the child’s circumstances have changed significantly.  See, e.g., R.S.W. § 26.50.130 (In 
Washington State, a court will also consider a petition for modification of a custody order 
“if there is reason to believe the child’s present environment may seriously endanger the 
child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”)  In general, a parent awarded joint 
custody may petition the court for modification of the order based on the failure of the other 
parent to comply with the provisions of the order any time after six months have expired 
from the date of the previous joint custody order, except that a parent may always petition 
the court for modification of the previous joint custody order on the basis of evidence that 
domestic violence involving a violation of section 13-1201 or 13-1204, spousal abuse, or 
child abuse occurred since the entry of the joint custody order).   
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parental rights.565  Certainly, a parent who was denied custody of his or her 
child on account of his or her past mental abuse could find it very difficult 
to reacquire his or her custodial rights, especially in a state that recognizes 
a rebuttable presumption that the child’s best interests would not be 
promoted by the court’s grant of custodial rights to that parent.  Still, he or 
she possesses at least a chance of obtaining custody of his or her child until 
his or her custodial rights are permanently terminated.  Therefore, on 
balance, a court likely would conclude that the private interests in this case 
are exceedingly important, but they are not as important as the private 
interests were in Stanley and Santosky.   
Without question, a state law intended to prevent minor children from 
being exposed to mental abuse promotes a compelling parens patriae 
interest of the state.  The psychological (or trauma) theory of domestic 
violence reveals that it is the internal trauma from which an abuser is 
suffering that causes him/her to abuse others; accordingly, a parent who has 
committed mental abuse in the past presents a real threat of subjecting or 
exposing his or her child to such abuse in the future.566  Moreover, even 
children who merely witness a parent’s mental abuse can suffer very severe 
mental and/or physical injuries, including the failure to develop an 
autonomous personality.567  In contrast, the Court in Santosky pointed out 
the only risk to the children of the court’s failure to terminate their father’s 
custodial rights was that they would be returned to the foster care system 
(not to their possibly abusive father).568  Here, a state possesses yet another 
compelling reason to ensure that young children are not exposed to a 
parent’s mental abuse, which is that the psychological theory of domestic 
violence teaches that such children are more likely to abuse others as adults 
and thereby perpetuate the cycle of domestic violence.569   
As the Court in Santosky noted, a state does not possess a parens 
patriae interest in denying a parent custody of his or her child until the 
state has in fact established that the parent is unfit.570  Still, in this case, in 
determining the level of proof required to prove that a parent has been 
mentally abusive, courts should consider the fact that this type of abuse 
does not leave visible scars and as a result is particularly difficult to prove.  
Finally, in child custody cases, most family courts around the country 
are required to consider any child abuse that a party committed in the 
past,571 and furthermore, most states include “mental abuse” in their 
definition of child abuse.572  States just do not treat mental abuse as 
 
 565. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–49; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646–49. 
 566. JOHNSON 2008, supra note 83, at 8, 26; Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 284.  
 567. See supra text accompanying notes 105–06, 110–15, 172–75, 279–309. 
 568. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70.    
 569. DUTTON, supra note 215.   
 570. Santosky, 405 U.S. at 766–67. 
 571. ABACDV, supra note 351.  
 572. See supra note 448.  
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“domestic violence,”573 probably because approximately one half of the 
states mandate that a finding of past domestic violence triggers the 
rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a party with a history 
of domestic violence.574   
The great majority of family courts around the country have had a fair 
amount of experience reviewing mental abuse claims in child custody 
proceedings, which is helpful for two reasons.  First, this fact would 
decrease a state’s cost of implementing a new definition of domestic 
violence, at least in child custody cases.  More importantly, family courts’ 
long experience in handling mental abuse claims suggests that their rate of 
erroneous findings of past mental abuse should already be low.   
In light of the competing interests described, if a parent were to 
challenge a state law denying his or her child custody rights based on a 
finding of his or her past mental abuse, the U.S. Supreme Court most likely 
would hold that the law must afford any such parent an individualized 
hearing on the issue.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not require a state to hold a 
formal hearing before it infringes a fundamental liberty interest of an 
individual.575  However, it does require a state to provide such an individual 
with some opportunity to be heard and confront the witnesses and evidence 
against him or her.576   
In all likelihood, the Court would hold that the proper standard of proof 
at such a hearing would be a preponderance of the evidence.  Adoption of a 
“clear and convincing” or “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof 
most likely would exclude many meritorious claims and thereby endanger 
the population, but a “substantial evidence” burden of proof certainly 
would not be sufficiently protective of an accused parent’s interests.  There 
is an enormous evidentiary obstacle for a party attempting to prove 
another’s past mental abuse, the great harm a child can suffer at the behest 
of a mental abuser, and the ever-continuing cycle of trauma begetting 
trauma balanced against the extremely valuable liberty interest of a parent 
to enjoy the company of his or her child and raise that child as he or she 
sees fit.  The Court in Santosky held that a “clear and convincing” standard 
was appropriate in that case, but there the interest of the father in avoiding 
the permanent termination of his parental rights was much higher than an 
accused parent in this case.577  Furthermore, there the risk of harm to which 
the children were exposed by the state’s failure to terminate the father’s 
custodial rights was much lower than when a custody court is considering 
 
 573. ABACDV, supra note 351. 
 574. Id. 
 575. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). 
 576. Id. at 264. 
 577. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982). 
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whether to temporarily deny custody of a child to a party on account of that 
party’s past domestic violence.   
This article recommends that all family courts recognize a rebuttable 
presumption against awarding sole or joint custody to a party who has 
committed mental abuse in the past.  However, given that such a 
presumption increases the risk of a family court reaching an erroneous 
finding that a party committed verbal abuse in the past, this article likewise 
recommends that any state which recognizes such a presumption 1) ensure 
that the presumption be rebutted with proof no greater than a 
preponderance of the evidence and 2) specify with particularity the types of 
evidence which could rebut the presumption, either initially or later in a 
modification heading (as some states’ custody  laws already do).  Officials 
in states should be free to decide what evidence they find credible on the 
issue of the parent’s parental fitness, but provision of a clear roadmap 
toward reunification of child and parent, at least over time, would seem to 
greatly reduce the incidence of erroneous abuse findings and thereby fortify 
the statute against constitutional attack.  
Last but not least, a state could further reduce its incidence of 
erroneous abuse findings by providing a clear and comprehensive 
definition of mental abuse in its child custody law.  Such a definition 
should provide that mental abuse (1) is a course of conduct or series of 
events (2) which has no legitimate purpose and (3) which the perpetrator 
knows or should know could traumatize his intended victim and any other 
witness to his abuse in his household.  If a state incorporated such a 
definition of mental abuse into its custody laws, then no one could be 
denied custody of a child “based solely on a few isolated instances of 
unusual conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior.”578  As the court in 
Santosky feared could happen as a result of the statute challenged in that 
case.579  Such a definition would be especially helpful if it included a list of 
specific behaviors, which, if repeated, would constitute mental abuse. 
In the next section of this article, U.S. anti-bullying statutes,580 U.S. 
anti-hazing statutes,581 and the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment582 (CAT) are 
reviewed for any guidance they may be able to provide regarding legal 
proscriptions against mental abuse.  Each of these schemes is similar to a 
 
 578. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)). 
 579. Id. 
 580. See infra text accompanying notes 583–613. 
 581. See infra text accompanying notes 614–35.  
 582. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/39151 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT].  This followed the General Assembly’s 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, Annex, U.N. 
GAOR, 30th Sess., 2433 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975). 
WRIGHT MACRO 4.10 430 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2013  6:05 PM 
Summer 2013] TORTURE AT HOME 551 
proscription against mental abuse in domestic relations because they 
prohibit mental abuse that flourishes on account of the ongoing contact 
between perpetrator and victim, in a particular setting—a school, a social 
organization, or a correctional institution—that society in general 
promotes.   
VIII. REVIEW OF OTHER LEGAL SCHEMES REGULATING 
MENTAL ABUSE 
A. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST BULLYING583 
Montana is the only state that does not have a law targeting school 
bullying,584 and many states enacted anti-bullying legislation within just the 
last few years.585  In May 2010, Massachusetts enacted what its legislators 
claim “is the most comprehensive and best piece of anti-bullying 
legislation in the country.”586  It prohibits bullying on school grounds, 
school buses, or school-sponsored activities.587  It defines “bullying” as: 
 
 583. For a good discussion of several such statutes, see Susan Hanley Kosse, Robert H. 
Wright, How Best to Confront the Bully: Should Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes be the 
Answer?, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 53, 62–69 (2005) [hereinafter Kosse & Wright].      
 584. Dena T. Sacco et al., An Overview of State Anti-Bullying Legislation and Other 
Related Laws, KINDER & BRAVER WORLD PROJECT, 3, n. 2 (Feb. 23, 2012) 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/State_Anti_bullying_Legislati
on_Overview_0.pdf (stating that “[a]s of January  2012, 48 states had enacted legislation 
requiring school districts to adopt policies regarding bullying” and “South Carolina and 
Montana do not have anti-bullying bills as addressed in this document, nor does the District 
of Columbia”) [hereinafter Sacco] (citing, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE 
BULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES XI (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-
bullying-laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf (reporting that, as of April 2011, forty-six states had 
enacted anti-bullying legislation) [hereinafter DOE REPORT]); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 13-
32-14-12-13-32-19 (2012);  Youth Bullying Prevention Act of 2012 , D.C. Act 19-11 
(2012), http://dcclims1. dccouncil.us/images/00001/20120510093523.pdf; see also Sameer 
Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws, Cyberbullying Laws, THE CYBER 
BULLYING RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 2012), http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and 
_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf; Ross Brenneman, Another Good Reason to Stop Bullying: 
Paperwork, Rules for Engagement (Oct. 19, 2012 5:07 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/ed 
week/rulesforengagement/2012/10/bullying_causes_a_lot_of_paperwork_so_please_just_st
op.html?qs=ross+brenneman; Rules for Engagement: A look at school culture & student 
well-being (Oct. 2012) http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/ rulesforengangement/2012/10 
(noting that “[e]very state but Montana has a bullying law of some kind”).          
 585. Jennifer Dounay, State Anti-Bullying Statutes, EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE 
STATES, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/60/41/6041.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) 
(reporting that, by April 2005, only seventeen states and Guam had enacted anti-bullying 
statutes).  
 586. Jessica Van Sack & Joe Dwinell, Senate and House Pass Anti-Bullying Bill, 
BOSTONHERALD.COM, Apr. 29, 2010, http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_politics/ 
2010/05/gov_deval_patrick_signs_anti_bully_bill; Hillary Chabot, Gov. Deval Patrick Signs 
Anti-Bully Bill, BOSTONHERALD.COM, May 4, 2010, http://news.bostonherald.com/news/ 
politics/view.bg?articleid=1252208. 
 587. S. No. 2404, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
legis/bills/senate/186/st02pdf/st02404.pdf.  
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The repeated use by one or more students of a written, verbal or 
electronic expression or a physical act or gesture or any 
combination thereof, directed at a victim that (i) causes physical or 
emotional harm to the victim or damage to the victim’s property; 
(ii) places the victim in reasonable fear of harm to himself or of 
damage to his property; (iii) creates a hostile environment at school 
for the victim; (iv) infringes on the rights of the victim at school; or 
(v) materially and substantially disrupts the education process or 
the orderly operation of a school. . . .  [B]ullying shall include 
cyber-bullying.588 
The legislation requires school employees to report suspected bullying 
to the principal. It requires principals to investigate such reports, convey 
the results of their investigations to the parents of the alleged victim(s) and 
the alleged bull(ies), and take disciplinary action.589  All public and private 
schools are required to offer an anti-bullying curriculum, school officials 
are mandated to obtain special training so they can recognize bullying, and 
students are required to receive education in bullying every year.590  In 
another example of states taking action against bullying, Alabama enacted 
a law in 2009 that makes it illegal for students to “engage in harassment, 
intimidation, violence, or threats of violence on school property, on a 
school bus, or at any school-sponsored function,”591 and it requires each 
school to develop policies designed to encourage students to report such 
behavior.592 
State legislatures have enacted anti-bullying statutes because of the 
serious physical and mental harm that victims of bullying suffer as well as 
the tremendous harm that society suffers on account of bullying.593  The 
various definitions of bullying adopted by state legislatures and boards of 
education also recognize that bullying is characterized by the bully’s intent 
to control the victim.594  These laws give credence to a bully’s desire to 
reduce the victim to a state of severe emotional upset, so that he or she is 
then empowered to inflict even greater harm on, and exert even greater 
control over, the victim.595  In other words, these laws acknowledge that 
bullying is a system of domination that is self-perpetuating, which, like 
 
 588. Mass. S. Res. 2404. 
 589. Id.  
 590. Id. 
 591. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-4 (West 2009).   
 592. Id.   
 593. See, e.g., DOE REPORT, supra note 584, at ix.   
 594. Kosse & Wright, supra note 583, at 54, n.3. 
 595. See, e.g., Mark Dombeck, The Long Term Effects of Bullying, American Academy of 
Experts in Traumatic Stress, aaes.org, 2012, http://www.aaets.org/article204.htm 
[hereinafter Dombeck]; Angela Oswalt, Bullying and Peer Abuse, SEVEN COUNTIES, 
http://www.sevencounties.org/poc/view_doc.php?type=doc&id=38393&cn=1262 
[hereinafter Oswalt]. 
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torture, hazing, and domestic violence, is a form of abuse that erodes the 
victim’s autonomy and ability to resist the bully’s domination over time.596   
While some statutes leave the definition of bullying to the state board 
of education or individual school districts, a number of statutes contain a 
definition of bullying.597  Some anti-bullying laws focus more on the 
bully’s intentions, some focus more on the reasonableness of the 
perpetrator’s actions, some emphasize the effect of the perpetrator’s acts on 
the victim, others, and/or the educational process, and some consider 
multiple factors.598 
Colorado’s anti-bullying statute, for example, emphasizes the bully’s 
intentions.  It provides that bullying is: “any written or verbal expression, 
or physical act or gesture, or a pattern thereof, that is intended to cause 
distress upon one or more students in the school.”599 Similarly, 
Connecticut’s anti-bullying statute focuses on the bully’s intentions and 
defines bullying as: 
[A]ny overt acts by a student or group of students directed against 
another student with the intent to ridicule, humiliate or intimidate 
the other student while on school grounds, at a school-sponsored 
activity or on a school bus, which acts are committed more than 
once against any student during the school year.600 
Washington’s statute emphasizes the effect of the perpetrator’s acts on 
the victim and/or others.  It provides that: 
“Harassment, intimidation, or bullying” means any intentional 
electronic, written, verbal or physical act, including but not limited 
to one shown to be motivated by any characteristic in RCW 
9A.36.080(3), or other distinguishing characteristics, when the 
intentional electronic, written, verbal, or physical act: 
(a) Physically harms a student or damages the student’s property; 
or 
(b) Has the effect of substantially interfering with a student’s 
education; or 
(c) Is so severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an 
intimidating or threating educational environmental; 
 
 596. Dombeck, supra note 595; Oswalt, supra note 595. 
 597. DOE REPORT, supra note 584, at 25.   
 598. Kosse & Wright, supra note 583, at 62–64; Sacco, supra note 584, at 4.  
 599. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(1)(b)(2012). 
 600. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2011). 
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(d) Has the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly operation 
of the school.601 
Likewise, Florida’s anti-bullying statute602 provides that “each school 
district shall adopt a policy prohibiting bullying and harassment”603 and 
shall define these activities “in a manner that is no less inclusive”604 than 
the following definitions:  
(a) ”Bullying” means systematically and chronically inflicting 
physical hurt or psychological distress on one or more students and 
may involve:  
1. Teasing;  
2. Social exclusion;  
3. Threat;  
4. Intimidation; 
5. Stalking;  
6. Physical violence;  
7. Theft;  
8. Sexual, religious, or racial harassment; 
9. Public humiliation; or  
10. Destruction of property.605 
and 
(b) ”Harassment” means any threatening, insulting, or 
dehumanizing gesture, use of data or computer software, or 
written, verbal, or physical conduct directed against a student or 
school employee that:  
1. Places a student or school employee in reasonable fear of harm  
to his or her person or damage to his or her property;  
 
 
 601. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2) (West Supp. 2010).  See also OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 339.351(1) (West Supp. 2009) (Bullying is “any act that substantially 
interferes with a student’s educational benefits, opportunities or performance, that takes 
place on or immediately adjacent to school grounds, at any school-sponsored activity, on 
school-provided transportation or at any official school bus stop, and that has the effect of: 
(a) Physically harming a student or damaging a student’s property; (b) Knowingly placing a 
student in reasonable fear of physical harm to the student or damage to the student’s 
property; or (c) Creating a hostile educational environment.”).  
 602. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2009). 
 603. Id. § 1006.147(4). 
 604. Id. § 1006.147(4)(b). 
 605. Id. § 1006.147(3)(a). 
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2. Has the effect of substantially interfering with a student’s  
education performance, opportunities, or benefits; or  
3. Has the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly operation of 
a school.606 
Finally, Michigan and Louisiana’s anti-bullying laws are good 
examples of statutes that focus on the reasonableness of the perpetrator’s 
actions.  Michigan’s law provides that “[b]ullying means any written, 
verbal, or physical act, or any electronic communication, that is intended or 
that a reasonable person would know is likely to harm 1 [sic] or more 
pupils . . . .”607  Louisiana’s law states that: 
The terms ‘harassment’, ‘intimidation’, and ‘bullying’ shall mean 
any intentional gesture or written, verbal, or physical act that: 
(a) a reasonable person under the circumstances should know will 
have the effect of harming a student or damaging his property or 
placing a student in reasonable fear of harm to his life or person or 
damage to his property; and 
(b) Is so severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an 
intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for a 
student.608  
Significantly, these statutory definitions of “bullying” do not 
distinguish between the bully’s infliction of physical harm and the bully’s 
infliction of mental harm except to suggest that the bully’s main intent is to 
cause the victim mental pain.609  A bully’s infliction or threat of physical 
harm or property damage in order to create emotional upset in his or her 
victim is consistent with the modus operandi of an intimate terrorist or 
torturer.610  The examples of proscribed behaviors provided in the various 
state anti-bullying statutes help provide clarity.  Furthermore, these statutes 
reveal that a bully is able to cause his or her victim mental pain through the 
infliction or threat of physical injury, mental injury, or property damage, or 
a course of conduct that creates a hostile, intimidating environment for the 
victim.611  Of course, it is the ongoing connection between abuser and 
victim that affords the abuser—here, referred to as the bully—the 
 
 606. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147(3)(b).  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West. 
Supp. 2009) (defining “harassment, intimidation or bullying” together).  
 607. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 380.1310b(8)(b) (2011). 
 608. LA. REV. STAT. § 17:416.13. (2012). 
 609. See, e.g., DOE REPORT, supra note 584, at 131–46 (Appendix C); Bullying 
Definitions in State Anti-Bullying Statutes, National School Boards Association (Feb. 
2012), http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Issues/Safety/Definitions.pdf.  
 610.  See supra Section III.A.1–2, and text accompanying notes 83–87, 101–15.   
 611.  Supra note 609.    
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opportunity to perpetuate a hostile, intimidating course of conduct.612  
Finally, these anti-bullying statutes seem to require only a “reckless” or 
“knowing” mens rea.  This aligns with this article’s suggestion that a 
definition of domestic violence should require that a perpetrator possess 
only a “reckless” or “knowing” state of mind, given that most abusers tend 
to deny, minimize, and rationalize their abuse and thereby make it difficult 
for their victims to prove that they possessed the “specific intent” to harm 
them.613  All of these aspects of anti-bullying statutes suggest useful 
components of a psychologically sound definition of domestic violence.  
B. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST HAZING  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “hazing” as “[t]he practice of 
physically or emotionally abusing newcomers to an organization as a 
means of initiation.”614  Hazing is common in a wide variety of 
organizations, including gangs, organized crime syndicates, the military, 
athletic teams, private clubs, and school organizations.615  The essential 
element of hazing is an organization’s control over its individual members, 
in particular its newest recruits.616  That is, “[t]he [hazing] process appears 
to involve [behavior that is] self-destructing and re-constructing rather than 
self-enhancing . . . [,]”617 and the serious harm that this process can cause to 
individual victims as well as society in general has long been recognized.618  
Forty-four states prohibit hazing today,619 typically providing that the 
state can impose a civil fine, criminal sanction, or both on a person who 
 
 612. See, e.g., Randall Collins, The Inflation of Bullying: From Fagging to Cyber-
Effervescent Scapegoating, SOCIOLOGICAL EYE (July 7, 2011), http://sociological-
eye.blogspot.fr/2011/07/inflation-of-bullying-from-fagging-to.html (stating that “[b]ullying 
is not a single event but an ongoing relationship”; see also Brandl et al., supra note 115, at 
40 (noting that, in “UI [Undue Influence], domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault 
cases, . . . [t ]he victim and exploiter are in an on-going relationship”).  
 613. See Johnson 2009, supra note 83, at 424.  
 614. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 736 (8th ed. 2004). 
 615. HANK NUWER, THE HAZING READER passim (2004) (discussing hazing processes in 
various contexts, including college sororities and fraternities, various military organizations, 
and sports teams) [hereinafter NUWER]. 
 616. Id. at 73. 
 617. Id. (citing John van Maanen, Doing New Things in Old Ways: The Chains of 
Socialization, in COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ORGANIZATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 211–47 (J. L. Bess ed., 1984)). 
 618. Julia Fisher, The Pain of Pledging: Hazing, THE CORNELL DAILY SUN, Feb. 4, 2010, 
available at http://cornellsun.com/node/40541 (reviewing numerous examples of hazing 
from as long ago as the 1800s and documenting the enormous emotional and physical injury 
suffered by hazing victims).    
 619. Education Commission of the States, State Anti-Hazing Laws, 
http://www.ecs.org/html/document.asp?chouseid=4483 (last visited May 20, 2010) (citing 
StopHazing.org, State Anti-Hazing Laws, http://www.stophazing.org/laws.html (last visited 
May 10, 2010) (compiling the forty-four state anti-hazing statutes)); see also Kappa Alpha 
Psi, Hazing Laws, http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.kappaalphapsi1911.com/resource/resmgr/ 
docs/state_hazing_laws.pdf (last visited Jan 2013).  
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participates in a hazing event.620  In addition, some states permit a hazing 
victim to recover civil damages from a responsible party.621  A few states’ 
anti-hazing statutes encompass all group initiation or pre-initiation 
activities, but most anti-hazing statutes are specifically directed at school 
groups.622 
Only fifteen of the forty-four state anti-hazing statutes in effect limit 
their definition of hazing to conduct that endangers a person’s physical 
health.623  The remaining twenty-nine statutes either define hazing to 
include conduct that endangers another person’s physical or mental health, 
or include in their definition of hazing specific activities that could only 
endanger a person’s mental health; these activities include forcing a person 
to appear in public partially or totally nude, carry pornographic materials in 
public, or commit a crime.624 
Most of the anti-hazing statutes stipulate that the mens rea required for 
a finding of hazing is recklessness,625 prohibiting willful or reckless hazing.  
A few statutes proscribe willful or knowing hazing, and a few statutes 
prohibit willful, knowing, or reckless hazing.626  Though some of these 
statutes may not contain a definition of these mental states, in a legal 
context, willful conduct is generally defined as conduct that “proceed[s] 
from a conscious motion of will . . .”627  On the other hand, “[a]n individual 
acts ‘knowingly’ when he acts with awareness of the nature of his 
conduct,”628 and he acts recklessly when he “does not desire harmful 
consequence but . . . foresees the possibility and consciously takes the 
 
 620. Id. 
 621. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 245.6(e) (2008). 
 622. Id. § 245.6(b)  For example, Section 245.6 of the Penal Code of California (otherwise 
known as “‘Matt’s Law’ in memory of Matthew William Carrington, who died on February 
2, 2005, as a result of hazing”) defines hazing as: “[A]ny method of initiation or 
preinitiation into a student organization or student body, whether or not the organization or 
body is officially recognized by an educational institution, which is likely to cause serious 
bodily injury to any former, current, or prospective student of any school, community 
college, college, university, or other educational institution in this state.  The term ‘hazing’ 
does not include customary athletic events or school-sanctioned events.” 
 623. See sources cited in supra note 619 (revealing that the anti-hazing statutes of only the 
following states are so limited: California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 624. See sources cited, supra note 619 (illustrating that the definition of hazing in 
Michigan’s anti-hazing statute includes forcing another person to commit a crime and the 
definition of hazing in Idaho and Oregon’s anti-hazing statutes includes forcing an 
individual to appear in public partially or totally nude, forcing an individual to carry 
pornographic materials in public, transporting and abandoning an individual, assigning an 
individual to commit pranks on others, and (in Oregon) compelling a person to act as one’s 
personal slave). 
 625. See supra note 619. 
 626. Id. 
 627. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1991). 
 628. Id. at 872. 
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risk”629 or “does not care about the consequences of his or her actions.”630  
Finally, none of the anti-hazing statutes provides that a victim’s consent 
constitutes a defense to hazing, and thirteen of these statutes specifically 
state that a victim’s consent does not provide a defense to hazing.631 
For example, Massachusetts defines hazing as: 
[A]ny conduct or method of initiation into any student 
organization, whether on public or private property, which 
willfully or recklessly endangers the physical or mental health of 
any student or other person.  Such conduct shall include whipping, 
beating, branding, forced calisthenics, exposure to the weather, 
forced consumption of any food, liquor, beverage, drug, or other 
substance, or any other brutal treatment or forced physical activity 
which is likely to adversely affect the physical health or safety of 
any such student or other person, or which subjects such student or 
other person to extreme mental stress, including extended 
deprivation of sleep or rest or extended isolation.632 
Similarly, Texas provides that hazing means:  
[A]ny intentional, knowing, or reckless act occurring on or off the 
campus of an educational institution, by one person alone or acting 
with others, directed against a student, that endangers the mental or 
physical health or safety of a student for the purpose of pledging, 
being initiated into, affiliating with, holding office in, or 
maintaining membership in any organization.  The term includes: 
(A) any type of physical brutality, such as whipping, beating, 
striking, branding, electronic shocking, placing of a harmful 
substance on the body, or similar activity; 
(B) any type of physical activity, such as sleep deprivation, 
exposure to the elements, confinement in a small space, 
calisthenics, or other activity that subjects the student to an 
unreasonable risk of harm or that adversely affects the mental or 
physical health or safety of the student;  
(C) any activity involving consumption of a food, liquid, alcoholic 
beverage, liquor, drug, or other substance that subjects the student 
to an unreasonable risk of harm or that adversely affects the mental 
or physical health or safety of the student; 
(D) any activity that intimidates or threatens the student with 
ostracism, that subjects the student to extreme mental stress, 
 
 629. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (8th ed. 2004). 
 630. Id. at 1299. 
 631. See supra note 619. 
 632. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 17 (2008). 
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shame, or humiliation, that adversely affects the mental health or 
dignity of the student or discourages the student from entering or 
remaining registered in an educational institution, or that may 
reasonably be expected to cause a student to leave the organization 
or the institution rather than submit to acts described in this 
subdivision; and  
(E) any activity that induces, causes, or requires the student to 
perform a duty or task that involves a violation of the Penal 
Code.633 
The most important implication of the anti-hazing statutes with regard 
to states’ legal regulation of domestic violence is that most state 
legislatures have concluded that controlling another human by breaking his 
or her independent will or spirit (the essential element of hazing) can be 
effected either by endangering a person’s physical health or by endangering 
his or her mental health.  As an intimate terrorist’s goal is likewise to 
completely control his victim,634 the state anti-hazing statutes provide 
strong support for the adoption of a definition of domestic violence that 
encompasses both physical harm and mental harm.  The mens rea of 
recklessness incorporated into most hazing definitions suggests that the 
same mens rea should be included in a definition of domestic violence.  
This is the case because perpetrators of both hazing and domestic violence 
endanger their victims’ physical and mental harm, not for the purpose of 
harming their victims, but for the purpose of controlling them.  Given this, 
in many cases a prosecutor could find it very difficult to establish that a 
perpetrator of hazing or domestic violence willfully or knowingly 
endangered his victim’s physical or mental health.  Nonetheless, as a 
perpetrator’s actions endanger his victim’s physical or mental health, the 
perpetrator should be held accountable for his actions.   
The fact that several anti-hazing statutes explicitly provide that a 
victim’s consent cannot constitute a defense to hazing has important 
ramifications in the domestic violence context.  A number of courts and 
legislatures have considered the effect of an autonomous adult’s consent to 
hazing, and they have consistently concluded that “[c]onsent . . . certainly 
should not be a bar to prosecution; intelligent consent cannot be a defense 
when the public conscience and morals are shocked.”635  Such courts and 
 
 633. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.151 (Vernon 2006). 
 634. See supra text accompanying notes 85–87, 101. 
 635. People v. Lenti, 260 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287 (N.Y. County Ct. 1965); see also Vera 
Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 165, 179 (discussing how the Model Penal Code § 2.11(2)(b) “recognize[s] consent as 
a defense for the harmful conduct of the perpetrator and bodily injuries of the victim only 
when those harms were ‘reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful 
athletic contest or competitive sport  . . . or other concerted activity not forbidden by law’” 
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legislatures have reasoned that if a state considers endangering another 
person’s physical or mental health to be immoral and therefore proscribes 
such conduct in its criminal law, the fact that a person has consented to be 
the victim of such conduct does not alter the immoral, and hence criminal, 
nature of the perpetrator’s act.636 
Similarly, a domestic violence victim’s choice to remain in a 
relationship with his or her abuser should not constitute consent to abuse, 
and, in any case, a victim’s consent to abuse should not vitiate or mitigate 
the perpetrator’s abuse of the victim.  As discussed above, an adult victim 
may wish to maintain a relationship or home with an abuser for many 
reasons unrelated to a desire to be abused.  In addition, a minor who is 
being abused by an adult in his or her household or who is forced to 
witness another person’s abuse is typically unable to leave home and 
support himself or herself and thereby avoid exposure the perpetrator’s 
abuse.  Moreover, endangering the physical or mental health of a family 
member certainly is as morally offensive as hazing.  For all of these 
reasons, a definition of domestic violence should likewise include the 
proviso that the appearance of consent by an adult or child victim is 
irrelevant.   
Finally, the examples of hazing provided in the various anti-hazing 
statutes, such as those quoted above, help provide parameters for the 
nebulous crime of hazing.  This article suggests that the provision of 
similar examples in a definition of domestic violence would help clarify the 
often intangible, but nonetheless horrific, crime of domestic violence.   
C. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND 
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT  
Whether in a “humanitarian” (international conflict) context or a 
“human rights” (peacetime) context, the “prohibition against torture” is a 
peremptory norm of international law and has acquired the status of jus 
cogens.637  Such a principle is “accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
 
and stating that “[i]t is likely, although not specifically provided, that other harmful, hostile 
activities, such as hazing, are . . . not covered by . . . [this provision]”). 
 636. Lenti, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 287.  Some hazing experts have noted that the very nature of 
hazing is that its victims are subject to the arbitrary whim of the perpetrator(s) and are 
deprived of meaningful advance knowledge of, or control over, the details of their hazing.  
NUWER, supra note 615, at 95.  This would suggest that many hazing victims could not 
provide informed consent to their hazing in any case.  However, as People v. Lenti makes 
clear, a victim’s consent to hazing is irrelevant regardless of whether such consent is both 
voluntary and informed. 
 637. Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under 
International Law: The Office Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 9, 17 
(2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
§§ 102, 702 (1987)) [hereinafter Rouillard].  
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derogation is permitted[.]”638  For example, even “[a] treaty is void if, at the 
time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law.”639  It is debatable whether the prohibition against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment likewise is a jus cogens 
principle,640 but it certainly constitutes customary international law and is 
reflected in numerous international treaties.641  In 1984, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the binding CAT,642 and, as of 
November 19, 2012, 153 nations were parties to the treaty.643  The United 
States signed the CAT on April 18, 1987,644 the Senate approved the treaty 
on April 30, 1994,645 subject to certain rules, understandings, and 
declarations646 and the U.S. Congress officially ratified the treaty on 
 
 638. Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the 
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 742 n.6 (2003) (quoting Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]).  
 639. Vienna Convention, supra note 638. 
 640. Rouillard, supra note 637, at 22. 
 641. THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 598–99 (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).  “Customary international law results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987).  
“Thus, for customary law the ‘best evidence’ is the proof of state practice, ordinarily by 
reference to official documents and other indications of governmental action.”  Id. § 103 
cmt. a. 
 642. CAT, supra note 582.   
 643. Id.  
 644. Id. 
 645. Pub. L. 103-236, 506(a), 103rd Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 30, 1994).  
 646. U.S. reservations, declarations, understandings, Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily 
ed., Oct. 27, 1990).  These reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs) primarily 
concern the U.S.’ understanding that the definition of “mental torture” in the CAT includes 
only “specifically intended . . . prolonged mental harm caused or resulting from (1) the 
intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain and suffering; (2) the 
administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering 
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the 
personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will 
imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or 
application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly 
the senses or personality.”  Id. at II.(1)(a).  The definition of “torture” in the Torture 
Prevention Act of 1991, which provides a civil remedy against torture committed by a 
foreigner on foreign soil, contains the same narrow definition of “mental pain or suffering.”  
Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, at § 3 (1992).  Furthermore, in its RUDs to its ratification of 
the CAT, the U.S. limited its obligation to prevent other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in territories under its control “only insofar as the term ‘cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel, unusual and inhumane 
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States.”  Id. at I(1).  As conduct does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee of due process of law unless it “shocks the conscience,” Rochin v. 
Cal., 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (forced pumping of suspect’s stomach contents in order to 
find drugs is unconstitutional because it “shocks the conscience”), it is unlikely that the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the near future would consider mental torture that does not stem from a 
threat of physical harm or the administration of mind-altering drugs to constitute cruel, 
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October 21, 1994,647 subject to those rules, understandings, and 
declarations.   
The CAT supplemented rather than supplanted customary, nonwritten 
international law prohibitions against torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, and the preamble to the CAT 
references earlier treaty provisions prohibiting torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,648 including Article 55 of 
the U.N. Charter,649 Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,650 and Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.651   
The CAT defines “torture” as: 
[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.  It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions.652 
The CAT’s definition of “torture” greatly assists in the effort to 
develop a workable definition of domestic violence.  First, the definition 
makes no distinction whatsoever between the significance of severe mental 
pain and suffering and physical pain and suffering.  If a government agent’s 
intentional infliction of severe mental pain and suffering on a person can 
constitute “torture,” so too should a person’s intentional infliction of severe 
mental pain and suffering on someone with whom he or she is in a 
domestic relationship constitute “domestic violence.”  Second, this 
 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  While the U.S.’s RUDs to the CAT are 
important to note, the great majority of nations did not condition their ratification of the 
CAT on such a narrow interpretation of “severe [mental] pain and suffering” or otherwise 
limit the scope of the mental pain and suffering encompassed in the definition of  “torture” 
in the CAT.  See CAT, supra note 582.  
 647. U.N. Treaty Collection, CAT, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en.  
 648. CAT, supra note 582, at pmbl. ¶¶ 3–5. 
 649. U.N. Charter, art. 55, 59 Stat. 1031, 1045 (1945).  
 650. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), Annex, art. 5, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 651. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 
Annex, art. 7, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 
1966). 
 652. CAT, supra note 582, at art. 1. 
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definition acknowledges that an abusive government official engages in or 
acquiesces in acts of torture in order to coerce, intimidate or discriminate 
against a victim.  This motivation, of course, is very similar to an intimate 
terrorist’s (often unconscious) motivation to intimidate and control his or 
her victim.  Finally, the CAT states that “[n]o exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency may be invoked as a justification 
of torture.”653  This unequivocal statement clarifies that no excuse or 
justification can exonerate torture, just as society can countenance no 
justification or excuse for domestic violence.   
Given the “invisible” nature of domestic violence, especially mental 
abuse, and that perpetrators of domestic violence, especially intimate 
terrorists, often deny, minimize and/or justify their violence, the “specific 
intent” aspect of the torture definition contained in the CAT should not be 
included in a definition of domestic violence.  It is unrealistic to expect a 
victim of domestic violence to prove that the perpetrator intentionally 
inflicted harm on the victim or specifically engaged in domestic violence in 
order to intimidate or control the victim.  In addition, perpetrators of 
situational couple violence do not appear to engage in domestic violence in 
order to exert power and control over their victims.654  Therefore, requiring 
a knowing or reckless state of mind would better comport with the nature 
of domestic violence.   
IX. PROPOSED DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
In this section, a more psychologically sound definition of domestic 
violence is proposed, and states are urged to adopt this or a similar 
definition of domestic violence, at least for use in child custody cases.  This 
definition reflects both situational couple violence and intimate terrorism, 
and accordingly includes mental abuse as well as physical abuse.  It 
furthermore incorporates protections for individuals’ privacy, free speech, 
and parental rights under the U.S. Constitution, including those suggested 
by similar legal prohibitions against mental abuse.  The definition that this 
article proposes states adopt, at least for child custody purposes, is the 
following:  
“Domestic violence” is defined as: 
Any act(s) or communication(s) (whether delivered orally, in 
writing, electronically, or via body language) which a perpetrator 
directs at a protected person or a third person known by a protected 
person and which has/have no legitimate purpose as a result of 
which the perpetrator (1) willfully, knowingly, or recklessly 
 
 653. CAT, supra note 582, at art. 2. 
 654. See supra text accompanying notes 91–92. 
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endangers the physical or mental health of that protected person or 
third person; or (2)  causes that protected person or third person to 
suffer (a) non-consensual or underage sexual contact; (b) property 
damage; or (c)  financial harm. Constitutionally-protected activity 
is exempt from this definition.   
 
The mental health of a person is endangered not by any single act 
but by a course of conduct that a reasonable person would believe 
creates an intimidating, hostile, or degrading atmosphere for a 
target of that course of conduct.  By way of example but not 
limitation, such conduct may consist of a series of any of the 
following: name-calling, insulting, demeaning, glaring, countering, 
criticizing, and isolating. “Countering” refers to the practice of 
automatically disagreeing with any and all statements which a 
person makes. A court shall base a finding that a person’s mental 
health has been or is endangered on the basis of a preponderance of 
the evidence.   
Neither an excuse offered by a perpetrator of domestic violence nor 
a protected person or third person’s consent shall diminish the 
culpability of, or the severity of punishment imposed on, the 
perpetrator. 
“Financial harm” is defined as “the use of a person’s financial 
assets or exposure of a person to financial liability, without the 
consent of that person.”  A “protected person” is defined as . . . 
[state’s definition]. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The great majority of U.S. states do not include mental abuse in their 
definitions of domestic violence, even though mental abuse is the sine qua 
non of intimate terrorism, the most dangerous and pervasive form of 
domestic violence.  Based on a comprehensive review of the psychological 
theory of domestic violence and numerous laws outlawing bullying, hazing, 
and torture, this article proposes a new, psychologically sound definition of 
domestic violence which encompasses mental abuse and at the same time 
provides protections against infringements of individuals’ privacy, free 
speech, and parental rights.  The legal regimes proscribing bullying, 
hazing, and torture were reviewed because the psychological literature 
reveals that it is the perpetrator’s ongoing contact with the victim which 
permits the former to mentally abuse the latter in each of these situations, 
which also is the case with domestic violence.   
This article concludes that there is every reason for U.S. states to 
include mental abuse in their definitions of domestic violence and no 
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reason for them not to do so.  In fact, it concludes that the states’ failure to 
treat mental abuse as domestic violence is greatly facilitating the 
perpetuation of domestic violence in U.S. society, as each generation is 
permitted to suffer emotional trauma at the hands of family members and 
intimate partners and then inflict similar trauma on the next generation.  If 
states fail to include mental abuse in their definitions of domestic violence, 
they are severely limiting the ability of the U.S. legal system to prevent and 
sanction domestic violence.  While the definition of domestic violence 
undoubtedly will continue to evolve, it is hoped that the definition of 
domestic violence proposed in this article will help combat the epidemic of 
domestic violence in this country.   
